Dr. Rice：
I thank the Commission for arranging this special session. Thank you for helping to find a way to meet the Nation's need to learn all we can about the September 11th attacks， while preserving important Constitutional principles.
This Commission， and those who appear before it， have a vital charge. We owe it to those we lost， and to their loved ones， and to our country， to learn all we can about that tragic day， and the events that led to it. Many families of the victims are here today， and I thank them for their contributions to the Commission's work.
The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on September 11th， 2001. Long before that day， radical， freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983， the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985， the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993， the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996， the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998， the attack on the USS Cole in 2000， these and other atrocities were part of a sustained， systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans.
The terrorists were at war with us， but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years， the terrorist threat gathered， and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically， democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats， tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American shipping， the United States did not enter the First World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany's repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of provocations throughout the mid-1930s， the Western democracies did not take action until 1939. The U.S. Government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And， tragically， for all the language of war spoken before September 11th， this country simply was not on a war footing.
Since then， America has been at war. And under President Bush's leadership， we will remain at war until the terrorist threat to our Nation is ended. The world has changed so much that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration was taking to fight terrorism before September 11th， 2001.
After President Bush was elected， we were briefed by the Clinton Administration on many national security issues during the transition. The President-elect and I were briefed by George Tenet on terrorism and on the al-Qaida network. Members of Sandy Berger's NSC staff briefed me， along with other members of the new national security team， on counterterrorism and al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour， and it reviewed the Clinton Administration's counterterrorism approach and the various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy and I personally discussed a variety of other topics， including North Korea， Iraq， the Middle East， and the Balkans.
Because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of al-Qaida over the years， we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to ensure there was no respite in the fight against al-Qaida. On an operational level， we decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence， and Louis Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the unusual step of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration's counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an expert in his field， as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we developed new and more aggressive policies.
At the beginning of the Administration， President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office -？ meetings which I attended， along with the Vice President and the Chief of Staff. At these meetings， the President received up-to-date intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials. From January 20 through September 10， the President received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida， and 13 of these were in response to questions he or his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet almost every morning， I generally spoke by telephone every morning at 7：15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and terrorism.
Of course， we also had other responsibilities. President Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We were improving America's relations with the world's great powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. planes enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had to deal with the occasional crisis， for instance， when the crew of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.
We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush understood the threat， and he understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was “tired of swatting flies.”
This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer of 2001， and was approved by the President's senior national security officials on September 4. It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush Administration -？ not Russia， not missile defense， not Iraq， but the elimination of al-Qaida.
Although this National Security Presidential Directive was originally a highly classified document， we arranged for portions to be declassified to help the Commission in its work， and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of al-Qaida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -？ intelligence， financial， diplomatic， and military ？- to meet this goal. And it gave Cabinet Secretaries and department heads specific responsibilities. For instance：
* It directed the Secretary of State to work with other countries to end all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida.
* It directed the Secretaries of the Treasury and State to work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of al-Qaida and its benefactors.
* It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups operating against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
* It tasked the Director of OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds were available in the budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.
* And it directed the Secretary of Defense to -？ and I quote ？- “ensure that the contingency planning process include plans： against al-Qaida and associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan， including leadership， command-control-communications， training， and logistics facilities； against Taliban targets in Afghanistan， including leadership， command-control， air and air defense， ground forces， and logistics； to eliminate weapons of mass destruction which al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups may acquire or manufacture， including those stored in underground bunkers.” This was a change from the prior strategy —— Presidential Decision Directive 62， signed in 1998 -？ which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S. for trial， to protect DOD forces overseas， and to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass destruction incidents.
More importantly， we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission， our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.
Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban， which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of protection， and we had to sever them. This was not easy.
Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office， President Bush sent a strong， private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis， including Musharraf himself， to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message， which was met with a rote， expressionless response.
America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working. We recognized that America's counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.
To address these problems， I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad， an expert on Afghanistan who， as a senior diplomat in the 1980s， had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen， helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia， as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together， we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance， we emphasized the importance of the south -？ the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India， to preserve stability on the subcontinent.
While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida， we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last Administration， and some had been on the table since 1998. We increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan； we bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets； we increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies； and we moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida.
When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001， we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that summer. Policy development and crisis management require different approaches. Throughout this period， we did both simultaneously.
For the essential crisis management task， we depended on the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from CIA， the FBI， the Department of Justice， the Defense Department （including the Joint Chiefs）， the State Department， and the Secret Service. The CSG had met regularly for many years， and its members had worked through numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat information increased， the CSG met more frequently， sometimes daily， to review and analyze the threat reporting and to coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest levels.
The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time， nor place， nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States， especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact， the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often， it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer：
* “Unbelievable news in coming weeks” * “Big event …… there will be a very， very， very， very big uproar” * “There will be attacks in the near future”
Troubling， yes. But they don't tell us when； they don't tell us where； they don't tell us who； and they don't tell us how.
In this context， I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received， since its content has frequently been mischaracterized. On August 6， 2001， the President's intelligence briefing included a response to questions he had earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our homeland. The briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting， mostly dating from the 1990s， regarding possible al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information. And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we received was focused overseas， I was also concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On July 5， Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke， and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond， even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland. Later that same day， Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG， as well as representatives from the FAA， the INS， Customs， and the Coast Guard. At that meeting， these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.
Throughout this period of heightened threat information， we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect， protect against， and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack. For instance：
* The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack， and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.
* The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats， enhanced security measures at certain embassies， and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.
* The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to Federal， State， and local law enforcement agencies， and specifically stated that， although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets， attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. Field Offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.
* The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel， including specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.
* The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 countries.
* During this period， the Vice President， DCI Tenet， and the NSC's Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign officials requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.
This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001.
Yet， as your hearings have shown， there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight， if anything might have helped stop 9/11， it would have been better information about threats inside the United States， something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to decapitate our government， destroy our financial system， and break the spirit of America. As an officer of government on duty that day， I will never forget the sorrow and the anger I felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the American people and the leadership of the President that day.
Now， we have an opportunity and an obligation to move forward together. Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes only possible in the wake of catastrophic events -？ events which create a new consensus that allows us to transcend old ways of thinking and acting. Just as World War II led to a fundamental reorganization of our national defense structure and to the creation of the National Security Council， so has September 11th made possible sweeping changes in the ways we protect our homeland.
President Bush is leading the country during this time of crisis and change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts to secure the American Homeland by creating the Department of Homeland Security， established a new center to integrate and analyze terrorist threat information， directed the transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror， broken down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers that prevented the sharing of vital threat information between our domestic law enforcement and our foreign intelligence agencies， and， working with the Congress， given officials new tools， such as the USA PATRIOT Act， to find and stop terrorists. And he has done all of this in a way that is consistent with protecting America's cherished civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free and open society.
But the President also recognizes that our work is far from complete. More structural reform will likely be necessary. Our intelligence gathering and analysis have improved dramatically in the last two years， but they must be stronger still. The President and all of us in his Administration welcome new ideas and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to protect the American people. And we look forward to receiving the recommendations of this Commission.
We are at war and our security as a nation depends on winning that war. We must and we will do everything we can to harden terrorist targets within the United States. Dedicated law enforcement and security professionals continue to risk their lives every day to make us all safer， and we owe them a debt of gratitude. And， let's remember， those charged with protecting us from attack have to succeed 100 percent of the time. To inflict devastation on a massive scale， the terrorists only have to succeed once， and we know they are trying every day.
That is why we must address the source of the problem. We must stay on offense， to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live， hide， and plot around the world. If we learned anything on September 11th， 2001， it is that we cannot wait while dangers gather.
After the September 11th attacks， our Nation faced hard choices. We could fight a narrow war against al-Qaida and the Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.
He recognizes that the War on Terror is a broad war. Under his leadership， the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations， cutting off their funding， and hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now pursue them with energy and force.
We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of mass destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly weapons and prevent then from getting into the hands of terrorists， seizing dangerous materials in transit， where necessary. Because we acted in Iraq， Saddam Hussein will never again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and materials.
And as we attack the threat at its sources， we are also addressing its roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our men and women in uniform， we removed from power two of the world's most brutal regimes —— sources of violence， and fear， and instability in the region. Today， along with many allies， we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle East to spread the blessings of liberty and democracy as the alternatives to instability， hatred， and terror. This work is hard and dangerous， yet it is worthy of our effort and our sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East.
In the aftermath of September 11th， those were the right choices for America to make —— the only choices that can ensure the safety of our Nation in the decades to come.
Thank you. Now I am happy to answer your questions.
賴斯：
我感謝調(diào)查委員會(huì)安排這次特別會(huì)議。感謝你們在維護(hù)重要的憲法原則的同時(shí)，努力幫助找到一種方式，滿足我們國家要盡可能了解有關(guān)9.11襲擊事件情況的需要。
貴委員會(huì)以及到委員會(huì)作證的人，都有一項(xiàng)重要使命。為了遇難者和他們的親人，為了我們的國家，我們必須了解有關(guān)那個(gè)悲慘的日子和導(dǎo)致它的種種事件的所有情況。今天有很多遇難者家屬在座，我感謝他們?yōu)槲瘑T會(huì)的工作做出的貢獻(xiàn)。
對我國的恐怖主義威脅并非在2001年9月11日才出現(xiàn)。早在這之前，仇恨自由的極端恐怖主義分子就已對美國和文明世界宣戰(zhàn)。1983年駐黎巴嫩的海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)營房被炸，1985年“阿奇里·勞羅”（Achille Lauro）號游輪被劫持，“基地”組織的興起和1993年的世貿(mào)中心爆炸案，1995年和1996年對美國在沙特阿拉伯的軍事設(shè)施的襲擊，1998年美國駐東非地區(qū)的大使館被炸，以及2000年對美國“科爾”號軍艦（USS Cole）的攻擊，所有這些以及其他種種暴行，都是四處制造破壞和混亂及謀害無辜美國人的持續(xù)和蓄意行動(dòng)的一部份。
恐怖主義分子已經(jīng)對我們開戰(zhàn)，但我們當(dāng)時(shí)還沒有對他們宣戰(zhàn)。在20多年中，恐怖主義威脅日益嚴(yán)重，但美國兩黨數(shù)屆政府都沒有做出充份的反應(yīng)?？v觀歷史，民主社會(huì)面對日益嚴(yán)重的威脅一向反應(yīng)遲緩，往往等到危險(xiǎn)發(fā)展到不容忽視的程度或者已經(jīng)為時(shí)太晚才采取措施。盡管“盧西塔尼亞”號（Lusitania）游輪于 1915年被擊沉，而且德國不斷騷擾美國航運(yùn)，但美國直到兩年以后才參加第世界大戰(zhàn)。盡管納粹德國屢次違反凡爾賽和約（Versailles Treaty）并在1930年代中期做出了一系列挑釁行徑，但西方民主國家直到1939年才采取行動(dòng)。美國政府一直沒有對日本帝國所構(gòu)成的日益嚴(yán)重的威脅做出反應(yīng)，直到這種威脅赤**地降臨珍珠港。而且，令人痛心的是，盡管“9.11”之前有種種戰(zhàn)爭言論，但這個(gè)國家根本沒有立足戰(zhàn)爭。
但從那以后，美國一直處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)。在布什總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，我們將持續(xù)作戰(zhàn)，直到消除我國受到的恐怖主義威脅。世界的變化如此巨大，以致我們很難回想起在那個(gè)日子以前的生活情景。但我確實(shí)想介紹一下本屆政府在2001年9月11日以前為抗擊恐怖主義所采取的行動(dòng)。
在布什總統(tǒng)當(dāng)選后，克林頓政府在交接階段向我們通報(bào)了很多國家安全方面的事宜。喬治·特尼特（George Tenet）向候任總統(tǒng)和我介紹了有關(guān)恐怖主義和“基地”組織網(wǎng)的情況。桑迪·伯杰（Sandy Berger）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國家安全委員會(huì)成員向我和新的國家安全事務(wù)班子的其他成員通報(bào)了有關(guān)反恐怖主義和“基地”組織的情況。這次通報(bào)會(huì)持續(xù)了一個(gè)小時(shí)左右，會(huì)議回顧了克林頓政府的反恐怖主義政策和當(dāng)時(shí)正在進(jìn)行的各種反恐怖主義活動(dòng)。桑迪和我面對面地討論了多項(xiàng)其他議題，包括北韓、伊拉克、中東和巴爾干。
由于聽取了這些匯報(bào)，也由于我們多年來一直關(guān)注 “基地”組織的發(fā)展，我們明白這個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)對美國構(gòu)成嚴(yán)重威脅。我們要確保繼續(xù)打擊“基地”組織，不給它任何喘息的機(jī)會(huì)。在行動(dòng)方面，我們即刻決定延續(xù)克林頓政府對秘密行動(dòng)的授權(quán)并繼續(xù)進(jìn)行其他打擊該網(wǎng)絡(luò)的努力。布什總統(tǒng)讓喬治·特尼特繼續(xù)擔(dān)任中央情報(bào)局（CIA）局長，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局（FBI）局長路易斯·弗里 （Louis Freeh）也繼續(xù)留任。我也特例留用了迪克·克拉克（Dick Clarke）和克林頓政府反恐怖主義班子的全體成員，讓他們繼續(xù)在國家安全委員會(huì)任職。我知道迪克是這方面的專家，而且在處理危機(jī)方面經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富。我們的宗旨是在制定新的、更積極的政策的同時(shí)，確保有關(guān)行動(dòng)繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。
本屆政府就任伊始，布什總統(tǒng)恢復(fù)了幾乎每天都在橢圓形辦公室聽取中央情報(bào)局局長匯報(bào)的慣例──我本人、副總統(tǒng)和白宮辦公室主任都參加了這些會(huì)議。在這些會(huì)議上，總統(tǒng)得到新的情報(bào)，向政府高情報(bào)官員提出問題。從1月20日到9月10日，總統(tǒng)在這些例會(huì)上聽取了40多項(xiàng)有關(guān)“基地”組織的匯報(bào)，其中13項(xiàng)是對他或他的高級顧問提問的回答。除了幾乎每天上午都同中央情報(bào)局局長特尼特會(huì)晤以外，我?guī)缀趺刻煸缟?時(shí)15分都同國務(wù)卿鮑威爾和國防部長拉姆斯菲爾德通電話。我還就“基地”組織和恐怖主義問題定期同中央情報(bào)局局長會(huì)晤和通話。
當(dāng)然，我們還有其他職責(zé)。布什總統(tǒng)制定了內(nèi)容廣泛的對外政策議程。我們決心制止大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的擴(kuò)散。我們當(dāng)時(shí)正在改善美國同其他世界大國的關(guān)系。我們不得不改變對伊拉克的政策，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)政策對遏制這個(gè)敵對政權(quán)──它頻頻向執(zhí)行聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)決議的美國飛機(jī)開火──絲毫沒有見效。我們還必須處理偶發(fā)性危機(jī)，例如海軍飛機(jī)機(jī)組人員被中國扣留11天的事件。
我們也采取行動(dòng)，為取締“基地”恐怖主義組織網(wǎng)制訂新的全面戰(zhàn)略。布什總統(tǒng)了解這一威脅，了解這一威脅的嚴(yán)重性。他向我們明確表示，他不愿逐一逐次地回應(yīng)“基地”組織的襲擊。他對我說，他“厭倦了打蒼蠅”。
這項(xiàng)新戰(zhàn)略是在2001年春夏時(shí)期制訂的，于9月4日得到總統(tǒng)國家安全高級官員的通過。它是布什政府制訂的第一項(xiàng)重大安全政策指示──針對的不是俄羅斯、不是導(dǎo)彈防御、不是伊拉克，而是鏟除“基地”組織。
雖然這項(xiàng)《國家安全總統(tǒng)令》（National Security Presidential Directive）原本是一份高度機(jī)密文件，但我們設(shè)法將其中一部份解密，以便于9.11調(diào)查委員會(huì)的工作。我今天將對部份文件進(jìn)行說明。這項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略將鏟除“基地”組織網(wǎng)定為目標(biāo)。它命令美國各相關(guān)部、局把鏟除“基地”組織作為一項(xiàng)重要任務(wù)，并動(dòng)用我國各方面國力──情報(bào)、金融、外交和軍事──來實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。它給內(nèi)閣級部長和其他各不部長規(guī)定了具體職責(zé)。例如：
。它指示國務(wù)卿同其他國家一道努力，終止對“基地”組織的一切庇護(hù)。
。它指示財(cái)政部長和國務(wù)卿與外國政府一道努力，截獲或凍結(jié)“基地”組織及其贊助者的資產(chǎn)和不動(dòng)產(chǎn)。
。它指示中央情報(bào)局局長制訂一套積極的秘密行動(dòng)計(jì)劃，干擾“基地”組織并為在阿富汗的反塔利班組織的行動(dòng)提供援助。
。它責(zé)成白宮行政管理和預(yù)算局（OMB）主任確保在今后5年內(nèi)，有充足的經(jīng)費(fèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略方案提出的目標(biāo)。
。它指示國防部長──我引述原文──“確保應(yīng)急計(jì)劃包含以下方案：打擊'基地'組織及其在阿富汗的相關(guān)恐怖分子設(shè)施，包括領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層、指揮控制通訊、培訓(xùn)和后勤設(shè)施；打擊阿富汗境內(nèi)的塔利班目標(biāo)，包括領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層、指揮控制、空軍防空、地面部隊(duì)及后勤；消除'基地'組織和有關(guān)的恐怖主義組織可能獲得或生產(chǎn)的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器，包括儲(chǔ)藏在地下工事中的武器。” 這是對此前戰(zhàn)略的改變──1998年簽署的《第62號總統(tǒng)決策令》（Presidential Decision Directive 62）指示國防部長提供交通工具，將恐怖主義分子送交美國接受審判；保護(hù)國防部駐外部隊(duì)；為反擊恐怖主義分子和大規(guī)模毀滅性武器事件做好準(zhǔn)備。
更重要的是，我們認(rèn)識到，沒有任何反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略能夠單獨(dú)取勝。如你們從我們向貴委員會(huì)提供的有關(guān)巴基斯坦和阿富汗戰(zhàn)略文件中所了解的，我們的反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略是針對這個(gè)地區(qū)的復(fù)雜情況所制定的一整套更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略的一部份。
將我們的反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略與區(qū)域性戰(zhàn)略相結(jié)合，是新戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的艱難和重要的方面。 “基地”組織既是塔利班庇護(hù)的對象，又是塔利班的資助保護(hù)者，塔利班同時(shí)也得到巴基斯坦的支持。這些關(guān)系為“基地”組織提供了一個(gè)巨大的保護(hù)傘，我們當(dāng)時(shí)必須切斷這些關(guān)系。而這并非易事。
我們并非沒有做出努力。布什總統(tǒng)就職后的一個(gè)月內(nèi)，就給穆沙拉夫（Musharraf）總統(tǒng)私下送去一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的信息，敦促穆沙拉夫利用他與塔利班的影響將本拉登（Bin Laden）繩之以法，并取締“基地”組織的訓(xùn)練營地。鮑威爾國務(wù)卿積極敦促巴基斯坦人，包括穆沙拉夫本人在內(nèi)，放棄對塔利班的支持。2001年6月，我在我的辦公室會(huì)晤了巴基斯坦外長。我傳遞了非常強(qiáng)硬的信息，但對方做出的是公事性的、毫無表情的反應(yīng)。
美國針對“基地”組織的政策沒有奏效，因?yàn)槲覀冡槍Π⒏缓沟恼邲]有奏效。我們的阿富汗政策沒有奏效是因?yàn)槲覀兊陌突固拐邲]有奏效。我們認(rèn)識到，美國的反恐怖主義政策必須與我們的區(qū)域性戰(zhàn)略、乃至我們的整個(gè)外交政策相結(jié)合。
為了解決這些問題，我努力做到讓關(guān)鍵的區(qū)域問題專家參與進(jìn)來。我邀請了阿富汗問題專家扎勒梅·哈利勒扎德（Zalmay Khalilzad），他在80年代擔(dān)任高級外交官時(shí)，曾與阿富汗圣戰(zhàn)者組織（Mujahedeen）有過密切合作，幫助他們擊敗前蘇聯(lián)的入侵。我還確保國家安全委員會(huì)的南亞問題專家、以及國務(wù)卿和他的區(qū)域問題專家參與這些事務(wù)。我們共同制定了解決阿富汗問題的新戰(zhàn)略。我們沒有將重點(diǎn)大力集中于北方聯(lián)盟，而是強(qiáng)調(diào)南方的重要性──南方是阿富汗的社會(huì)和政治中心。我們以新的胡蘿卜與大棒并舉的方式對待巴基斯坦問題，促使它停止支持塔利班。我們也開始改變我們對待印度的方法，以維護(hù)印度次大陸的穩(wěn)定。
在我們制定對付“基地”組織的新戰(zhàn)略的同時(shí)，我們也就由迪克·克拉克提出的一系列反“基地”組織的具體行動(dòng)計(jì)劃做出決策。上屆政府推遲了對其中許多建議的決定，有些建議在1998年就被提上桌面。我們向?yàn)跗潉e克斯坦增加了反恐怖主義援助；我們支持財(cái)政部追蹤和扣押恐怖主義資產(chǎn)的行動(dòng)；我們增加了對幾個(gè)政府機(jī)構(gòu)之間的反恐怖主義活動(dòng)的撥款；我們迅速采取行動(dòng)，為打擊“基地”組織而裝備“捕獲者”（Predator）無人駕駛偵察機(jī)。
當(dāng)2001年春夏之際有關(guān)威脅的報(bào)告增多時(shí)，我們使各級美國政府進(jìn)入高度警戒狀態(tài)和采取相關(guān)行動(dòng)。讓我來對我們制定新戰(zhàn)略與我們那年夏天為應(yīng)對威脅所采取的許多行動(dòng)之間的關(guān)系作一澄清。制定政策與處理危機(jī)需要不同的舉措。在那一階段，我們同時(shí)進(jìn)行了雙方面的工作。
對危機(jī)處理的基本工作，我們依靠由迪克·克拉克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的反恐怖主義安全小組（Counterterrorism Security Group）作為各部門間的神經(jīng)中樞。該小組由來自中央情報(bào)局、聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局、司法部、國防部（包括參謀長聯(lián)席會(huì)議）、國務(wù)院以及特工處等部門的反恐怖主義資深專家組成。多年來，反恐怖主義安全小組定期開會(huì)，其成員具有在多次高度威脅警戒期工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。隨著有關(guān)威脅信息的增多，安全小組開會(huì)的頻率增加，有時(shí)每天開會(huì)，以評估和分析有關(guān)威脅的情報(bào)，并協(xié)調(diào)應(yīng)對行動(dòng)。安全小組成員還可隨時(shí)與內(nèi)閣部長聯(lián)系，可把他們的關(guān)注提至高層。
我們在2001年春夏之際收到的有關(guān)威脅的報(bào)告無論在時(shí)間、地點(diǎn)、還是襲擊方式等方面均不詳細(xì)具體。幾乎所有報(bào)告都集中在“基地”組織在美國以外──尤其是在中東和北非地區(qū)──的活動(dòng)。事實(shí)上，具體到可以采取應(yīng)對措施的情報(bào)僅涉及海外的恐怖主義活動(dòng)。通常，這類報(bào)告都是令人無奈地含糊。讓我給諸位讀一些我們在那年春夏之際收集的某些話語：
·“數(shù)周內(nèi)會(huì)出現(xiàn)難以置信的消息”
·“大事……會(huì)出非常、非常、非常、非常大的*”
·“不久的將來將有襲擊”
這確實(shí)令人不安。但它們沒有告訴我們何時(shí)，沒有告訴我們何地，沒有告訴我們何人，沒有告訴我們何種方式。
以這種情況為背景，我想比較詳細(xì)地談?wù)勎覀兪盏降囊粍t通報(bào)，因?yàn)樗膬?nèi)容經(jīng)常被曲解。2001年8月6日，在總統(tǒng)的情報(bào)通報(bào)會(huì)上，有一項(xiàng)對總統(tǒng)早些時(shí)候提出的問題做出的回答，那個(gè)問題是關(guān)于基地“組織攻擊我國國土的意圖。這項(xiàng)通報(bào)回顧了過去的情報(bào)報(bào)告，大部份始于90年代，內(nèi)容是圍繞”基地“組織在美國國內(nèi)發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊的可能計(jì)劃。通報(bào)提及一份未經(jīng)核實(shí)的1998年的報(bào)告；那份報(bào)告說，恐怖主義分子可能企圖劫持一架美國飛機(jī)，用以要挾美國政府釋放因參與1993 年世界貿(mào)易中心爆炸事件而被美方拘押的恐怖主義分子。那份報(bào)告不是基于任何具體威脅的情報(bào)而提出的，也沒有提到恐怖主義分子把飛機(jī)作為導(dǎo)彈使用的可能性。
盡管我們收到的大部份有關(guān)威脅的情報(bào)都針對海外，但我仍對美國國內(nèi)有可能受到威脅感到擔(dān)心。7月5日白宮辦公廳主任安迪·內(nèi)閣卡德（Andy Card）和我與迪克·克拉克會(huì)晤， 我請迪克要確保國內(nèi)的機(jī)構(gòu)意識到這段時(shí)期威脅已經(jīng)升級，并采取恰當(dāng)?shù)姆磻?yīng)措施，盡管當(dāng)時(shí)我們沒有掌握具體針對國內(nèi)的威脅。同一天的晚些時(shí)候， 克拉克召開了他的反恐安全小組的特別會(huì)議，參加會(huì)議的還有來自聯(lián)邦航空管理局（FAA）、移民局（INS）、海關(guān)（Customs）和海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)（Coast Guard）的代表。會(huì)上這些機(jī)構(gòu)被要求采取進(jìn)一步措施來加強(qiáng)安全和監(jiān)督。
在關(guān)于威脅的情報(bào)升級的整個(gè)階段，我們從幾條戰(zhàn)線上做出努力，以便發(fā)現(xiàn)、預(yù)防和瓦解任何可能導(dǎo)致攻擊事件的恐怖主義計(jì)劃或行動(dòng)。例如：
·國防部至少向美國部隊(duì)發(fā)出5份緊急警告，告之“基地”組織可能正在策劃一場近期攻擊，并使某些地區(qū)的駐軍進(jìn)入升級警戒狀態(tài)。
·國務(wù)院至少發(fā)布了4次針對恐怖主義威脅的緊急安全公告和全球安全預(yù)警，加強(qiáng)了對某些駐外大使館的安全措施，并且警告塔利班政權(quán)，他們要對“基地”組織針對美國利益的任何攻擊行動(dòng)負(fù)責(zé)。
· 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局向聯(lián)邦、州和地方執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)出至少3次全國性的警告，具體指出，雖然情報(bào)大部份針對海外目標(biāo)，但不可排除對美國本土的攻擊。聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局還責(zé)成它在國內(nèi)的所有56個(gè)地方辦事處，加強(qiáng)對已知和可疑的恐怖主義分子的監(jiān)督，并與我們認(rèn)識的可能握有恐怖主義活動(dòng)情報(bào)的內(nèi)線人取得聯(lián)系。
·美國聯(lián)邦航空管理局向各美國航空公司和機(jī)場安全人員發(fā)出至少5份民航安全情況通知，包括關(guān)于劫持飛機(jī)可能性的具體警告。
·中央情報(bào)局以夜以繼日的努力，解除在世界范圍內(nèi)出現(xiàn)的威脅。中央情報(bào)局官員在20多個(gè)國家開展了范圍廣泛的瓦解“基地”組織威脅的活動(dòng)。
·在這段時(shí)期，副總統(tǒng)、中央情報(bào)局局長特尼特、國家安全委員會(huì)反恐班子的成員分別打電話給外國高級官員，請他們增加情報(bào)援助，并隨時(shí)向我們通報(bào)任何威脅信息。
這是對我們在2001年夏天做出的大量努力的簡單舉例說明。
但是，如同你們的聽證會(huì)顯示的那樣，沒有任何可以防止9.11襲擊發(fā)生的法寶。從事后來看，如果當(dāng)時(shí)有任何因素可能幫助制止9.11事件的話，那應(yīng)該是有更好的關(guān)于美國境內(nèi)威脅的情報(bào)。但結(jié)構(gòu)和法律障礙阻止我們的執(zhí)法部門和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)收集和交換情報(bào)，從而給這方面帶來困難。
因此，襲擊發(fā)生了。一夥兇殘的恐怖主義分子試圖斬首我們的政府，摧毀我們的金融體系，挫敗美國精神。作為一名那天在職的政府官員，我永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)忘記我當(dāng)時(shí)的悲哀和憤怒。我也不會(huì)忘記美國人民當(dāng)天所顯示出的勇氣和振作力以及總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)才能。
現(xiàn)在，我們有機(jī)會(huì)和責(zé)任共同向前邁進(jìn)。大膽和全面的改變有時(shí)只有在災(zāi)難事件后才能出現(xiàn)──這些災(zāi)難事件帶來新的共識，促使我們超越舊式思維和行動(dòng)方式。正如第二次世界大戰(zhàn)導(dǎo)致我國國防結(jié)構(gòu)的根本改組和國家安全委員會(huì)的誕生，9.11襲擊事件使我們能夠?qū)ΡＷo(hù)國土的方式做出全面改革。
布什總統(tǒng)是這個(gè)危機(jī)和變化時(shí)期的國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。他整合了保護(hù)美國國土安全的工作，具體措施包括組建國土安全部（Department of Homeland Security），新建一個(gè)綜合分析有關(guān)恐怖主義威脅的情報(bào)中心，指示聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局轉(zhuǎn)型成為從事反恐斗爭的機(jī)構(gòu)，消除阻礙我國國內(nèi)執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)與對外情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)相互交換有關(guān)威脅的重要情報(bào)的體制隔閡和法律障礙，并與國會(huì)合作，給予有關(guān)官員諸如《美國愛國法》（USA Patriot Act）等新手段來查明和制止恐怖主義分子。他在進(jìn)行所有這些努力的同時(shí)，維護(hù)了美國備受珍視的公民自由以及我國作為一個(gè)自由、開放的社會(huì)的特色。
但總統(tǒng)也認(rèn)識到我們的工作還遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒有完成?？赡苡斜匾M(jìn)行更多的結(jié)構(gòu)改革。我們的情報(bào)收集和分析工作兩年來取得了長足的進(jìn)步，但還有待進(jìn)一步加強(qiáng)?？偨y(tǒng)和我們所有在他的政府中的官員都?xì)g迎新觀點(diǎn)和新思維。我們迫切希望為保護(hù)美國人民做出一切必要努力。我們也期待聽到貴委員會(huì)提出的建議。
我們處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)，我們的國家安全取決于贏得這場戰(zhàn)爭。我們必須而且將會(huì)全力以赴地確定美國國內(nèi)的恐怖主義打擊對象。具有獻(xiàn)身精神的執(zhí)法人員和治安人員繼續(xù)日復(fù)一日地冒著生命危險(xiǎn)保障我們所有人的安全，我們應(yīng)對他們深表感謝。此外還應(yīng)記住，那些負(fù)責(zé)保護(hù)我們不遭攻擊的人，必須萬無一失?？植乐髁x分子只需得逞，就會(huì)造成重大災(zāi)難，而我們知道他們每天都在力圖這樣做。
因此，我們必須找到問題的根源。我們必須保持攻勢，不管恐怖主義分子在世界上哪一角落落腳、藏身和策劃，我們都要找到并擊潰他們。如果我們從2001年9月11日吸取了任何教訓(xùn)的話，那就是，絕不能任憑危險(xiǎn)加劇。
在9.11襲擊事件發(fā)生后，我國面臨一個(gè)艱難的抉擇。我們可以針對“基地”組織和塔利班進(jìn)行小規(guī)模作戰(zhàn)，也可以針對全球性威脅進(jìn)行一場大規(guī)模作戰(zhàn)。我們可以爭取小范圍的勝利，也可以為建設(shè)長期和平和一個(gè)更加美好的世界而努力。布什總統(tǒng)選擇了更有膽魄的目標(biāo)。
總統(tǒng)認(rèn)識到反恐怖之戰(zhàn)是一場大規(guī)模戰(zhàn)爭。在他的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，美國及盟國正在制止恐怖主義活動(dòng)、切斷恐怖主義的資金來源并將恐怖主義分子一個(gè)個(gè)捉拿歸案。他們的地盤日益縮小?？植乐髁x分子喪失了在阿富汗的大本營和訓(xùn)練營地?，F(xiàn)在，巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯政府正在大力追剿他們。
我們正面臨著同惡相濟(jì)的恐怖和大規(guī)模毀滅性武器。我們正在努力制止致命武器的擴(kuò)散并防止它們落入恐怖主義分子手中，并且在必要時(shí)截獲轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)中的危險(xiǎn)物資。由于我們對伊拉克采取了行動(dòng)，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因再也不能對他本國人民或他的鄰國使用大規(guī)模毀滅性武器了。此外，我們還說服了利比亞放棄其所有同大規(guī)模毀滅性武器有關(guān)的項(xiàng)目和材料。
我們在打擊威脅的源頭之時(shí)，也在努力鏟除其產(chǎn)生的根源。憑借我國男女軍人的英勇和技能，我們*了世界上兩個(gè)殘暴的政權(quán)──該地區(qū)暴力、恐懼和動(dòng)蕩的根源。今天，我們正在同多方盟友一道，幫助伊拉克和阿富汗人民建設(shè)自由的社會(huì)。我們還在同中東人民合作，傳播自由和民主的福祉，取代*蕩、仇恨和恐怖。這項(xiàng)工作是艱巨和危險(xiǎn)的，但它值得我們?yōu)橹冻雠蜖奚Ｔ谶@些國家擊敗恐怖、贏得自由不僅符合我國的利益，而且將在整個(gè)大中東地區(qū)喚起希望和激勵(lì)改革。
這是美國在9 .11之后應(yīng)當(dāng)做出的正確選擇──這是在未來歲月中能夠確保我國安全的選擇。
謝謝。現(xiàn)在我愿意回答你們的提問。
I thank the Commission for arranging this special session. Thank you for helping to find a way to meet the Nation's need to learn all we can about the September 11th attacks， while preserving important Constitutional principles.
This Commission， and those who appear before it， have a vital charge. We owe it to those we lost， and to their loved ones， and to our country， to learn all we can about that tragic day， and the events that led to it. Many families of the victims are here today， and I thank them for their contributions to the Commission's work.
The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on September 11th， 2001. Long before that day， radical， freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983， the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985， the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993， the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996， the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998， the attack on the USS Cole in 2000， these and other atrocities were part of a sustained， systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans.
The terrorists were at war with us， but we were not yet at war with them. For more than 20 years， the terrorist threat gathered， and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically， democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats， tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American shipping， the United States did not enter the First World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany's repeated violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of provocations throughout the mid-1930s， the Western democracies did not take action until 1939. The U.S. Government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And， tragically， for all the language of war spoken before September 11th， this country simply was not on a war footing.
Since then， America has been at war. And under President Bush's leadership， we will remain at war until the terrorist threat to our Nation is ended. The world has changed so much that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration was taking to fight terrorism before September 11th， 2001.
After President Bush was elected， we were briefed by the Clinton Administration on many national security issues during the transition. The President-elect and I were briefed by George Tenet on terrorism and on the al-Qaida network. Members of Sandy Berger's NSC staff briefed me， along with other members of the new national security team， on counterterrorism and al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour， and it reviewed the Clinton Administration's counterterrorism approach and the various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy and I personally discussed a variety of other topics， including North Korea， Iraq， the Middle East， and the Balkans.
Because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of al-Qaida over the years， we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to ensure there was no respite in the fight against al-Qaida. On an operational level， we decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence， and Louis Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the unusual step of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration's counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an expert in his field， as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we developed new and more aggressive policies.
At the beginning of the Administration， President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office -？ meetings which I attended， along with the Vice President and the Chief of Staff. At these meetings， the President received up-to-date intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials. From January 20 through September 10， the President received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida， and 13 of these were in response to questions he or his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet almost every morning， I generally spoke by telephone every morning at 7：15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and terrorism.
Of course， we also had other responsibilities. President Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We were improving America's relations with the world's great powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. planes enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had to deal with the occasional crisis， for instance， when the crew of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.
We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush understood the threat， and he understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was “tired of swatting flies.”
This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer of 2001， and was approved by the President's senior national security officials on September 4. It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush Administration -？ not Russia， not missile defense， not Iraq， but the elimination of al-Qaida.
Although this National Security Presidential Directive was originally a highly classified document， we arranged for portions to be declassified to help the Commission in its work， and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of al-Qaida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -？ intelligence， financial， diplomatic， and military ？- to meet this goal. And it gave Cabinet Secretaries and department heads specific responsibilities. For instance：
* It directed the Secretary of State to work with other countries to end all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida.
* It directed the Secretaries of the Treasury and State to work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of al-Qaida and its benefactors.
* It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups operating against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
* It tasked the Director of OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds were available in the budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.
* And it directed the Secretary of Defense to -？ and I quote ？- “ensure that the contingency planning process include plans： against al-Qaida and associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan， including leadership， command-control-communications， training， and logistics facilities； against Taliban targets in Afghanistan， including leadership， command-control， air and air defense， ground forces， and logistics； to eliminate weapons of mass destruction which al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups may acquire or manufacture， including those stored in underground bunkers.” This was a change from the prior strategy —— Presidential Decision Directive 62， signed in 1998 -？ which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S. for trial， to protect DOD forces overseas， and to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass destruction incidents.
More importantly， we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission， our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.
Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban， which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of protection， and we had to sever them. This was not easy.
Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office， President Bush sent a strong， private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis， including Musharraf himself， to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message， which was met with a rote， expressionless response.
America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working. We recognized that America's counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.
To address these problems， I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad， an expert on Afghanistan who， as a senior diplomat in the 1980s， had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen， helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia， as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together， we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance， we emphasized the importance of the south -？ the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India， to preserve stability on the subcontinent.
While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida， we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last Administration， and some had been on the table since 1998. We increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan； we bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets； we increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies； and we moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida.
When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001， we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that summer. Policy development and crisis management require different approaches. Throughout this period， we did both simultaneously.
For the essential crisis management task， we depended on the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from CIA， the FBI， the Department of Justice， the Defense Department （including the Joint Chiefs）， the State Department， and the Secret Service. The CSG had met regularly for many years， and its members had worked through numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat information increased， the CSG met more frequently， sometimes daily， to review and analyze the threat reporting and to coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest levels.
The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time， nor place， nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States， especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact， the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often， it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer：
* “Unbelievable news in coming weeks” * “Big event …… there will be a very， very， very， very big uproar” * “There will be attacks in the near future”
Troubling， yes. But they don't tell us when； they don't tell us where； they don't tell us who； and they don't tell us how.
In this context， I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received， since its content has frequently been mischaracterized. On August 6， 2001， the President's intelligence briefing included a response to questions he had earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our homeland. The briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting， mostly dating from the 1990s， regarding possible al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information. And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we received was focused overseas， I was also concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On July 5， Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke， and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond， even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland. Later that same day， Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG， as well as representatives from the FAA， the INS， Customs， and the Coast Guard. At that meeting， these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.
Throughout this period of heightened threat information， we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect， protect against， and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack. For instance：
* The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack， and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.
* The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats， enhanced security measures at certain embassies， and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.
* The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to Federal， State， and local law enforcement agencies， and specifically stated that， although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets， attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. Field Offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.
* The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel， including specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.
* The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 countries.
* During this period， the Vice President， DCI Tenet， and the NSC's Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign officials requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.
This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001.
Yet， as your hearings have shown， there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight， if anything might have helped stop 9/11， it would have been better information about threats inside the United States， something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to decapitate our government， destroy our financial system， and break the spirit of America. As an officer of government on duty that day， I will never forget the sorrow and the anger I felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the American people and the leadership of the President that day.
Now， we have an opportunity and an obligation to move forward together. Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes only possible in the wake of catastrophic events -？ events which create a new consensus that allows us to transcend old ways of thinking and acting. Just as World War II led to a fundamental reorganization of our national defense structure and to the creation of the National Security Council， so has September 11th made possible sweeping changes in the ways we protect our homeland.
President Bush is leading the country during this time of crisis and change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts to secure the American Homeland by creating the Department of Homeland Security， established a new center to integrate and analyze terrorist threat information， directed the transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror， broken down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers that prevented the sharing of vital threat information between our domestic law enforcement and our foreign intelligence agencies， and， working with the Congress， given officials new tools， such as the USA PATRIOT Act， to find and stop terrorists. And he has done all of this in a way that is consistent with protecting America's cherished civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free and open society.
But the President also recognizes that our work is far from complete. More structural reform will likely be necessary. Our intelligence gathering and analysis have improved dramatically in the last two years， but they must be stronger still. The President and all of us in his Administration welcome new ideas and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to protect the American people. And we look forward to receiving the recommendations of this Commission.
We are at war and our security as a nation depends on winning that war. We must and we will do everything we can to harden terrorist targets within the United States. Dedicated law enforcement and security professionals continue to risk their lives every day to make us all safer， and we owe them a debt of gratitude. And， let's remember， those charged with protecting us from attack have to succeed 100 percent of the time. To inflict devastation on a massive scale， the terrorists only have to succeed once， and we know they are trying every day.
That is why we must address the source of the problem. We must stay on offense， to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live， hide， and plot around the world. If we learned anything on September 11th， 2001， it is that we cannot wait while dangers gather.
After the September 11th attacks， our Nation faced hard choices. We could fight a narrow war against al-Qaida and the Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.
He recognizes that the War on Terror is a broad war. Under his leadership， the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations， cutting off their funding， and hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now pursue them with energy and force.
We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of mass destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly weapons and prevent then from getting into the hands of terrorists， seizing dangerous materials in transit， where necessary. Because we acted in Iraq， Saddam Hussein will never again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and materials.
And as we attack the threat at its sources， we are also addressing its roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our men and women in uniform， we removed from power two of the world's most brutal regimes —— sources of violence， and fear， and instability in the region. Today， along with many allies， we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle East to spread the blessings of liberty and democracy as the alternatives to instability， hatred， and terror. This work is hard and dangerous， yet it is worthy of our effort and our sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East.
In the aftermath of September 11th， those were the right choices for America to make —— the only choices that can ensure the safety of our Nation in the decades to come.
Thank you. Now I am happy to answer your questions.
賴斯：
我感謝調(diào)查委員會(huì)安排這次特別會(huì)議。感謝你們在維護(hù)重要的憲法原則的同時(shí)，努力幫助找到一種方式，滿足我們國家要盡可能了解有關(guān)9.11襲擊事件情況的需要。
貴委員會(huì)以及到委員會(huì)作證的人，都有一項(xiàng)重要使命。為了遇難者和他們的親人，為了我們的國家，我們必須了解有關(guān)那個(gè)悲慘的日子和導(dǎo)致它的種種事件的所有情況。今天有很多遇難者家屬在座，我感謝他們?yōu)槲瘑T會(huì)的工作做出的貢獻(xiàn)。
對我國的恐怖主義威脅并非在2001年9月11日才出現(xiàn)。早在這之前，仇恨自由的極端恐怖主義分子就已對美國和文明世界宣戰(zhàn)。1983年駐黎巴嫩的海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)營房被炸，1985年“阿奇里·勞羅”（Achille Lauro）號游輪被劫持，“基地”組織的興起和1993年的世貿(mào)中心爆炸案，1995年和1996年對美國在沙特阿拉伯的軍事設(shè)施的襲擊，1998年美國駐東非地區(qū)的大使館被炸，以及2000年對美國“科爾”號軍艦（USS Cole）的攻擊，所有這些以及其他種種暴行，都是四處制造破壞和混亂及謀害無辜美國人的持續(xù)和蓄意行動(dòng)的一部份。
恐怖主義分子已經(jīng)對我們開戰(zhàn)，但我們當(dāng)時(shí)還沒有對他們宣戰(zhàn)。在20多年中，恐怖主義威脅日益嚴(yán)重，但美國兩黨數(shù)屆政府都沒有做出充份的反應(yīng)?？v觀歷史，民主社會(huì)面對日益嚴(yán)重的威脅一向反應(yīng)遲緩，往往等到危險(xiǎn)發(fā)展到不容忽視的程度或者已經(jīng)為時(shí)太晚才采取措施。盡管“盧西塔尼亞”號（Lusitania）游輪于 1915年被擊沉，而且德國不斷騷擾美國航運(yùn)，但美國直到兩年以后才參加第世界大戰(zhàn)。盡管納粹德國屢次違反凡爾賽和約（Versailles Treaty）并在1930年代中期做出了一系列挑釁行徑，但西方民主國家直到1939年才采取行動(dòng)。美國政府一直沒有對日本帝國所構(gòu)成的日益嚴(yán)重的威脅做出反應(yīng)，直到這種威脅赤**地降臨珍珠港。而且，令人痛心的是，盡管“9.11”之前有種種戰(zhàn)爭言論，但這個(gè)國家根本沒有立足戰(zhàn)爭。
但從那以后，美國一直處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)。在布什總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，我們將持續(xù)作戰(zhàn)，直到消除我國受到的恐怖主義威脅。世界的變化如此巨大，以致我們很難回想起在那個(gè)日子以前的生活情景。但我確實(shí)想介紹一下本屆政府在2001年9月11日以前為抗擊恐怖主義所采取的行動(dòng)。
在布什總統(tǒng)當(dāng)選后，克林頓政府在交接階段向我們通報(bào)了很多國家安全方面的事宜。喬治·特尼特（George Tenet）向候任總統(tǒng)和我介紹了有關(guān)恐怖主義和“基地”組織網(wǎng)的情況。桑迪·伯杰（Sandy Berger）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國家安全委員會(huì)成員向我和新的國家安全事務(wù)班子的其他成員通報(bào)了有關(guān)反恐怖主義和“基地”組織的情況。這次通報(bào)會(huì)持續(xù)了一個(gè)小時(shí)左右，會(huì)議回顧了克林頓政府的反恐怖主義政策和當(dāng)時(shí)正在進(jìn)行的各種反恐怖主義活動(dòng)。桑迪和我面對面地討論了多項(xiàng)其他議題，包括北韓、伊拉克、中東和巴爾干。
由于聽取了這些匯報(bào)，也由于我們多年來一直關(guān)注 “基地”組織的發(fā)展，我們明白這個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)對美國構(gòu)成嚴(yán)重威脅。我們要確保繼續(xù)打擊“基地”組織，不給它任何喘息的機(jī)會(huì)。在行動(dòng)方面，我們即刻決定延續(xù)克林頓政府對秘密行動(dòng)的授權(quán)并繼續(xù)進(jìn)行其他打擊該網(wǎng)絡(luò)的努力。布什總統(tǒng)讓喬治·特尼特繼續(xù)擔(dān)任中央情報(bào)局（CIA）局長，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局（FBI）局長路易斯·弗里 （Louis Freeh）也繼續(xù)留任。我也特例留用了迪克·克拉克（Dick Clarke）和克林頓政府反恐怖主義班子的全體成員，讓他們繼續(xù)在國家安全委員會(huì)任職。我知道迪克是這方面的專家，而且在處理危機(jī)方面經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富。我們的宗旨是在制定新的、更積極的政策的同時(shí)，確保有關(guān)行動(dòng)繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。
本屆政府就任伊始，布什總統(tǒng)恢復(fù)了幾乎每天都在橢圓形辦公室聽取中央情報(bào)局局長匯報(bào)的慣例──我本人、副總統(tǒng)和白宮辦公室主任都參加了這些會(huì)議。在這些會(huì)議上，總統(tǒng)得到新的情報(bào)，向政府高情報(bào)官員提出問題。從1月20日到9月10日，總統(tǒng)在這些例會(huì)上聽取了40多項(xiàng)有關(guān)“基地”組織的匯報(bào)，其中13項(xiàng)是對他或他的高級顧問提問的回答。除了幾乎每天上午都同中央情報(bào)局局長特尼特會(huì)晤以外，我?guī)缀趺刻煸缟?時(shí)15分都同國務(wù)卿鮑威爾和國防部長拉姆斯菲爾德通電話。我還就“基地”組織和恐怖主義問題定期同中央情報(bào)局局長會(huì)晤和通話。
當(dāng)然，我們還有其他職責(zé)。布什總統(tǒng)制定了內(nèi)容廣泛的對外政策議程。我們決心制止大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的擴(kuò)散。我們當(dāng)時(shí)正在改善美國同其他世界大國的關(guān)系。我們不得不改變對伊拉克的政策，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)政策對遏制這個(gè)敵對政權(quán)──它頻頻向執(zhí)行聯(lián)合國安理會(huì)決議的美國飛機(jī)開火──絲毫沒有見效。我們還必須處理偶發(fā)性危機(jī)，例如海軍飛機(jī)機(jī)組人員被中國扣留11天的事件。
我們也采取行動(dòng)，為取締“基地”恐怖主義組織網(wǎng)制訂新的全面戰(zhàn)略。布什總統(tǒng)了解這一威脅，了解這一威脅的嚴(yán)重性。他向我們明確表示，他不愿逐一逐次地回應(yīng)“基地”組織的襲擊。他對我說，他“厭倦了打蒼蠅”。
這項(xiàng)新戰(zhàn)略是在2001年春夏時(shí)期制訂的，于9月4日得到總統(tǒng)國家安全高級官員的通過。它是布什政府制訂的第一項(xiàng)重大安全政策指示──針對的不是俄羅斯、不是導(dǎo)彈防御、不是伊拉克，而是鏟除“基地”組織。
雖然這項(xiàng)《國家安全總統(tǒng)令》（National Security Presidential Directive）原本是一份高度機(jī)密文件，但我們設(shè)法將其中一部份解密，以便于9.11調(diào)查委員會(huì)的工作。我今天將對部份文件進(jìn)行說明。這項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略將鏟除“基地”組織網(wǎng)定為目標(biāo)。它命令美國各相關(guān)部、局把鏟除“基地”組織作為一項(xiàng)重要任務(wù)，并動(dòng)用我國各方面國力──情報(bào)、金融、外交和軍事──來實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。它給內(nèi)閣級部長和其他各不部長規(guī)定了具體職責(zé)。例如：
。它指示國務(wù)卿同其他國家一道努力，終止對“基地”組織的一切庇護(hù)。
。它指示財(cái)政部長和國務(wù)卿與外國政府一道努力，截獲或凍結(jié)“基地”組織及其贊助者的資產(chǎn)和不動(dòng)產(chǎn)。
。它指示中央情報(bào)局局長制訂一套積極的秘密行動(dòng)計(jì)劃，干擾“基地”組織并為在阿富汗的反塔利班組織的行動(dòng)提供援助。
。它責(zé)成白宮行政管理和預(yù)算局（OMB）主任確保在今后5年內(nèi)，有充足的經(jīng)費(fèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略方案提出的目標(biāo)。
。它指示國防部長──我引述原文──“確保應(yīng)急計(jì)劃包含以下方案：打擊'基地'組織及其在阿富汗的相關(guān)恐怖分子設(shè)施，包括領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層、指揮控制通訊、培訓(xùn)和后勤設(shè)施；打擊阿富汗境內(nèi)的塔利班目標(biāo)，包括領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層、指揮控制、空軍防空、地面部隊(duì)及后勤；消除'基地'組織和有關(guān)的恐怖主義組織可能獲得或生產(chǎn)的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器，包括儲(chǔ)藏在地下工事中的武器。” 這是對此前戰(zhàn)略的改變──1998年簽署的《第62號總統(tǒng)決策令》（Presidential Decision Directive 62）指示國防部長提供交通工具，將恐怖主義分子送交美國接受審判；保護(hù)國防部駐外部隊(duì)；為反擊恐怖主義分子和大規(guī)模毀滅性武器事件做好準(zhǔn)備。
更重要的是，我們認(rèn)識到，沒有任何反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略能夠單獨(dú)取勝。如你們從我們向貴委員會(huì)提供的有關(guān)巴基斯坦和阿富汗戰(zhàn)略文件中所了解的，我們的反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略是針對這個(gè)地區(qū)的復(fù)雜情況所制定的一整套更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略的一部份。
將我們的反恐怖主義戰(zhàn)略與區(qū)域性戰(zhàn)略相結(jié)合，是新戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的艱難和重要的方面。 “基地”組織既是塔利班庇護(hù)的對象，又是塔利班的資助保護(hù)者，塔利班同時(shí)也得到巴基斯坦的支持。這些關(guān)系為“基地”組織提供了一個(gè)巨大的保護(hù)傘，我們當(dāng)時(shí)必須切斷這些關(guān)系。而這并非易事。
我們并非沒有做出努力。布什總統(tǒng)就職后的一個(gè)月內(nèi)，就給穆沙拉夫（Musharraf）總統(tǒng)私下送去一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的信息，敦促穆沙拉夫利用他與塔利班的影響將本拉登（Bin Laden）繩之以法，并取締“基地”組織的訓(xùn)練營地。鮑威爾國務(wù)卿積極敦促巴基斯坦人，包括穆沙拉夫本人在內(nèi)，放棄對塔利班的支持。2001年6月，我在我的辦公室會(huì)晤了巴基斯坦外長。我傳遞了非常強(qiáng)硬的信息，但對方做出的是公事性的、毫無表情的反應(yīng)。
美國針對“基地”組織的政策沒有奏效，因?yàn)槲覀冡槍Π⒏缓沟恼邲]有奏效。我們的阿富汗政策沒有奏效是因?yàn)槲覀兊陌突固拐邲]有奏效。我們認(rèn)識到，美國的反恐怖主義政策必須與我們的區(qū)域性戰(zhàn)略、乃至我們的整個(gè)外交政策相結(jié)合。
為了解決這些問題，我努力做到讓關(guān)鍵的區(qū)域問題專家參與進(jìn)來。我邀請了阿富汗問題專家扎勒梅·哈利勒扎德（Zalmay Khalilzad），他在80年代擔(dān)任高級外交官時(shí)，曾與阿富汗圣戰(zhàn)者組織（Mujahedeen）有過密切合作，幫助他們擊敗前蘇聯(lián)的入侵。我還確保國家安全委員會(huì)的南亞問題專家、以及國務(wù)卿和他的區(qū)域問題專家參與這些事務(wù)。我們共同制定了解決阿富汗問題的新戰(zhàn)略。我們沒有將重點(diǎn)大力集中于北方聯(lián)盟，而是強(qiáng)調(diào)南方的重要性──南方是阿富汗的社會(huì)和政治中心。我們以新的胡蘿卜與大棒并舉的方式對待巴基斯坦問題，促使它停止支持塔利班。我們也開始改變我們對待印度的方法，以維護(hù)印度次大陸的穩(wěn)定。
在我們制定對付“基地”組織的新戰(zhàn)略的同時(shí)，我們也就由迪克·克拉克提出的一系列反“基地”組織的具體行動(dòng)計(jì)劃做出決策。上屆政府推遲了對其中許多建議的決定，有些建議在1998年就被提上桌面。我們向?yàn)跗潉e克斯坦增加了反恐怖主義援助；我們支持財(cái)政部追蹤和扣押恐怖主義資產(chǎn)的行動(dòng)；我們增加了對幾個(gè)政府機(jī)構(gòu)之間的反恐怖主義活動(dòng)的撥款；我們迅速采取行動(dòng)，為打擊“基地”組織而裝備“捕獲者”（Predator）無人駕駛偵察機(jī)。
當(dāng)2001年春夏之際有關(guān)威脅的報(bào)告增多時(shí)，我們使各級美國政府進(jìn)入高度警戒狀態(tài)和采取相關(guān)行動(dòng)。讓我來對我們制定新戰(zhàn)略與我們那年夏天為應(yīng)對威脅所采取的許多行動(dòng)之間的關(guān)系作一澄清。制定政策與處理危機(jī)需要不同的舉措。在那一階段，我們同時(shí)進(jìn)行了雙方面的工作。
對危機(jī)處理的基本工作，我們依靠由迪克·克拉克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的反恐怖主義安全小組（Counterterrorism Security Group）作為各部門間的神經(jīng)中樞。該小組由來自中央情報(bào)局、聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局、司法部、國防部（包括參謀長聯(lián)席會(huì)議）、國務(wù)院以及特工處等部門的反恐怖主義資深專家組成。多年來，反恐怖主義安全小組定期開會(huì)，其成員具有在多次高度威脅警戒期工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。隨著有關(guān)威脅信息的增多，安全小組開會(huì)的頻率增加，有時(shí)每天開會(huì)，以評估和分析有關(guān)威脅的情報(bào)，并協(xié)調(diào)應(yīng)對行動(dòng)。安全小組成員還可隨時(shí)與內(nèi)閣部長聯(lián)系，可把他們的關(guān)注提至高層。
我們在2001年春夏之際收到的有關(guān)威脅的報(bào)告無論在時(shí)間、地點(diǎn)、還是襲擊方式等方面均不詳細(xì)具體。幾乎所有報(bào)告都集中在“基地”組織在美國以外──尤其是在中東和北非地區(qū)──的活動(dòng)。事實(shí)上，具體到可以采取應(yīng)對措施的情報(bào)僅涉及海外的恐怖主義活動(dòng)。通常，這類報(bào)告都是令人無奈地含糊。讓我給諸位讀一些我們在那年春夏之際收集的某些話語：
·“數(shù)周內(nèi)會(huì)出現(xiàn)難以置信的消息”
·“大事……會(huì)出非常、非常、非常、非常大的*”
·“不久的將來將有襲擊”
這確實(shí)令人不安。但它們沒有告訴我們何時(shí)，沒有告訴我們何地，沒有告訴我們何人，沒有告訴我們何種方式。
以這種情況為背景，我想比較詳細(xì)地談?wù)勎覀兪盏降囊粍t通報(bào)，因?yàn)樗膬?nèi)容經(jīng)常被曲解。2001年8月6日，在總統(tǒng)的情報(bào)通報(bào)會(huì)上，有一項(xiàng)對總統(tǒng)早些時(shí)候提出的問題做出的回答，那個(gè)問題是關(guān)于基地“組織攻擊我國國土的意圖。這項(xiàng)通報(bào)回顧了過去的情報(bào)報(bào)告，大部份始于90年代，內(nèi)容是圍繞”基地“組織在美國國內(nèi)發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊的可能計(jì)劃。通報(bào)提及一份未經(jīng)核實(shí)的1998年的報(bào)告；那份報(bào)告說，恐怖主義分子可能企圖劫持一架美國飛機(jī)，用以要挾美國政府釋放因參與1993 年世界貿(mào)易中心爆炸事件而被美方拘押的恐怖主義分子。那份報(bào)告不是基于任何具體威脅的情報(bào)而提出的，也沒有提到恐怖主義分子把飛機(jī)作為導(dǎo)彈使用的可能性。
盡管我們收到的大部份有關(guān)威脅的情報(bào)都針對海外，但我仍對美國國內(nèi)有可能受到威脅感到擔(dān)心。7月5日白宮辦公廳主任安迪·內(nèi)閣卡德（Andy Card）和我與迪克·克拉克會(huì)晤， 我請迪克要確保國內(nèi)的機(jī)構(gòu)意識到這段時(shí)期威脅已經(jīng)升級，并采取恰當(dāng)?shù)姆磻?yīng)措施，盡管當(dāng)時(shí)我們沒有掌握具體針對國內(nèi)的威脅。同一天的晚些時(shí)候， 克拉克召開了他的反恐安全小組的特別會(huì)議，參加會(huì)議的還有來自聯(lián)邦航空管理局（FAA）、移民局（INS）、海關(guān)（Customs）和海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)（Coast Guard）的代表。會(huì)上這些機(jī)構(gòu)被要求采取進(jìn)一步措施來加強(qiáng)安全和監(jiān)督。
在關(guān)于威脅的情報(bào)升級的整個(gè)階段，我們從幾條戰(zhàn)線上做出努力，以便發(fā)現(xiàn)、預(yù)防和瓦解任何可能導(dǎo)致攻擊事件的恐怖主義計(jì)劃或行動(dòng)。例如：
·國防部至少向美國部隊(duì)發(fā)出5份緊急警告，告之“基地”組織可能正在策劃一場近期攻擊，并使某些地區(qū)的駐軍進(jìn)入升級警戒狀態(tài)。
·國務(wù)院至少發(fā)布了4次針對恐怖主義威脅的緊急安全公告和全球安全預(yù)警，加強(qiáng)了對某些駐外大使館的安全措施，并且警告塔利班政權(quán)，他們要對“基地”組織針對美國利益的任何攻擊行動(dòng)負(fù)責(zé)。
· 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局向聯(lián)邦、州和地方執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)出至少3次全國性的警告，具體指出，雖然情報(bào)大部份針對海外目標(biāo)，但不可排除對美國本土的攻擊。聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局還責(zé)成它在國內(nèi)的所有56個(gè)地方辦事處，加強(qiáng)對已知和可疑的恐怖主義分子的監(jiān)督，并與我們認(rèn)識的可能握有恐怖主義活動(dòng)情報(bào)的內(nèi)線人取得聯(lián)系。
·美國聯(lián)邦航空管理局向各美國航空公司和機(jī)場安全人員發(fā)出至少5份民航安全情況通知，包括關(guān)于劫持飛機(jī)可能性的具體警告。
·中央情報(bào)局以夜以繼日的努力，解除在世界范圍內(nèi)出現(xiàn)的威脅。中央情報(bào)局官員在20多個(gè)國家開展了范圍廣泛的瓦解“基地”組織威脅的活動(dòng)。
·在這段時(shí)期，副總統(tǒng)、中央情報(bào)局局長特尼特、國家安全委員會(huì)反恐班子的成員分別打電話給外國高級官員，請他們增加情報(bào)援助，并隨時(shí)向我們通報(bào)任何威脅信息。
這是對我們在2001年夏天做出的大量努力的簡單舉例說明。
但是，如同你們的聽證會(huì)顯示的那樣，沒有任何可以防止9.11襲擊發(fā)生的法寶。從事后來看，如果當(dāng)時(shí)有任何因素可能幫助制止9.11事件的話，那應(yīng)該是有更好的關(guān)于美國境內(nèi)威脅的情報(bào)。但結(jié)構(gòu)和法律障礙阻止我們的執(zhí)法部門和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)收集和交換情報(bào)，從而給這方面帶來困難。
因此，襲擊發(fā)生了。一夥兇殘的恐怖主義分子試圖斬首我們的政府，摧毀我們的金融體系，挫敗美國精神。作為一名那天在職的政府官員，我永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)忘記我當(dāng)時(shí)的悲哀和憤怒。我也不會(huì)忘記美國人民當(dāng)天所顯示出的勇氣和振作力以及總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)才能。
現(xiàn)在，我們有機(jī)會(huì)和責(zé)任共同向前邁進(jìn)。大膽和全面的改變有時(shí)只有在災(zāi)難事件后才能出現(xiàn)──這些災(zāi)難事件帶來新的共識，促使我們超越舊式思維和行動(dòng)方式。正如第二次世界大戰(zhàn)導(dǎo)致我國國防結(jié)構(gòu)的根本改組和國家安全委員會(huì)的誕生，9.11襲擊事件使我們能夠?qū)ΡＷo(hù)國土的方式做出全面改革。
布什總統(tǒng)是這個(gè)危機(jī)和變化時(shí)期的國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。他整合了保護(hù)美國國土安全的工作，具體措施包括組建國土安全部（Department of Homeland Security），新建一個(gè)綜合分析有關(guān)恐怖主義威脅的情報(bào)中心，指示聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局轉(zhuǎn)型成為從事反恐斗爭的機(jī)構(gòu)，消除阻礙我國國內(nèi)執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)與對外情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)相互交換有關(guān)威脅的重要情報(bào)的體制隔閡和法律障礙，并與國會(huì)合作，給予有關(guān)官員諸如《美國愛國法》（USA Patriot Act）等新手段來查明和制止恐怖主義分子。他在進(jìn)行所有這些努力的同時(shí)，維護(hù)了美國備受珍視的公民自由以及我國作為一個(gè)自由、開放的社會(huì)的特色。
但總統(tǒng)也認(rèn)識到我們的工作還遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒有完成?？赡苡斜匾M(jìn)行更多的結(jié)構(gòu)改革。我們的情報(bào)收集和分析工作兩年來取得了長足的進(jìn)步，但還有待進(jìn)一步加強(qiáng)?？偨y(tǒng)和我們所有在他的政府中的官員都?xì)g迎新觀點(diǎn)和新思維。我們迫切希望為保護(hù)美國人民做出一切必要努力。我們也期待聽到貴委員會(huì)提出的建議。
我們處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)，我們的國家安全取決于贏得這場戰(zhàn)爭。我們必須而且將會(huì)全力以赴地確定美國國內(nèi)的恐怖主義打擊對象。具有獻(xiàn)身精神的執(zhí)法人員和治安人員繼續(xù)日復(fù)一日地冒著生命危險(xiǎn)保障我們所有人的安全，我們應(yīng)對他們深表感謝。此外還應(yīng)記住，那些負(fù)責(zé)保護(hù)我們不遭攻擊的人，必須萬無一失?？植乐髁x分子只需得逞，就會(huì)造成重大災(zāi)難，而我們知道他們每天都在力圖這樣做。
因此，我們必須找到問題的根源。我們必須保持攻勢，不管恐怖主義分子在世界上哪一角落落腳、藏身和策劃，我們都要找到并擊潰他們。如果我們從2001年9月11日吸取了任何教訓(xùn)的話，那就是，絕不能任憑危險(xiǎn)加劇。
在9.11襲擊事件發(fā)生后，我國面臨一個(gè)艱難的抉擇。我們可以針對“基地”組織和塔利班進(jìn)行小規(guī)模作戰(zhàn)，也可以針對全球性威脅進(jìn)行一場大規(guī)模作戰(zhàn)。我們可以爭取小范圍的勝利，也可以為建設(shè)長期和平和一個(gè)更加美好的世界而努力。布什總統(tǒng)選擇了更有膽魄的目標(biāo)。
總統(tǒng)認(rèn)識到反恐怖之戰(zhàn)是一場大規(guī)模戰(zhàn)爭。在他的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，美國及盟國正在制止恐怖主義活動(dòng)、切斷恐怖主義的資金來源并將恐怖主義分子一個(gè)個(gè)捉拿歸案。他們的地盤日益縮小?？植乐髁x分子喪失了在阿富汗的大本營和訓(xùn)練營地?，F(xiàn)在，巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯政府正在大力追剿他們。
我們正面臨著同惡相濟(jì)的恐怖和大規(guī)模毀滅性武器。我們正在努力制止致命武器的擴(kuò)散并防止它們落入恐怖主義分子手中，并且在必要時(shí)截獲轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)中的危險(xiǎn)物資。由于我們對伊拉克采取了行動(dòng)，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因再也不能對他本國人民或他的鄰國使用大規(guī)模毀滅性武器了。此外，我們還說服了利比亞放棄其所有同大規(guī)模毀滅性武器有關(guān)的項(xiàng)目和材料。
我們在打擊威脅的源頭之時(shí)，也在努力鏟除其產(chǎn)生的根源。憑借我國男女軍人的英勇和技能，我們*了世界上兩個(gè)殘暴的政權(quán)──該地區(qū)暴力、恐懼和動(dòng)蕩的根源。今天，我們正在同多方盟友一道，幫助伊拉克和阿富汗人民建設(shè)自由的社會(huì)。我們還在同中東人民合作，傳播自由和民主的福祉，取代*蕩、仇恨和恐怖。這項(xiàng)工作是艱巨和危險(xiǎn)的，但它值得我們?yōu)橹冻雠蜖奚Ｔ谶@些國家擊敗恐怖、贏得自由不僅符合我國的利益，而且將在整個(gè)大中東地區(qū)喚起希望和激勵(lì)改革。
這是美國在9 .11之后應(yīng)當(dāng)做出的正確選擇──這是在未來歲月中能夠確保我國安全的選擇。
謝謝。現(xiàn)在我愿意回答你們的提問。