Russia and Belarus
俄羅斯與白俄羅斯
Loveless brothers
兄弟鬩墻 （陳繼龍 編譯）
Another Russian gas conflict was averted, but a short oil war broke out instead. Europe should take heed 又是俄羅斯——天然氣之爭才告平息，一場短暫的石油之戰(zhàn)又打了起來，歐洲需提防
RUSSIA and Belarus, its ex-Soviet neighbour, are supposedly brotherly Slavic nations that are in the process of forming a union state. There are indeed some striking family resemblances. Both have irascible[1] authoritarian presidents—Russia's Vladimir Putin and Belarus's brutal Alyaksandr Lukashenka—and both are inclined to risky diplomatic brinkmanship. （1）This week that similarity propelled them over the brink and into an unfraternal[2] trade dispute. Brief though it may have been, it had important implications for Russia's energy dealings with Europe, and perhaps also for the future of benighted[3] Belarus.
俄羅斯與其前蘇聯(lián)鄰邦白俄羅斯都屬于斯拉夫民族，而且正籌備建立一個(gè)聯(lián)盟國家。人們都認(rèn)為它們親如兄弟，而事實(shí)上兩國之間的確有著驚人的相似之處。它們的總統(tǒng)（即俄羅斯的弗拉基米爾•普金和白俄羅斯的暴君亞歷山大•盧卡申科）都是性情暴躁的*主義者，兩國在外交上也都奉行冒險(xiǎn)的邊緣政策[1]。本周，正是這些相似之處讓兩國都撕破臉皮，圍繞貿(mào)易問題較起勁來，兄弟之情也被拋置腦后。對于俄羅斯與歐洲之間的能源貿(mào)易而言，這場“較勁”雖沒能持續(xù)多久，卻有著重要含義，對蒙昧的白俄羅斯的未來而言也許亦是如此。
A year ago, wrangling over the price of gas sold by Russia to Ukraine briefly diminished the flow of gas through Ukraine to Europe. At the end of 2006, Belarusian resistance to Russia's demand that it too pay more for gas threatened to unleash another so-called “gas war”. （2）The modest economic growth that Mr Lukashenka terms the “Belarus economic miracle”—which along with his total control of the media and harassment of opponents has shored up[4] his regime—has in fact been largely based on massively discounted Russian gas imports.
一年前，圍繞俄羅斯銷往烏克蘭的天然氣價(jià)格之爭使得途經(jīng)烏克蘭輸送至歐洲的天然氣量銳減。2006年底，俄羅斯提出要對銷往白俄羅斯的天然氣進(jìn)行漲價(jià)，白俄羅斯人對此進(jìn)行了抵制，新一輪所謂的“天然氣之戰(zhàn)”一觸即發(fā)。一直以來，白俄羅斯有條不紊的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長事實(shí)上大部分都依賴于俄羅斯天然氣價(jià)格的高度優(yōu)惠政策。盧卡申科的政權(quán)之所以不斷鞏固，就是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)被他稱作“白俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡”的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，以及他對媒體的完全掌控和對政敵的鉗制。
In the event, the two countries cantankerously[5] reached a deal on an increased gas price just before their New Year's Eve deadline. But a few days later, an oil war broke out instead: Russia imposed new duties on the crude oil it exports to Belarus (refining and re-exporting it have been a crucial money-spinner for Mr Lukashenka, in effect another big Russian subsidy to the Belarusian economy). In revenge, Belarus demanded a transit fee on the oil that crosses Belarus to other European customers. The Russians refused—and Belarus began siphoning[6] off oil in lieu of payment. On the night of January 7th Russia stopped pumping oil into a pipeline network that crosses Belarus and delivers 12.5% of the European Union's oil needs. Supplies to Poland, Germany and others stopped flowing.
結(jié)果是，新年之前的最后一天，兩國一邊還鬧得不可開交，一邊卻就天然氣漲價(jià)達(dá)成了一致?？墒菦]過幾天，一場石油戰(zhàn)又爆發(fā)了：俄羅斯對出口到白俄羅斯的原油征收新的關(guān)稅（對這些原油進(jìn)行提煉并重新出口一直都是盧卡申科一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的創(chuàng)收途徑，實(shí)際上也就相當(dāng)于俄羅斯為白俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)提供的另類豐厚補(bǔ)助），而白俄羅斯則要求對過境輸往歐洲其他國家的俄羅斯石油收取過境費(fèi)，以示報(bào)復(fù)。俄羅斯人不同意，而白俄羅斯則開始截留過境的俄羅斯石油，并且分文不付。1月7日晚，俄羅斯切斷了一個(gè)過境白俄羅斯的石油管網(wǎng)（通過該管網(wǎng)輸往歐盟的石油占?xì)W盟石油需求量的12.5%），波蘭、德國和其他國家也隨之“斷油”了。
The two countries' tactics may be similar, but their muscle is not. Mr Putin talked of cutting oil production and rerouting supplies. The Russians also threatened duties on all Belarusian goods, many of which would struggle to find markets elsewhere. （3）On January 10th, after the presidents talked on the telephone, Mr Lukashenka blinked; the transit fee was lifted; and oil began to flow again before Europe was seriously affected. Nevertheless, the short but nasty spat has telling lessons.
兩國的策略雖如出一轍，但它們的力量卻不可相提并論。普金提出要縮減石油產(chǎn)量和改變石油供應(yīng)渠道；俄羅斯人還威脅要對所有白俄羅斯的商品征收關(guān)稅，這很可能會斷了許多白俄羅斯商品的銷路。1月10日，兩國總統(tǒng)通過電話會談后，盧卡申科動搖了，過境費(fèi)取消了，石油又開始輸送了，歐洲受到的影響還不算嚴(yán)重。不管怎么樣，這場“小打小鬧”還是有不少值得吸取的教訓(xùn)。
One is that, with the Russians in this mood, Mr Lukashenka's grip on Belarus may be in jeopardy. While others reviled him, Mr Putin stood by Mr Lukashenka during his rigged re-election last year. （4）But Mr Putin's motive was more aversion to European meddling in Russia's “near abroad”, and to the so-called “colour revolutions” of the kind that overtook Ukraine in 2004, than affection for Mr Lukashenka. Personal relations between the two men are said to be rancid[7]; a proper union between their two countries, a plan Mr Putin inherited from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, now looks fanciful. (Mr Lukashenka is said to have cooled on the idea after it became clear that he was unlikely to remain president after the merger.) In the absence of a reliable alternative, defenestrating Mr Lukashenka may not be part of Mr Putin's plan. But the new gas price alone could seriously damage Belarus's mostly state-owned factories and collective farms, and alienate ordinary Belarusians.
一個(gè)教訓(xùn)就是，把俄羅斯人“惹毛”了，盧卡申科對白俄羅斯的控制權(quán)可能會岌岌可危。去年進(jìn)行的二度選舉，眾叛親離的盧卡申科得到了普金的支持，并通過幕后操縱獲勝。但是，普金這么做與其說是因?yàn)樗麑ΡR卡申科有好感，還不如說是因?yàn)樗锤袣W洲人攙和俄羅斯“家門口的事”以及所謂的“顏色革命”（比如2004年那場席卷了烏克蘭的革命）。據(jù)說，兩人的私交很差；普金的前任葉利欽計(jì)劃建立一個(gè)兩國聯(lián)盟，普金上任后計(jì)劃雖未改變，但要構(gòu)建一個(gè)合乎雙方利益的聯(lián)盟現(xiàn)在看來卻是異想天開的事情。（據(jù)說，盧卡申科已逐漸對這個(gè)計(jì)劃喪失了興趣，因?yàn)樗庾R到兩國一旦聯(lián)盟他不可能繼續(xù)當(dāng)他的總統(tǒng)了。）在找到其它可行的辦法之前，普金也許并不打算丟下盧卡申科不管。不過，光上漲后的天然氣價(jià)格就會讓白俄羅斯大部分國有工廠和集體農(nóng)場遭受嚴(yán)重打擊，讓盧卡申科失去白俄羅斯民眾的擁護(hù)。
The affair also confirms the increasingly poisonous nature of Russia's dealings with many of its former vassals[8]. Energy feuds are both a cause and a symptom of this trend. Georgia, Mr Putin's least favourite ex-Soviet neighbour, has been forced to accept a price for Russian gas that is more than twice the new one for Belarus. But supplies from neighbouring Azerbaijan are helping Georgia through the winter, and they may soon, says Nika Gilauri, Georgia's energy minister, replace Russian imports altogether. With its own oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan itself recently rejected what Hafiz Pashayev, the deputy foreign minister, describes as the “unreasonable” gas terms offered by Russia, and stopped importing Russian gas. It has also ceased sending its oil through Russian pipelines.
這一事件也證明，俄羅斯與前蘇聯(lián)各“諸侯國”之間交易的本質(zhì)越來越惡劣，表現(xiàn)為能源紛爭不斷，而后者又讓這種惡劣本質(zhì)變本加厲。普金最不看重的格魯吉亞已被迫接受了俄羅斯天然氣的價(jià)格，這個(gè)價(jià)格要比給白俄羅斯的最新價(jià)格高出2倍多。不過，來自鄰邦阿塞拜疆的天然氣正幫助格魯吉亞度過這個(gè)冬天，而且格魯吉亞能源部長尼卡•吉勞里稱，阿塞拜疆很快就會完全取代俄羅斯成為格魯吉亞天然氣進(jìn)口國。阿塞拜疆由于在里海擁有自己的石油和天然氣礦層，所以它也拒絕了俄羅斯提出的天然氣條款，并停止從俄羅斯進(jìn)口天然氣。阿副外長哈菲茲•帕沙耶夫認(rèn)為那都是些“不合理”的條款。同時(shí)，阿也不再過境俄羅斯天然氣管線輸送天然氣。
The most important lesson for Europe, however, is once again that over-reliance on Russian energy is dangerous. In principle, the Kremlin's drive to charge its neighbours more for gas is reasonable. Overall demand for Russian gas is outstripping supply; suppressing demand in the ex-Soviet states should make more gas available for export to the more lucrative European market. In the particular case of Belarus, the Russians deserve some sympathy. （5）Until last year they were criticised for coddling Mr Lukashenka with preferential gas terms—and Belarus's re-export of duty-free Russian oil was, as one foreign observer in Minsk puts it, an obvious “scam[9]”.
然而對于歐洲而言，最重要的教訓(xùn)莫過于：過分依賴俄羅斯能源是危險(xiǎn)的，而且這樣的教訓(xùn)已經(jīng)不是第一次了。照理說，克里姆林宮想要對賣給鄰國的天然氣漲價(jià)并不過分。它們的天然氣已經(jīng)越來越供不應(yīng)求，限制前蘇聯(lián)國家的天然氣需求能騰出更多的天然氣用于出口到利潤更為可觀的歐洲市場。僅就與白俄羅斯之間的爭執(zhí)來看，俄羅斯人是值得同情的。去年以前，人們一直批評俄羅斯人在天然氣問題上明顯關(guān)照盧卡申科，讓他享受了不少特惠政策——而且，正如明斯克一位外國觀察家指出，白俄羅斯轉(zhuǎn)手輸出俄羅斯的免稅石油（對俄羅斯而言）是一種明顯的“欺詐行為”。
（6）But however reasonable its aims, Russia's bullying and capricious methods, plus its volatile relationship with energy transit countries and carelessness over the impact on European consumers, have rightly alarmed European leaders. Though Mr Putin pledged to “do everything to secure the interests of Western consumers,” Germany's Angela Merkel spoke of damaged confidence. The Europeans should also note that Russia has emerged from its tussle with Belarus with a 50% stake in Belarus's gas pipeline (payment for which will partly offset the gas-price hike), strengthening the Kremlin's grip on Europe's energy infrastructure. An EU energy strategy released this week talked about the need for diversifying suppliers and dealing with them collectively: the quicker, the better.
話說回來，不管俄羅斯的意圖是否合理，它恃強(qiáng)凌弱和出爾反爾的表現(xiàn)，以及同能源輸送過境國之間動蕩不定的關(guān)系和對歐洲能源消費(fèi)國所受影響的不在乎，已經(jīng)很自然地引起了歐洲各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的警惕。普金信誓旦旦地說要“盡力保護(hù)西方石油消費(fèi)國的利益”，可德國總理安吉拉•默克爾表示他們的信心已經(jīng)受到了打擊。歐洲人還應(yīng)當(dāng)看到，俄白“斗氣”最終讓俄羅斯獲得了白俄羅斯天然氣管線50%的股份（購股費(fèi)用將部分抵消天然氣價(jià)格上漲后所增加的支出），克里姆林宮對歐洲能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的控制也得以進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化。歐盟本周公布的一項(xiàng)能源戰(zhàn)略指出，有必要尋求能源供應(yīng)來源多元化，并共同與供應(yīng)來源國進(jìn)行交易——越快越好。
[1]所謂邊緣政策，即一種在談判中以破裂相威脅以達(dá)到施壓力于對方，迫使對方讓步的策略。其特征是兇、狠、份量重，系孤注一擲，成敗在此一舉，常運(yùn)用在“最后立場”的條件上。故邊緣政策可以作為談判終局的標(biāo)志。
[NOTES]（OXFORD）
1. irascible adj. （fml 文） （of a person） easily made angry （指人）易怒的, 性情暴躁的.
2. unfraternal adj. 無兄弟情的，六親不認(rèn)的
3. benighted adj. （dated 舊） unenlightened morally or intellectually; ignorant; backward 未開化的; 愚昧無知的; 落後的: benighted savages 未開化的野人.
4. shore up （phr v） support sth with a wooden beam, etc propped against it （以支柱等）支撐: shore up the side of an old house to stop it falling down 支撐舊屋墻壁以防倒塌 * （fig 比喻） She used this evidence to shore up her argument. 她用該證據(jù)來支持自己的論點(diǎn).
5. cantankerous adj. bad-tempered; quarrelsome 脾氣壞的; 好爭吵的. –ly adv.
6. siphon sth into/out of sth; siphon sth off/out draw （a liquid） from one place to another using a siphon 用虹吸管將（液體）抽出: siphon petrol out of a car into a can 把汽車?yán)锏钠陀煤缥艹檫M(jìn)罐里 * siphon off all the waste liquid 把全部廢液用虹吸管抽掉. siphon sb/sth off （infml often derog 口, 常作貶義） transfer sb/sth from one place to another, often unfairly or illegally 將某人[某物]由一處抽調(diào)到另一處（通常指不公正地或非法地）: The big clubs siphon off all the best players. 大俱樂部把所有選手都抽調(diào)走了. * She siphoned off profits from the business into her account. 她把企業(yè)的贏利轉(zhuǎn)到了自己的帳戶上.
7. rancid adj. 1 （of fatty foods） tasting or smelling bad because of staleness （指含油脂食物）因變質(zhì)而有陳腐味道或氣味的: The butter has gone/turned rancid. 這黃油已經(jīng)哈喇了. 2 （of smells or tastes） like stale fat （指氣味或味道）如陳腐脂肪味的: the rancid stench of dirty drains 臟水溝發(fā)出的腐臭味.
8. vassal n. 1 （in the Middle Ages） man promising to fight for and be loyal to a king or lord in return for the right to hold land （中世紀(jì)的）封臣, 家臣（為國君或領(lǐng)主效忠可受封土地者）. 2 （fig 比喻） person or nation dependent on another 附庸; 下屬; 屬國: [attrib 作定語] vassal states, kingdoms, etc 附庸國、 王國等.
9. scam n. （US infml 口） dishonest scheme 騙局; 欺詐: a betting scam 賭博騙局.
俄羅斯與白俄羅斯
Loveless brothers
兄弟鬩墻 （陳繼龍 編譯）
Another Russian gas conflict was averted, but a short oil war broke out instead. Europe should take heed 又是俄羅斯——天然氣之爭才告平息，一場短暫的石油之戰(zhàn)又打了起來，歐洲需提防
RUSSIA and Belarus, its ex-Soviet neighbour, are supposedly brotherly Slavic nations that are in the process of forming a union state. There are indeed some striking family resemblances. Both have irascible[1] authoritarian presidents—Russia's Vladimir Putin and Belarus's brutal Alyaksandr Lukashenka—and both are inclined to risky diplomatic brinkmanship. （1）This week that similarity propelled them over the brink and into an unfraternal[2] trade dispute. Brief though it may have been, it had important implications for Russia's energy dealings with Europe, and perhaps also for the future of benighted[3] Belarus.
俄羅斯與其前蘇聯(lián)鄰邦白俄羅斯都屬于斯拉夫民族，而且正籌備建立一個(gè)聯(lián)盟國家。人們都認(rèn)為它們親如兄弟，而事實(shí)上兩國之間的確有著驚人的相似之處。它們的總統(tǒng)（即俄羅斯的弗拉基米爾•普金和白俄羅斯的暴君亞歷山大•盧卡申科）都是性情暴躁的*主義者，兩國在外交上也都奉行冒險(xiǎn)的邊緣政策[1]。本周，正是這些相似之處讓兩國都撕破臉皮，圍繞貿(mào)易問題較起勁來，兄弟之情也被拋置腦后。對于俄羅斯與歐洲之間的能源貿(mào)易而言，這場“較勁”雖沒能持續(xù)多久，卻有著重要含義，對蒙昧的白俄羅斯的未來而言也許亦是如此。
A year ago, wrangling over the price of gas sold by Russia to Ukraine briefly diminished the flow of gas through Ukraine to Europe. At the end of 2006, Belarusian resistance to Russia's demand that it too pay more for gas threatened to unleash another so-called “gas war”. （2）The modest economic growth that Mr Lukashenka terms the “Belarus economic miracle”—which along with his total control of the media and harassment of opponents has shored up[4] his regime—has in fact been largely based on massively discounted Russian gas imports.
一年前，圍繞俄羅斯銷往烏克蘭的天然氣價(jià)格之爭使得途經(jīng)烏克蘭輸送至歐洲的天然氣量銳減。2006年底，俄羅斯提出要對銷往白俄羅斯的天然氣進(jìn)行漲價(jià)，白俄羅斯人對此進(jìn)行了抵制，新一輪所謂的“天然氣之戰(zhàn)”一觸即發(fā)。一直以來，白俄羅斯有條不紊的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長事實(shí)上大部分都依賴于俄羅斯天然氣價(jià)格的高度優(yōu)惠政策。盧卡申科的政權(quán)之所以不斷鞏固，就是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)被他稱作“白俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡”的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，以及他對媒體的完全掌控和對政敵的鉗制。
In the event, the two countries cantankerously[5] reached a deal on an increased gas price just before their New Year's Eve deadline. But a few days later, an oil war broke out instead: Russia imposed new duties on the crude oil it exports to Belarus (refining and re-exporting it have been a crucial money-spinner for Mr Lukashenka, in effect another big Russian subsidy to the Belarusian economy). In revenge, Belarus demanded a transit fee on the oil that crosses Belarus to other European customers. The Russians refused—and Belarus began siphoning[6] off oil in lieu of payment. On the night of January 7th Russia stopped pumping oil into a pipeline network that crosses Belarus and delivers 12.5% of the European Union's oil needs. Supplies to Poland, Germany and others stopped flowing.
結(jié)果是，新年之前的最后一天，兩國一邊還鬧得不可開交，一邊卻就天然氣漲價(jià)達(dá)成了一致?？墒菦]過幾天，一場石油戰(zhàn)又爆發(fā)了：俄羅斯對出口到白俄羅斯的原油征收新的關(guān)稅（對這些原油進(jìn)行提煉并重新出口一直都是盧卡申科一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的創(chuàng)收途徑，實(shí)際上也就相當(dāng)于俄羅斯為白俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)提供的另類豐厚補(bǔ)助），而白俄羅斯則要求對過境輸往歐洲其他國家的俄羅斯石油收取過境費(fèi)，以示報(bào)復(fù)。俄羅斯人不同意，而白俄羅斯則開始截留過境的俄羅斯石油，并且分文不付。1月7日晚，俄羅斯切斷了一個(gè)過境白俄羅斯的石油管網(wǎng)（通過該管網(wǎng)輸往歐盟的石油占?xì)W盟石油需求量的12.5%），波蘭、德國和其他國家也隨之“斷油”了。
The two countries' tactics may be similar, but their muscle is not. Mr Putin talked of cutting oil production and rerouting supplies. The Russians also threatened duties on all Belarusian goods, many of which would struggle to find markets elsewhere. （3）On January 10th, after the presidents talked on the telephone, Mr Lukashenka blinked; the transit fee was lifted; and oil began to flow again before Europe was seriously affected. Nevertheless, the short but nasty spat has telling lessons.
兩國的策略雖如出一轍，但它們的力量卻不可相提并論。普金提出要縮減石油產(chǎn)量和改變石油供應(yīng)渠道；俄羅斯人還威脅要對所有白俄羅斯的商品征收關(guān)稅，這很可能會斷了許多白俄羅斯商品的銷路。1月10日，兩國總統(tǒng)通過電話會談后，盧卡申科動搖了，過境費(fèi)取消了，石油又開始輸送了，歐洲受到的影響還不算嚴(yán)重。不管怎么樣，這場“小打小鬧”還是有不少值得吸取的教訓(xùn)。
One is that, with the Russians in this mood, Mr Lukashenka's grip on Belarus may be in jeopardy. While others reviled him, Mr Putin stood by Mr Lukashenka during his rigged re-election last year. （4）But Mr Putin's motive was more aversion to European meddling in Russia's “near abroad”, and to the so-called “colour revolutions” of the kind that overtook Ukraine in 2004, than affection for Mr Lukashenka. Personal relations between the two men are said to be rancid[7]; a proper union between their two countries, a plan Mr Putin inherited from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, now looks fanciful. (Mr Lukashenka is said to have cooled on the idea after it became clear that he was unlikely to remain president after the merger.) In the absence of a reliable alternative, defenestrating Mr Lukashenka may not be part of Mr Putin's plan. But the new gas price alone could seriously damage Belarus's mostly state-owned factories and collective farms, and alienate ordinary Belarusians.
一個(gè)教訓(xùn)就是，把俄羅斯人“惹毛”了，盧卡申科對白俄羅斯的控制權(quán)可能會岌岌可危。去年進(jìn)行的二度選舉，眾叛親離的盧卡申科得到了普金的支持，并通過幕后操縱獲勝。但是，普金這么做與其說是因?yàn)樗麑ΡR卡申科有好感，還不如說是因?yàn)樗锤袣W洲人攙和俄羅斯“家門口的事”以及所謂的“顏色革命”（比如2004年那場席卷了烏克蘭的革命）。據(jù)說，兩人的私交很差；普金的前任葉利欽計(jì)劃建立一個(gè)兩國聯(lián)盟，普金上任后計(jì)劃雖未改變，但要構(gòu)建一個(gè)合乎雙方利益的聯(lián)盟現(xiàn)在看來卻是異想天開的事情。（據(jù)說，盧卡申科已逐漸對這個(gè)計(jì)劃喪失了興趣，因?yàn)樗庾R到兩國一旦聯(lián)盟他不可能繼續(xù)當(dāng)他的總統(tǒng)了。）在找到其它可行的辦法之前，普金也許并不打算丟下盧卡申科不管。不過，光上漲后的天然氣價(jià)格就會讓白俄羅斯大部分國有工廠和集體農(nóng)場遭受嚴(yán)重打擊，讓盧卡申科失去白俄羅斯民眾的擁護(hù)。
The affair also confirms the increasingly poisonous nature of Russia's dealings with many of its former vassals[8]. Energy feuds are both a cause and a symptom of this trend. Georgia, Mr Putin's least favourite ex-Soviet neighbour, has been forced to accept a price for Russian gas that is more than twice the new one for Belarus. But supplies from neighbouring Azerbaijan are helping Georgia through the winter, and they may soon, says Nika Gilauri, Georgia's energy minister, replace Russian imports altogether. With its own oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan itself recently rejected what Hafiz Pashayev, the deputy foreign minister, describes as the “unreasonable” gas terms offered by Russia, and stopped importing Russian gas. It has also ceased sending its oil through Russian pipelines.
這一事件也證明，俄羅斯與前蘇聯(lián)各“諸侯國”之間交易的本質(zhì)越來越惡劣，表現(xiàn)為能源紛爭不斷，而后者又讓這種惡劣本質(zhì)變本加厲。普金最不看重的格魯吉亞已被迫接受了俄羅斯天然氣的價(jià)格，這個(gè)價(jià)格要比給白俄羅斯的最新價(jià)格高出2倍多。不過，來自鄰邦阿塞拜疆的天然氣正幫助格魯吉亞度過這個(gè)冬天，而且格魯吉亞能源部長尼卡•吉勞里稱，阿塞拜疆很快就會完全取代俄羅斯成為格魯吉亞天然氣進(jìn)口國。阿塞拜疆由于在里海擁有自己的石油和天然氣礦層，所以它也拒絕了俄羅斯提出的天然氣條款，并停止從俄羅斯進(jìn)口天然氣。阿副外長哈菲茲•帕沙耶夫認(rèn)為那都是些“不合理”的條款。同時(shí)，阿也不再過境俄羅斯天然氣管線輸送天然氣。
The most important lesson for Europe, however, is once again that over-reliance on Russian energy is dangerous. In principle, the Kremlin's drive to charge its neighbours more for gas is reasonable. Overall demand for Russian gas is outstripping supply; suppressing demand in the ex-Soviet states should make more gas available for export to the more lucrative European market. In the particular case of Belarus, the Russians deserve some sympathy. （5）Until last year they were criticised for coddling Mr Lukashenka with preferential gas terms—and Belarus's re-export of duty-free Russian oil was, as one foreign observer in Minsk puts it, an obvious “scam[9]”.
然而對于歐洲而言，最重要的教訓(xùn)莫過于：過分依賴俄羅斯能源是危險(xiǎn)的，而且這樣的教訓(xùn)已經(jīng)不是第一次了。照理說，克里姆林宮想要對賣給鄰國的天然氣漲價(jià)并不過分。它們的天然氣已經(jīng)越來越供不應(yīng)求，限制前蘇聯(lián)國家的天然氣需求能騰出更多的天然氣用于出口到利潤更為可觀的歐洲市場。僅就與白俄羅斯之間的爭執(zhí)來看，俄羅斯人是值得同情的。去年以前，人們一直批評俄羅斯人在天然氣問題上明顯關(guān)照盧卡申科，讓他享受了不少特惠政策——而且，正如明斯克一位外國觀察家指出，白俄羅斯轉(zhuǎn)手輸出俄羅斯的免稅石油（對俄羅斯而言）是一種明顯的“欺詐行為”。
（6）But however reasonable its aims, Russia's bullying and capricious methods, plus its volatile relationship with energy transit countries and carelessness over the impact on European consumers, have rightly alarmed European leaders. Though Mr Putin pledged to “do everything to secure the interests of Western consumers,” Germany's Angela Merkel spoke of damaged confidence. The Europeans should also note that Russia has emerged from its tussle with Belarus with a 50% stake in Belarus's gas pipeline (payment for which will partly offset the gas-price hike), strengthening the Kremlin's grip on Europe's energy infrastructure. An EU energy strategy released this week talked about the need for diversifying suppliers and dealing with them collectively: the quicker, the better.
話說回來，不管俄羅斯的意圖是否合理，它恃強(qiáng)凌弱和出爾反爾的表現(xiàn)，以及同能源輸送過境國之間動蕩不定的關(guān)系和對歐洲能源消費(fèi)國所受影響的不在乎，已經(jīng)很自然地引起了歐洲各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的警惕。普金信誓旦旦地說要“盡力保護(hù)西方石油消費(fèi)國的利益”，可德國總理安吉拉•默克爾表示他們的信心已經(jīng)受到了打擊。歐洲人還應(yīng)當(dāng)看到，俄白“斗氣”最終讓俄羅斯獲得了白俄羅斯天然氣管線50%的股份（購股費(fèi)用將部分抵消天然氣價(jià)格上漲后所增加的支出），克里姆林宮對歐洲能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的控制也得以進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化。歐盟本周公布的一項(xiàng)能源戰(zhàn)略指出，有必要尋求能源供應(yīng)來源多元化，并共同與供應(yīng)來源國進(jìn)行交易——越快越好。
[1]所謂邊緣政策，即一種在談判中以破裂相威脅以達(dá)到施壓力于對方，迫使對方讓步的策略。其特征是兇、狠、份量重，系孤注一擲，成敗在此一舉，常運(yùn)用在“最后立場”的條件上。故邊緣政策可以作為談判終局的標(biāo)志。
[NOTES]（OXFORD）
1. irascible adj. （fml 文） （of a person） easily made angry （指人）易怒的, 性情暴躁的.
2. unfraternal adj. 無兄弟情的，六親不認(rèn)的
3. benighted adj. （dated 舊） unenlightened morally or intellectually; ignorant; backward 未開化的; 愚昧無知的; 落後的: benighted savages 未開化的野人.
4. shore up （phr v） support sth with a wooden beam, etc propped against it （以支柱等）支撐: shore up the side of an old house to stop it falling down 支撐舊屋墻壁以防倒塌 * （fig 比喻） She used this evidence to shore up her argument. 她用該證據(jù)來支持自己的論點(diǎn).
5. cantankerous adj. bad-tempered; quarrelsome 脾氣壞的; 好爭吵的. –ly adv.
6. siphon sth into/out of sth; siphon sth off/out draw （a liquid） from one place to another using a siphon 用虹吸管將（液體）抽出: siphon petrol out of a car into a can 把汽車?yán)锏钠陀煤缥艹檫M(jìn)罐里 * siphon off all the waste liquid 把全部廢液用虹吸管抽掉. siphon sb/sth off （infml often derog 口, 常作貶義） transfer sb/sth from one place to another, often unfairly or illegally 將某人[某物]由一處抽調(diào)到另一處（通常指不公正地或非法地）: The big clubs siphon off all the best players. 大俱樂部把所有選手都抽調(diào)走了. * She siphoned off profits from the business into her account. 她把企業(yè)的贏利轉(zhuǎn)到了自己的帳戶上.
7. rancid adj. 1 （of fatty foods） tasting or smelling bad because of staleness （指含油脂食物）因變質(zhì)而有陳腐味道或氣味的: The butter has gone/turned rancid. 這黃油已經(jīng)哈喇了. 2 （of smells or tastes） like stale fat （指氣味或味道）如陳腐脂肪味的: the rancid stench of dirty drains 臟水溝發(fā)出的腐臭味.
8. vassal n. 1 （in the Middle Ages） man promising to fight for and be loyal to a king or lord in return for the right to hold land （中世紀(jì)的）封臣, 家臣（為國君或領(lǐng)主效忠可受封土地者）. 2 （fig 比喻） person or nation dependent on another 附庸; 下屬; 屬國: [attrib 作定語] vassal states, kingdoms, etc 附庸國、 王國等.
9. scam n. （US infml 口） dishonest scheme 騙局; 欺詐: a betting scam 賭博騙局.