2007考研英語時(shí)文閱讀(14)

字號(hào):

英國財(cái)相擬提升倫敦金融中心地位
    2006年3月21日 星期二
    Brown to focus on London’s position
    英國財(cái)相擬提升倫敦金融中心地位
    Gordon Brown, UK chancellor of the exchequer, will tomorrow unveil a new drive to expand London’s position as one of the world’s leading financial centres, conceding that the government must do much more to preserve one of the main pillars of the British economy.【您現(xiàn)在閱讀的文章來自“中國學(xué)習(xí)考試網(wǎng)”,請(qǐng)記住我們的永久域名:www.stu88.com 】
    英國財(cái)政大臣戈登•布朗(Gordon Brown)將于明日宣布一項(xiàng)新舉措,提升倫敦作為全球主要金融中心之一的地位。他將承認(rèn)英國政府必須采取更多措施,來保護(hù)這一英國主要的經(jīng)濟(jì)支柱之一。
    Announcing a budget that will have the promotion of the UK’s high value added industries as its central theme, the British finance minister looks set to launch his most concerted campaign to woo the City since the left-of-centre Labour party came to power in 1997.
    在布朗即將宣布的預(yù)算案中,中心議題將是促進(jìn)英國高附加值產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展。這將是中間偏左的工黨(Labour party) 自1997年執(zhí)政以來,這位英國財(cái)政大臣為取悅倫敦金融城而準(zhǔn)備出臺(tái)的面的措施。
    In nearly a decade as chancellor, Mr Brown has sought to protect the City’s status as one of the world’s top financial centres, most notably facing down plans for a European Union withholding tax on bonds.
    在布朗擔(dān)任財(cái)政大臣的近10年中,他曾多次尋求保護(hù)倫敦金融城作為全球金融中心的地位,其中最的是他反對(duì)歐盟(EU)對(duì)債券征收預(yù)扣稅的計(jì)劃。
    But Mr Brown has told leading City figures that the government must work far more closely with London’s leading institutions to preserve the capital’s status. He has therefore pledged to listen hard to concerns that London has the right tax and regulatory structures in order to attract business from the growing Chinese and Indian economies.
    但布朗已向金融城的大人物們表示,政府必須與倫敦主要金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行更為密切的合作,以維護(hù)倫敦的地位。因此,他承諾將認(rèn)真聽取意見,確保倫敦?fù)碛泻侠淼亩愂蘸捅O(jiān)管結(jié)構(gòu),以便從不斷發(fā)展的中國和印度吸引業(yè)務(wù)。
    Mr Brown will announce that he is bringing together a number of leading City institutions – such as the London Stock Exchange, Euronext-Liffe and the London Investment Banking Association –to “develop and support a co-ordinated strategy” for the City.
    布朗將宣布,他將與金融城眾多機(jī)構(gòu)合作,包括倫敦證交所(LSE)、泛歐交易所-倫敦國際金融期貨期權(quán)交易所(Euronext-Liffe)和倫敦投資銀行協(xié)會(huì)(London Investment Banking Asociation)等,為金融城“制訂并支持實(shí)施一項(xiàng)協(xié)同戰(zhàn)略”。
    The chancellor will publish a detailed analysis by Treasury officials of the challenges facing London, arguing that the City cannot be complacent.
    布朗將就倫敦面臨的挑戰(zhàn),發(fā)表一份由英國財(cái)政部官員編寫的詳盡分析報(bào)告,指出金融城不能滿足于現(xiàn)狀。
    At the heart of this drive will be an overhaul of UK Trade and Investment, the government’s export promotion body, so that it focuses more heavily on trade links with India and China.
    布朗新舉措的核心內(nèi)容是對(duì)英國貿(mào)易及投資署(UK Trade & Investment)進(jìn)行全面改革,使其更加關(guān)注與中國和印度的貿(mào)易關(guān)系。英國貿(mào)易及投資署是英國政府的出口促進(jìn)機(jī)構(gòu)。
    Leading City figures have been concerned by a range of issues, including the Treasury’s 0.5 per cent stamp duty on all share transactions, yielding the government £2bn ($3.5bn, ?2.9bn) a year.
    金融城的大人物一直對(duì)一系列問題表示擔(dān)憂,包括財(cái)政部對(duì)所有股票交易征收0.5%印花稅的問題。這項(xiàng)稅收每年為政府帶來20億英鎊(35億美元)收入。
    注釋:
    chancellor n.長官, 大臣
    exchequer n. 財(cái)政部
    pillar n.[建] 柱子, 棟梁, 重要的支持者
    woo v.求愛, 追求, 懇求, 招致
    face down v.壓倒, 降服
    withhold vt.使停止, 拒給, 保留, 抑制
    bring together 集合
    overhaul n.全面檢查,全面修訂
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    “敲打中國”──卻敲響美元喪鐘?
    2006年3月22日 星期三
    “敲打中國”──卻敲響美元喪鐘?
    How China creates American jobs
    美國政客們?nèi)遮厙?yán)重的保護(hù)主義本能,是否會(huì)破壞美元匯率的穩(wěn)定?
    Could the increasingly protectionist instincts of US politicians destabilise the dollar?
    在這方面肯定有一些不祥的跡象。首先:阿拉伯聯(lián)合酋長國決定將10%的外匯儲(chǔ)備換成其它貨幣,以此回應(yīng)美國抵制迪拜港口世界公司(Dubai Ports World)成為美國港口的潛在所有者。這筆數(shù)目在外匯市場(chǎng)微不足道,但如果其它中東國家也開始效仿,情況可能就會(huì)有所不同。此外,美國參議員查爾斯·舒默(Charles Schumer)和林塞·格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)起草了一項(xiàng)法案,提議對(duì)中國進(jìn)口商品征收27.5%的關(guān)稅,中國對(duì)此會(huì)做何反應(yīng)呢?對(duì)于美國這樣每月經(jīng)常賬戶赤字逾700億美元的國家,這種做法就像是搬起石頭砸自己的腳。
    There are certainly some ugly pointers, starting with the United Arab Emirates' decision to switch 10 per cent of its reserves out of the dollar in response to the US rejection of Dubai Ports World as a potential owner of American ports. This is peanuts in the currency markets but, if others in the Middle East followed suit, it could look different. Then there is the question of what China might do in response to the Schumer/ Graham draft bill in the US senate to impose a 27.5 per cent tariff on Chinese imports. Coming from a country with a current account deficit running at more than $70bn (£40bn) a month, this looks a lunatic shot in the foot.
    然而,我難以相信美元匯率將會(huì)暴跌,也難以相信全球失衡會(huì)出現(xiàn)過于突然的調(diào)整。產(chǎn)油國必須為自己的盈余尋找去處。它們也許喜歡把歐元變成一種“石油貨幣”(petrocurrency)的主意,但就流動(dòng)性而言,歐元和歐元區(qū)債券市場(chǎng)都無法與美元市場(chǎng)相提并論。
    Yet I find it hard to believe that we are about to see a dollar collapse and an over-abrupt adjustment of global imbalances. Oil producers have to find a home for their surpluses. They may like the idea of turning the euro into a petrocurrency but the euro and eurozone bond market cannot compete on liquidity with dollar markets.
    同樣道理也適用于亞洲各國的官方儲(chǔ)備。除非它們準(zhǔn)備采用一種大不相同的經(jīng)濟(jì)管理方式和匯率政策,否則就需要美國赤字提供的調(diào)節(jié)功能——這種調(diào)節(jié)是歐元區(qū)無力提供的。
    Much the same point applies to the holders of Asian official reserves. Unless they are prepared to adopt a very different approach to economic management and exchange rate policy, they need the accommodation provided by the US deficit - accommodation that would not be afforded by the eurozone.
    這并非美國盡管面臨巨額外債,卻仍占盡風(fēng)光的原因。從國際收支平衡資本賬戶的角度來看,美國是商業(yè)銀行、私人股本投資者和對(duì)沖基金的混合體。
    That is not the only sense in which the US is sitting pretty despite its huge external indebtedness. Looked at from a balance of payments capital account perspective, it is a cross between a commercial bank, a private equity investor and a hedge fund.
    追溯到20世紀(jì)70年代,在石油美元的循環(huán)時(shí)期,美國主要扮演銀行貸方的角色,以本幣借入短期借款,并發(fā)放長期貸款。20世紀(jì)80年代,隨著美國從國際債權(quán)國變?yōu)閭鶆?wù)國,它更偏重于投資那些回報(bào)率較高的資產(chǎn),如外國直接投資(FDI),好像一家私人股本公司。
    Back in the 1970s, during the petrodollar recycling episode, the US operated primarily as a bank lender, borrowing short in its own currency and lending long. In the 1980s, as it changed from being an international creditor to a debtor, it invested more heavily in higher return assets such as foreign direct investment, like a private equity house.
    近年來,美國投資者遵循對(duì)沖基金的思路,大舉投資包括新興市場(chǎng)在內(nèi)的外國股市。
    More recently US investors have invested heavily in foreign equities, including the emerging markets, along hedge fund lines.
    其結(jié)果是,美國一邊從流動(dòng)性和安全意識(shí)較強(qiáng)的歐、亞貸方低成本借入資金,一邊加大在收益率較高的外國資產(chǎn)上的投資。同時(shí),美國對(duì)外直接投資的所得,要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于其它國家在美直接投資的所得。因此,盡管是一個(gè)凈債務(wù)國,美國仍能產(chǎn)生巨額收入盈余。
    The result is that, while the US leverages up with low-cost borrowing from liquidity and security-conscious Eurasian lenders, it invests growing amounts in higher yielding foreign assets. It also earns much more on its FDI than foreigners do on FDI in the US. So, despite being a net debtor, the US generates a big income surplus.
    在即將發(fā)表于《朗伯德街研究》(Lombard Street Research)的一篇論文里,布賴恩·里丁(Brian Reading)主張,美國沒有像許多人預(yù)料的那樣落入債務(wù)陷阱之中,因?yàn)槊绹鴥羰杖朐鲩L速度一直遠(yuǎn)高于凈債務(wù)增速。這在一定程度上也可以解釋,在美國經(jīng)常賬戶赤字迅速擴(kuò)大的情況下,美元始終沒有崩盤。
    In a forthcoming paper for Lombard Street Research, Brian Reading argues that the US has not fallen into the widely predicted debt trap largely because its net income has been growing so much faster than net debt. Here is part of the explanation for the dollar's failure to collapse despite the burgeoning current account deficit.
    里丁還就中國的8000億美元外匯儲(chǔ)備提出了一個(gè)重要觀點(diǎn)。美國目前在外國直接投資方面的回報(bào)率為10.5%,而在政府借貸上僅支付3.5%的成本。這樣,通過再循環(huán)中國的外匯儲(chǔ)備,美國就能獲得7%的回報(bào),總額超過500億美元,相當(dāng)于美國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的0.5%。從實(shí)際效應(yīng)上說,美國在為中國運(yùn)行一個(gè)代理離岸銀行系統(tǒng)。中國的在岸銀行體系還比較落后。
    Mr Reading also makes an important point about China's $800bn foreign exchange reserves. The US currently earns a 10.5 per cent return on its foreign direct investment and pays 3.5 per cent on government borrowing. It is thus making a 7 percentage point turn of more than $50bn, equivalent to half a per cent of US gross domestic product, on recycling Chinese reserves. In effect, it is running a surrogate offshore banking system for China, whose onshore banks are pretty primitive.
    在美國制造業(yè)萎縮之際,上述狀況在美國金融服務(wù)業(yè)創(chuàng)造了大量工作機(jī)會(huì)。對(duì)此,美國國會(huì)的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義者應(yīng)給予注意。
    This has created a welter of financial services jobs in the US as manufacturing shrinks. Protectionists on Capitol Hill please note.
    譯者/梁艷梅 徐柳