China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, is on a visit to America that includes a meeting with President George Bush. Mr Wen hopes to quell trade tensions. Mr Bush hopes to quell tensions over Taiwan
中國(guó)總理溫家寶在美國(guó)進(jìn)行訪問(wèn)并同布什總統(tǒng)進(jìn)行會(huì)晤。溫希望緩解經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力，而布什則希望緩解對(duì)臺(tái)灣的壓力
ON MONDAY December 8th, Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, kicked off his three-day visit to America by ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. It was a symbolic[標(biāo)志性的] moment—a leader of the Chinese Communist Party firing the starting gun[發(fā)令槍] for the capitalist running dogs of Wall Street. The running dogs clapped, and no wonder: China is good for profits. Its limitless supplies of cheap labour, its efficient production platforms and its absence of currency risk have made it an integral part[主要組成部分] of international capitalism. In recent years, multinational companies have perfected the art of assembling[組裝] their goods in China, selling them back to the West, and distributing the dividends to applauding Wall Street investors.
十二月八日，中國(guó)總理溫家寶以敲響紐約證券交易所的鐘聲開(kāi)始了他為期三天的美國(guó)之行。這是個(gè)標(biāo)志性的時(shí)刻——一個(gè)中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人為華爾街的資本主義走狗打響了發(fā)令槍。走狗們鼓掌了，因?yàn)闊o(wú)疑：中國(guó)能帶來(lái)利益。它能供給無(wú)限的廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力；它有高效的生產(chǎn)平臺(tái)；它沒(méi)有貨幣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這一切使它成為國(guó)際資本主義的重要組成部分。近些年，跨國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)于在中國(guó)組裝他們的產(chǎn)品已是輕車熟路，再把他們的產(chǎn)品買到西方諸國(guó)，然后給這些鼓掌的華爾街投資者帶來(lái)分紅。
On Tuesday, Mr Wen moved on to Washington, where his reception was likely to be less enthusiastic. Tensions[壓力] are rising over trade and Taiwan. Militants[好戰(zhàn)派] in Congress decry China's unbalanced and, they say, unfair trade with America. Meanwhile, militants in mainland China denounce the Taiwanese government's provocative experiments in people power.
周二，溫先生前往華盛頓，但在那里他受到的接待似乎不夠熱情。貿(mào)易和臺(tái)灣問(wèn)題的壓力持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)。國(guó)會(huì)的好戰(zhàn)派譴責(zé)中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)貿(mào)易的不公。同時(shí)，中國(guó)大陸的好戰(zhàn)派也在抨擊臺(tái)灣政府對(duì)民權(quán)的煽動(dòng)性嘗試。
Last month, Taiwan’s parliament passed a law that would allow the island to hold national referendums[公投]. Nothing wrong with that, you might say. But referendums have a nasty[令人厭惡] habit of providing definitive[確定性], yes or no answers to delicate[微妙的] questions that might be better left unposed. For Taiwan, the most delicate question of all is its ambiguous[曖昧的] status vis-a-vis[與] mainland China. The possibility that the people of Taiwan could vote for independence from the mainland enraged[激怒] the authorities[*] in Beijing, who view the island as a wayward[不聽(tīng)教導(dǎo)的] province. They condemned[譴責(zé)] the referendum law as a tool for separatists[獨(dú)立派]. One Chinese military official, quoted by the state media, was frighteningly blunt[直言的]: “Taiwan independence means war,” he said. “This is the word of 1.3 billion people, and we will keep our word.”
上月，臺(tái)灣國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)了一項(xiàng)允許在島上進(jìn)行全民公投的法律。您也許會(huì)說(shuō)這并沒(méi)錯(cuò)，但公投的決定性也是很令人厭惡的，對(duì)于一些微妙的問(wèn)題，與其直接回答“是”或“否”還不如讓它懸而不決。對(duì)臺(tái)灣而言，最微妙問(wèn)題就是它與中國(guó)大陸的不確定的關(guān)系。臺(tái)灣能通過(guò)投票從大陸?yīng)毩⒊鰜?lái)，而激怒北京*，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為臺(tái)灣只是個(gè)不聽(tīng)話的省。他們譴責(zé)公投只是獨(dú)派的工具。據(jù)中國(guó)媒體報(bào)道，一位中國(guó)軍方官員令人生畏地明言：“*就意味著戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，”他補(bǔ)充：“這是十三億人民的聲音，我們言出必行?！?BR> Stung by such outrage[欺辱], the Taiwanese opposition succeeded in watering down the government’s proposal. The law, as passed, would only allow a referendum on Taiwan’s independence if China attacked the island. But Taiwan’s government may not settle for[滿足] that. It has toyed with the idea of repealing[廢黜] the law and starting again. Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian, has said he intends to hold a referendum on March 20th, the same day he stands for re-election, urging China to renounce[放棄] the use of force against the island and to remove the estimated[推測(cè)的] 496 ballistic[彈道] missiles[導(dǎo)彈] it is currently pointing across the Taiwan Strait.
因?yàn)檫@樣的刺激，臺(tái)灣的反對(duì)派成功的阻撓了政府的提案。通過(guò)的發(fā)令只允許臺(tái)灣在受到大陸進(jìn)攻的情況下進(jìn)行公投。但臺(tái)灣的政府不會(huì)滿足于此，它又開(kāi)始玩弄廢法重立的把戲。臺(tái)灣總統(tǒng)陳水扁說(shuō)，他計(jì)劃在明年3月20日進(jìn)行公投，這正是臺(tái)灣選舉總統(tǒng)的日子，以此來(lái)敦促中國(guó)大陸放棄對(duì)臺(tái)灣的武力威脅，移除推測(cè)的496枚對(duì)準(zhǔn)臺(tái)灣海峽的彈道導(dǎo)彈。
The United States is the third corner of this awkward[尷尬的] triangle[三角]. On Monday, it warned mainland China not to contemplate[企圖] coercion[威脅]. But it also told Taiwan that it does not want to see unilateral[單方面的] moves in the direction of independence. President George Bush confirmed that stance[姿態(tài)] on Tuesday, while seated beside Mr Wen. But Taiwan's Mr Chen remains undeterred[未被嚇住的]. On Wednesday, as he launched his campaign[競(jìng)選活動(dòng)] for re-election, he said the “Taiwan people have the right to say loudly that they oppose[反對(duì)] missiles[導(dǎo)彈] and are for democracy[民主].” Mr Bush would rather they spoke softly. As one aide confided[透露] to the New York Times, the president “isn't shopping around for another international crisis”.
美國(guó)是這個(gè)尷尬三角的第三角。周一，它警告中國(guó)大陸不要企圖施加壓力。但它又對(duì)臺(tái)灣說(shuō)，不愿意看到單方面的獨(dú)立進(jìn)程。周二，坐在溫先生旁邊的喬治.布什總統(tǒng)重申了這個(gè)態(tài)度，但臺(tái)灣的陳先生不為所動(dòng)。周三，在他開(kāi)展連任競(jìng)選活動(dòng)時(shí)說(shuō)“臺(tái)灣人民有權(quán)大聲說(shuō)我們反對(duì)導(dǎo)彈，我們期望民主?！笨刹际蚕壬鷮幵杆麄冋f(shuō)話柔和一些。正如他的一個(gè)助手對(duì)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》透露的：總統(tǒng)在另一次國(guó)際危機(jī)之間徘徊。
Talking trade
Mr Bush is, however, shopping around for some concession on trade and exchange rates. China is expected to amass a trade surplus of at least $120 billion with the United States this year. The manufacturing states are in uproar over the migration of jobs to China and their complaints are reverberating in Washington. Last month, America imposed import quotas on Chinese socks, dressing gowns and bras, claiming that they were disrupting America’s textiles market. Some fear that the quotas, while insignificant in themselves, might represent a shot across China’s bow—to be followed up with a full fusillade of protectionist measures if more is not done to narrow the trade gap.
China can hardly apologise for making its exports cheaply. But it is also accused of keeping its currency, the yuan, too cheap. Pegged at a rate of 8.28 to the dollar since 1994, the yuan has followed the greenback on its long march downwards since the beginning of last year. As America’s competitiveness has improved, China’s has kept step, and the trade gap between the two has only widened. John Snow, America’s treasury secretary, has urged the Chinese to move towards unpegging the yuan or repegging it at a less competitive rate. The Chinese authorities have agreed to study the possibility with the Americans, but no more.
However, China’s banks and their customers seem to be expecting something more. According to figures published on Monday by the Bank for International Settlements, $9.1 billion was repatriated to China from foreign bank accounts in the second quarter. Most analysts think these funds are coming home in anticipation of yuan appreciation. If so, Mr Snow may rue the day he lodged the thought in the minds of Chinese investors. China is the third-biggest customer for American government bonds. If it takes its money out of the market, the Treasury’s debt will fetch a lower price, and its cost of borrowing will rise—collateral damage from the Bush administration’s threatened trade war.
中國(guó)總理溫家寶在美國(guó)進(jìn)行訪問(wèn)并同布什總統(tǒng)進(jìn)行會(huì)晤。溫希望緩解經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力，而布什則希望緩解對(duì)臺(tái)灣的壓力
ON MONDAY December 8th, Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, kicked off his three-day visit to America by ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. It was a symbolic[標(biāo)志性的] moment—a leader of the Chinese Communist Party firing the starting gun[發(fā)令槍] for the capitalist running dogs of Wall Street. The running dogs clapped, and no wonder: China is good for profits. Its limitless supplies of cheap labour, its efficient production platforms and its absence of currency risk have made it an integral part[主要組成部分] of international capitalism. In recent years, multinational companies have perfected the art of assembling[組裝] their goods in China, selling them back to the West, and distributing the dividends to applauding Wall Street investors.
十二月八日，中國(guó)總理溫家寶以敲響紐約證券交易所的鐘聲開(kāi)始了他為期三天的美國(guó)之行。這是個(gè)標(biāo)志性的時(shí)刻——一個(gè)中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人為華爾街的資本主義走狗打響了發(fā)令槍。走狗們鼓掌了，因?yàn)闊o(wú)疑：中國(guó)能帶來(lái)利益。它能供給無(wú)限的廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力；它有高效的生產(chǎn)平臺(tái)；它沒(méi)有貨幣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這一切使它成為國(guó)際資本主義的重要組成部分。近些年，跨國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)于在中國(guó)組裝他們的產(chǎn)品已是輕車熟路，再把他們的產(chǎn)品買到西方諸國(guó)，然后給這些鼓掌的華爾街投資者帶來(lái)分紅。
On Tuesday, Mr Wen moved on to Washington, where his reception was likely to be less enthusiastic. Tensions[壓力] are rising over trade and Taiwan. Militants[好戰(zhàn)派] in Congress decry China's unbalanced and, they say, unfair trade with America. Meanwhile, militants in mainland China denounce the Taiwanese government's provocative experiments in people power.
周二，溫先生前往華盛頓，但在那里他受到的接待似乎不夠熱情。貿(mào)易和臺(tái)灣問(wèn)題的壓力持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)。國(guó)會(huì)的好戰(zhàn)派譴責(zé)中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)貿(mào)易的不公。同時(shí)，中國(guó)大陸的好戰(zhàn)派也在抨擊臺(tái)灣政府對(duì)民權(quán)的煽動(dòng)性嘗試。
Last month, Taiwan’s parliament passed a law that would allow the island to hold national referendums[公投]. Nothing wrong with that, you might say. But referendums have a nasty[令人厭惡] habit of providing definitive[確定性], yes or no answers to delicate[微妙的] questions that might be better left unposed. For Taiwan, the most delicate question of all is its ambiguous[曖昧的] status vis-a-vis[與] mainland China. The possibility that the people of Taiwan could vote for independence from the mainland enraged[激怒] the authorities[*] in Beijing, who view the island as a wayward[不聽(tīng)教導(dǎo)的] province. They condemned[譴責(zé)] the referendum law as a tool for separatists[獨(dú)立派]. One Chinese military official, quoted by the state media, was frighteningly blunt[直言的]: “Taiwan independence means war,” he said. “This is the word of 1.3 billion people, and we will keep our word.”
上月，臺(tái)灣國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)了一項(xiàng)允許在島上進(jìn)行全民公投的法律。您也許會(huì)說(shuō)這并沒(méi)錯(cuò)，但公投的決定性也是很令人厭惡的，對(duì)于一些微妙的問(wèn)題，與其直接回答“是”或“否”還不如讓它懸而不決。對(duì)臺(tái)灣而言，最微妙問(wèn)題就是它與中國(guó)大陸的不確定的關(guān)系。臺(tái)灣能通過(guò)投票從大陸?yīng)毩⒊鰜?lái)，而激怒北京*，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為臺(tái)灣只是個(gè)不聽(tīng)話的省。他們譴責(zé)公投只是獨(dú)派的工具。據(jù)中國(guó)媒體報(bào)道，一位中國(guó)軍方官員令人生畏地明言：“*就意味著戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，”他補(bǔ)充：“這是十三億人民的聲音，我們言出必行?！?BR> Stung by such outrage[欺辱], the Taiwanese opposition succeeded in watering down the government’s proposal. The law, as passed, would only allow a referendum on Taiwan’s independence if China attacked the island. But Taiwan’s government may not settle for[滿足] that. It has toyed with the idea of repealing[廢黜] the law and starting again. Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian, has said he intends to hold a referendum on March 20th, the same day he stands for re-election, urging China to renounce[放棄] the use of force against the island and to remove the estimated[推測(cè)的] 496 ballistic[彈道] missiles[導(dǎo)彈] it is currently pointing across the Taiwan Strait.
因?yàn)檫@樣的刺激，臺(tái)灣的反對(duì)派成功的阻撓了政府的提案。通過(guò)的發(fā)令只允許臺(tái)灣在受到大陸進(jìn)攻的情況下進(jìn)行公投。但臺(tái)灣的政府不會(huì)滿足于此，它又開(kāi)始玩弄廢法重立的把戲。臺(tái)灣總統(tǒng)陳水扁說(shuō)，他計(jì)劃在明年3月20日進(jìn)行公投，這正是臺(tái)灣選舉總統(tǒng)的日子，以此來(lái)敦促中國(guó)大陸放棄對(duì)臺(tái)灣的武力威脅，移除推測(cè)的496枚對(duì)準(zhǔn)臺(tái)灣海峽的彈道導(dǎo)彈。
The United States is the third corner of this awkward[尷尬的] triangle[三角]. On Monday, it warned mainland China not to contemplate[企圖] coercion[威脅]. But it also told Taiwan that it does not want to see unilateral[單方面的] moves in the direction of independence. President George Bush confirmed that stance[姿態(tài)] on Tuesday, while seated beside Mr Wen. But Taiwan's Mr Chen remains undeterred[未被嚇住的]. On Wednesday, as he launched his campaign[競(jìng)選活動(dòng)] for re-election, he said the “Taiwan people have the right to say loudly that they oppose[反對(duì)] missiles[導(dǎo)彈] and are for democracy[民主].” Mr Bush would rather they spoke softly. As one aide confided[透露] to the New York Times, the president “isn't shopping around for another international crisis”.
美國(guó)是這個(gè)尷尬三角的第三角。周一，它警告中國(guó)大陸不要企圖施加壓力。但它又對(duì)臺(tái)灣說(shuō)，不愿意看到單方面的獨(dú)立進(jìn)程。周二，坐在溫先生旁邊的喬治.布什總統(tǒng)重申了這個(gè)態(tài)度，但臺(tái)灣的陳先生不為所動(dòng)。周三，在他開(kāi)展連任競(jìng)選活動(dòng)時(shí)說(shuō)“臺(tái)灣人民有權(quán)大聲說(shuō)我們反對(duì)導(dǎo)彈，我們期望民主?！笨刹际蚕壬鷮幵杆麄冋f(shuō)話柔和一些。正如他的一個(gè)助手對(duì)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》透露的：總統(tǒng)在另一次國(guó)際危機(jī)之間徘徊。
Talking trade
Mr Bush is, however, shopping around for some concession on trade and exchange rates. China is expected to amass a trade surplus of at least $120 billion with the United States this year. The manufacturing states are in uproar over the migration of jobs to China and their complaints are reverberating in Washington. Last month, America imposed import quotas on Chinese socks, dressing gowns and bras, claiming that they were disrupting America’s textiles market. Some fear that the quotas, while insignificant in themselves, might represent a shot across China’s bow—to be followed up with a full fusillade of protectionist measures if more is not done to narrow the trade gap.
China can hardly apologise for making its exports cheaply. But it is also accused of keeping its currency, the yuan, too cheap. Pegged at a rate of 8.28 to the dollar since 1994, the yuan has followed the greenback on its long march downwards since the beginning of last year. As America’s competitiveness has improved, China’s has kept step, and the trade gap between the two has only widened. John Snow, America’s treasury secretary, has urged the Chinese to move towards unpegging the yuan or repegging it at a less competitive rate. The Chinese authorities have agreed to study the possibility with the Americans, but no more.
However, China’s banks and their customers seem to be expecting something more. According to figures published on Monday by the Bank for International Settlements, $9.1 billion was repatriated to China from foreign bank accounts in the second quarter. Most analysts think these funds are coming home in anticipation of yuan appreciation. If so, Mr Snow may rue the day he lodged the thought in the minds of Chinese investors. China is the third-biggest customer for American government bonds. If it takes its money out of the market, the Treasury’s debt will fetch a lower price, and its cost of borrowing will rise—collateral damage from the Bush administration’s threatened trade war.