To develop a feed-forward orientation as a complement to the feedback practices they currently use, corporations must learn to envision the future. In this variation of scenario planning, enterprises should describe the set of external and internal circumstances that they would like to see in the next 10, 20, or 50 years. This will open executives’ minds to the range and unpredictability of possibilities that the future may bring. Enterprises must then pursue strategies that will increase the likelihood of those circumstances’ becoming reality. For instance, in the early 1980s, Alcoa envisioned a future in which aluminum, rather than steel, would be automobile manufacturers’ metal of choice. In 1982, it allied with Audi to make that happen. By the mid-1990s, the collaboration between the two companies had produced the breakthrough Audi Space Frame, an aluminum structure into which car body panels are integrated so that they can perform a load-bearing function, which later became the industry norm.
Wicked strategy issues don’t occur according to a timetable. Companies must constantly scan the environment for weak signals rather than conduct periodic analyses of the business landscape. (See, for example, George S. Day and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, “Scanning the Periphery,” HBR November 2005.) It’s increasingly difficult to identify the boundaries of the arenas companies should watch. Changes in one industry or segment often affect companies in others. For instance, who could have imagined that changes brought about by the computer industry and the internet would affect the music industry so radically? Businesses should scan sources of regulatory and technological change in addition to monitoring suppliers, competitors, potential entrants, and customers all over the world.
To forge effective approaches to wicked issues, executives must explore and monitor the assumptions behind their strategies. One way of doing that is through discovery-driven planning, where executives list the assumptions underlying the revenues and income they expect and test the validity of each premise. (See Rita Gunther McGrath and Ian C. MacMillan, “Discovery-Driven Planning,” HBR July–August 1995.) By sharing those assumptions, executives can better align decision making throughout the organization.
Case Study: How PPG Battles Wickedness
PPG Industries’ strategic-planning practices constitute an effective response to wicked strategy issues. The company, founded over a century ago as a plate-glass manufacturer, makes chemicals and coatings too. With 125 manufacturing facilities and partners in 25 countries, PPG is a global player. Although it operates in mature industries, the company has paid dividends every year since 1899—and has maintained or increased dividends every year since 1972.
PPG first became aware of strategy’s wickedness in the late 1980s. Two missteps taught the company that diversification, be it into other industries or countries, is fraught with peril. Realizing that growth was slowing down, PPG expanded its portfolio by acquiring medical electronics businesses from Honeywell and Litton Industries in 1986 and from Allegheny International in 1987. However, the biomedical industry’s volatility and the units’ focus on customization didn’t fit the company’s competence in low-cost, standardized production. Seven years later, PPG had to sell the division. The company’s other wicked challenge was China, where PPG’s initial focus was glass. Although it entered the market in 1987, PPG’s operations there were unprofitable until the mid-1990s. The company then realized that it would have to focus on coatings if it wanted to make money in China.
These experiences changed the company’s approach to planning strategy in three ways. First, in the mid-1980s, PPG revisited its mission and articulated its identity in a document called the Blueprint. The company stated that it valued steady growth that met stakeholders’ expectations; that it believed it was capable of achieving high levels of operational efficiency and using technology to develop innovations; and that it aspired to remain a profitable global player in all its businesses. Since then, PPG’s identity has been more or less unchanged. The 2006 iteration mentioned the same core values and expressed a similar aspiration, with some modification in PPG’s goals. It also identified a richer set of competencies. Although PPG’s business portfolio has changed, with coatings assuming primacy over glass in the 2000s, its identity has endured.
Sidebar IconPPG’s Alternate Futures
Second, PPG’s plans have become living documents. They change frequently as the result of technology reviews conducted by teams of senior and R&D executives; examinations of the business portfolio at the corporate level; brainstorming sessions that promote fresh thinking by executives and employees; and scanning of markets, technologies, and regulatory issues by its three business units. PPG’s executives say that the planning process is continuous, with the company constantly identifying problems and developing responses. The company often draws up possible scenarios and works to create the future it desires. The exhibit “PPG’s Alternate Futures” shows the future scenarios it drew up in 2004 after making assumptions about two key variables: the cost of the energy required for its manufacturing operations and the extent of the opportunity to compete globally through differentiation. When PPG’s senior executives studied the scenarios, they identified three kinds of actions that would deliver results in all four cases:
Emphasize operational excellence through cost efficiency (using lean manufacturing techniques and improved logistics) and quality (through Six Sigma programs).
Wicked strategy issues don’t occur according to a timetable. Companies must constantly scan the environment for weak signals rather than conduct periodic analyses of the business landscape. (See, for example, George S. Day and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, “Scanning the Periphery,” HBR November 2005.) It’s increasingly difficult to identify the boundaries of the arenas companies should watch. Changes in one industry or segment often affect companies in others. For instance, who could have imagined that changes brought about by the computer industry and the internet would affect the music industry so radically? Businesses should scan sources of regulatory and technological change in addition to monitoring suppliers, competitors, potential entrants, and customers all over the world.
To forge effective approaches to wicked issues, executives must explore and monitor the assumptions behind their strategies. One way of doing that is through discovery-driven planning, where executives list the assumptions underlying the revenues and income they expect and test the validity of each premise. (See Rita Gunther McGrath and Ian C. MacMillan, “Discovery-Driven Planning,” HBR July–August 1995.) By sharing those assumptions, executives can better align decision making throughout the organization.
Case Study: How PPG Battles Wickedness
PPG Industries’ strategic-planning practices constitute an effective response to wicked strategy issues. The company, founded over a century ago as a plate-glass manufacturer, makes chemicals and coatings too. With 125 manufacturing facilities and partners in 25 countries, PPG is a global player. Although it operates in mature industries, the company has paid dividends every year since 1899—and has maintained or increased dividends every year since 1972.
PPG first became aware of strategy’s wickedness in the late 1980s. Two missteps taught the company that diversification, be it into other industries or countries, is fraught with peril. Realizing that growth was slowing down, PPG expanded its portfolio by acquiring medical electronics businesses from Honeywell and Litton Industries in 1986 and from Allegheny International in 1987. However, the biomedical industry’s volatility and the units’ focus on customization didn’t fit the company’s competence in low-cost, standardized production. Seven years later, PPG had to sell the division. The company’s other wicked challenge was China, where PPG’s initial focus was glass. Although it entered the market in 1987, PPG’s operations there were unprofitable until the mid-1990s. The company then realized that it would have to focus on coatings if it wanted to make money in China.
These experiences changed the company’s approach to planning strategy in three ways. First, in the mid-1980s, PPG revisited its mission and articulated its identity in a document called the Blueprint. The company stated that it valued steady growth that met stakeholders’ expectations; that it believed it was capable of achieving high levels of operational efficiency and using technology to develop innovations; and that it aspired to remain a profitable global player in all its businesses. Since then, PPG’s identity has been more or less unchanged. The 2006 iteration mentioned the same core values and expressed a similar aspiration, with some modification in PPG’s goals. It also identified a richer set of competencies. Although PPG’s business portfolio has changed, with coatings assuming primacy over glass in the 2000s, its identity has endured.
Sidebar IconPPG’s Alternate Futures
Second, PPG’s plans have become living documents. They change frequently as the result of technology reviews conducted by teams of senior and R&D executives; examinations of the business portfolio at the corporate level; brainstorming sessions that promote fresh thinking by executives and employees; and scanning of markets, technologies, and regulatory issues by its three business units. PPG’s executives say that the planning process is continuous, with the company constantly identifying problems and developing responses. The company often draws up possible scenarios and works to create the future it desires. The exhibit “PPG’s Alternate Futures” shows the future scenarios it drew up in 2004 after making assumptions about two key variables: the cost of the energy required for its manufacturing operations and the extent of the opportunity to compete globally through differentiation. When PPG’s senior executives studied the scenarios, they identified three kinds of actions that would deliver results in all four cases:
Emphasize operational excellence through cost efficiency (using lean manufacturing techniques and improved logistics) and quality (through Six Sigma programs).