學(xué)券計劃 孩子與音樂 電子書
報紙的消亡 環(huán)境保護(hù) 帶薪請假制度
英語的消亡
FEW ideas in education are more controversial than vouchers——letting parents choose to educate their children wherever they wish at the taxpayer's expense. First suggested by Milton Friedman, an economist, in 1955, the principle is compelling simple. The state pays； parents choose； schools compete； standards rise； everybody gains.
Simple, perhaps, but it has aroused predictable——and often fatal——opposition from the educational establishment. Letting parents choose where to educate their children is a silly idea； professionals know best. Cooperation, not competition, is the way to improve education for all. Vouchers would increase inequality because children who are hardest to teach would be left behind.
But these arguments are now succumbing to sheer weight of evidence. Voucher schemes are running in several different countries without ill-effects for social cohesion； those that use a lottery to hand out vouchers offer proof that recipients get a better education than those that do not.
Harry Patrinos, an education economist at the World Bank, cites a Colombian program to broaden access to secondary schooling, known as PACES, a 1990s initiative that provided over 125,000 poor children with vouchers worth around half the cost of private secondary school. Crucially, there were more applicants than vouchers. The programme, which selected children by lottery, provided researchers with an almost perfect experiment, akin to the pill-placebo studies used to judge the efficacy of new medicines. The subsequent results show that the children who received vouchers were 15—20% more likely to finish secondary education, five percentage points less likely to repeat a grade, scorced a bit better on scholastic tests and were much more likely to take college entrance exams.
Vouchers programmes in several American states have been run along similar lines. Greg Forster, a statistician at the Friedman Foundation, a charity advocating universal vouchers, says there have been eight similar studies in America： seven showed statistically significant positive results but was not designed well enough to count.
The voucher pupils did better even though the sate spent less than it would have done had the children been educated in normal state schools. American voucher schemes typically offer private schools around half of what the sate would spend if the pupils stayed in public schools. The Colombian programme did not even set out to offer better schooling than was available in the state sector； the aim was simply to raise enrollment rates as quickly and cheaply as possible.
These results are important because they strip out other influences. Home, neighborhood and natural ability all affect results more than which school a child attends. If the pupils who received vouchers differ from those who don't——perhaps simply by coming from the sort of go-getting family that elbows its way to the front of every queue——any effect might simply be the result of any number of other factors. But assigning the vouchers randomly guarded against this risk.
Opponents still argue that those who exercise choice will be the most able and committed, and by clustering themselves together in better schools they will abandon the weak and voiceless to languish in rotten ones. Some cite the example of Chile, where a universal voucher scheme that allows schools to charge top-up fees seems to have improved the education of the best-off most.
The strongest evidence against this criticism comes from Sweden, where parents are freer than those in almost any other country to spend as they wish the money the government allocates to educating their children. Sweeping education reforms in 1992 not only relaxed enrolment rules in state sector, allowing students to attend schools outside their own municipality, but also let them take their state funding to private schools, including religious ones and those operating for profit. The only real restrictions imposed on private schools were that they must run their admissions on a first-come-first-served basis and promise not to charge top-up fees(most American voucher schemes impose similar conditions).
The result has been burgeoning variety and a breakneck expansion of the private sector. At the time of the reforms only around 1% of Swedish students were educated privately； now 10% are, and growth in private schooling continues unabated.
Anders Hultin of Kunskapsskolan, a chain of 26 Swedish schools founded by a venture capitalist in 1999 and now running at a profit, says its schools only rarely have to invoke the first-come-first-served rule——the chain has responded to demand by expanding so fast that parents keen to send their children to its schools usually get a place. So the private sector, by increasing the total number of places available, can ease the mad scramble for the best schools in the state sector(bureaucrats, by contrast, dislike paying for extra places in popular schools if there are vacancies in bad ones).
More evidence that choice can raise standards for all comes from Caroline Hoxby, an economist at Harvard University, who has shown that when American public schools must compete for their students with schools that accept vouchers, their performance improves. Swedish researchers say the same. It seems that those who work in state schools are just like everybody else： they do better when confronted by a bit of competition.
沒有什么教育觀念比學(xué)券更容易引發(fā)爭議。所謂學(xué)券，就是讓父母花納稅人的錢隨意為孩子選擇去哪里上學(xué)。經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Milton Friedman 1955年首次提出這一概念，其原則十分簡單，但令人信服：即國家出錢；父母選擇；學(xué)校競爭，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提升；各方受益。
這一原則雖然簡單，但引發(fā)了教育機構(gòu)的反對。這是預(yù)料之中的，但常常是致命的。讓父母為孩子選擇在何處接受教育的想法很荒唐；專業(yè)人士才是最懂行的。合作而非競爭才是提高所有學(xué)生教育水平的方式。學(xué)券會增加不平等，因為最難教的孩子將會被甩在后面。
但是這些說法在強有力的證據(jù)面前正敗下陣來。一些不同的國家正在實行學(xué)券計劃，但并沒有對社會疑聚力造成負(fù)面影響；用抽簽方式發(fā)放學(xué)券的國家也證明：接受學(xué)券者比不接受學(xué)券者獲得了更好的教育。
世界銀行的教育經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Harry Patrinos列舉了20世紀(jì)90年代啟動、被稱做“PACES”的哥倫比亞項目。該項目旨在增加學(xué)生上中學(xué)的機會。它為12.5 萬名貧困孩子提供了學(xué)券，其價值約為私立中學(xué)教育收費的一半。但關(guān)鍵問題是，申請人比學(xué)券多。該項目以抽簽方式挑選學(xué)生，為研究人員提供了幾乎完美無缺的實驗，類似于用來判定新藥療效的“安慰劑”研究。后來的研究結(jié)果表明，接受學(xué)券的孩子完成中學(xué)學(xué)業(yè)的可能性要高出15%至20%，留級的可能性低5個百分點，在學(xué)術(shù)能力測試中的得分高些，也更有可能參加大學(xué)入學(xué)考試。
美國也有幾個州在類似方式實施學(xué)券計劃。主張全面推廣學(xué)券計劃的慈善組織弗里德曼基金會的統(tǒng)計學(xué)家Greg Forster說，美國有8項類似的研究，其中7項研究的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)顯示，學(xué)券對于那些幸運的獲得者們具有明顯的積極作用；第8項研究也顯示了正面結(jié)果，但由于設(shè)計不佳不予考慮。
盡管在與普通公立學(xué)校接受教育的學(xué)生相比，政府的支出要少，但接受學(xué)券的學(xué)生成績卻更好。美國的學(xué)券計劃通常提供給私立學(xué)校費用為政府在公立學(xué)校學(xué)生身上投入的一半。哥倫比亞項目甚至沒有把提供比公立學(xué)校更好的教育作為目標(biāo)；其目標(biāo)僅僅是盡快提高入學(xué)率，并提供盡可能便宜的教育。
這些研究結(jié)果非常重要，因為他們完全排除了其它因素的影響。家庭背景、居住社區(qū)環(huán)境和天賦都比孩子在哪個學(xué)校就讀更能影響結(jié)果。如果說拿到學(xué)券的學(xué)生與未能拿到學(xué)券的學(xué)生之間存在差異——或許僅僅由于前者來自那種事事爭先，志在必得的家庭——任何差可能僅僅是其他多種因素作用的結(jié)果。但隨機分配學(xué)券避免了這種風(fēng)險。
反對學(xué)券制者認(rèn)為，那些擇校的人能力、最執(zhí)著，如果讓他們在好學(xué)校扎堆兒，會將那些處于弱勢地位、沒有代言人的學(xué)生留在爛校長期受煎熬。有人舉智利為例，該國普及了允許學(xué)校收取附加學(xué)費的學(xué)券計劃，但似乎只程度地提高了最富裕學(xué)生的教育水平。
反擊這一批評的最有力的證據(jù)來自瑞典。瑞典的父母比幾乎任何其它國家的人都自由，可隨意支配政府分配的子女教育費用。1992年開始的全面改革不僅放寬了公立學(xué)校的入學(xué)要求，允許學(xué)生到他們所居住的城市以外的地方上學(xué)，而且也允許學(xué)生將國家的資助轉(zhuǎn)到私立學(xué)校，包括宗教學(xué)校以及盈利性學(xué)校。對私立學(xué)校真正的限制就是必須按“先來先得”的原則招收學(xué)生，并且要承諾不收取附加費(大多數(shù)美國學(xué)券計劃也附加類似條件)。
這樣做的結(jié)果是辦學(xué)形式越來越多樣化，私立學(xué)校飛速增加。啟動改革時，瑞典只有大約1%的學(xué)生在私立學(xué)校接受教育，現(xiàn)在達(dá)到了10%，而且在私立學(xué)校就讀學(xué)生比例增長的趨勢依然不減。
一位風(fēng)險資本家在1999年創(chuàng)辦的Kunskapsskolan是一家擁有26所瑞典學(xué)校的連鎖學(xué)校，現(xiàn)在正處于贏利狀態(tài)。該校的Anders Hultin 說，各分校幾乎沒有用過“先來先得”的規(guī)則——為滿足需求，連鎖學(xué)校增加得非?？?，愿意送孩子來該校讀書的家長一般都能如愿。所以，通過增加學(xué)校數(shù)量，私立學(xué)校這一領(lǐng)域能夠緩解公立學(xué)校領(lǐng)域瘋狂爭搶進(jìn)入學(xué)校的壓力(對比之下，如果劣等學(xué)校還有招生空間，政府官員就不愿意為增加招生撥款)。
哈佛大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Caroline Hoxby為擇校能夠提高所有學(xué)生水平提供了更多的證據(jù)。他已經(jīng)證明，當(dāng)美國的公立學(xué)校必須同接受學(xué)券的學(xué)校競爭生源時，它們的業(yè)績就有進(jìn)步。瑞典的研究人員也堅持同樣的觀點?？磥?，在公立學(xué)校工作的人就像其他人一樣：面對一點競爭時，他們會做得更好。
報紙的消亡 環(huán)境保護(hù) 帶薪請假制度
英語的消亡
FEW ideas in education are more controversial than vouchers——letting parents choose to educate their children wherever they wish at the taxpayer's expense. First suggested by Milton Friedman, an economist, in 1955, the principle is compelling simple. The state pays； parents choose； schools compete； standards rise； everybody gains.
Simple, perhaps, but it has aroused predictable——and often fatal——opposition from the educational establishment. Letting parents choose where to educate their children is a silly idea； professionals know best. Cooperation, not competition, is the way to improve education for all. Vouchers would increase inequality because children who are hardest to teach would be left behind.
But these arguments are now succumbing to sheer weight of evidence. Voucher schemes are running in several different countries without ill-effects for social cohesion； those that use a lottery to hand out vouchers offer proof that recipients get a better education than those that do not.
Harry Patrinos, an education economist at the World Bank, cites a Colombian program to broaden access to secondary schooling, known as PACES, a 1990s initiative that provided over 125,000 poor children with vouchers worth around half the cost of private secondary school. Crucially, there were more applicants than vouchers. The programme, which selected children by lottery, provided researchers with an almost perfect experiment, akin to the pill-placebo studies used to judge the efficacy of new medicines. The subsequent results show that the children who received vouchers were 15—20% more likely to finish secondary education, five percentage points less likely to repeat a grade, scorced a bit better on scholastic tests and were much more likely to take college entrance exams.
Vouchers programmes in several American states have been run along similar lines. Greg Forster, a statistician at the Friedman Foundation, a charity advocating universal vouchers, says there have been eight similar studies in America： seven showed statistically significant positive results but was not designed well enough to count.
The voucher pupils did better even though the sate spent less than it would have done had the children been educated in normal state schools. American voucher schemes typically offer private schools around half of what the sate would spend if the pupils stayed in public schools. The Colombian programme did not even set out to offer better schooling than was available in the state sector； the aim was simply to raise enrollment rates as quickly and cheaply as possible.
These results are important because they strip out other influences. Home, neighborhood and natural ability all affect results more than which school a child attends. If the pupils who received vouchers differ from those who don't——perhaps simply by coming from the sort of go-getting family that elbows its way to the front of every queue——any effect might simply be the result of any number of other factors. But assigning the vouchers randomly guarded against this risk.
Opponents still argue that those who exercise choice will be the most able and committed, and by clustering themselves together in better schools they will abandon the weak and voiceless to languish in rotten ones. Some cite the example of Chile, where a universal voucher scheme that allows schools to charge top-up fees seems to have improved the education of the best-off most.
The strongest evidence against this criticism comes from Sweden, where parents are freer than those in almost any other country to spend as they wish the money the government allocates to educating their children. Sweeping education reforms in 1992 not only relaxed enrolment rules in state sector, allowing students to attend schools outside their own municipality, but also let them take their state funding to private schools, including religious ones and those operating for profit. The only real restrictions imposed on private schools were that they must run their admissions on a first-come-first-served basis and promise not to charge top-up fees(most American voucher schemes impose similar conditions).
The result has been burgeoning variety and a breakneck expansion of the private sector. At the time of the reforms only around 1% of Swedish students were educated privately； now 10% are, and growth in private schooling continues unabated.
Anders Hultin of Kunskapsskolan, a chain of 26 Swedish schools founded by a venture capitalist in 1999 and now running at a profit, says its schools only rarely have to invoke the first-come-first-served rule——the chain has responded to demand by expanding so fast that parents keen to send their children to its schools usually get a place. So the private sector, by increasing the total number of places available, can ease the mad scramble for the best schools in the state sector(bureaucrats, by contrast, dislike paying for extra places in popular schools if there are vacancies in bad ones).
More evidence that choice can raise standards for all comes from Caroline Hoxby, an economist at Harvard University, who has shown that when American public schools must compete for their students with schools that accept vouchers, their performance improves. Swedish researchers say the same. It seems that those who work in state schools are just like everybody else： they do better when confronted by a bit of competition.
沒有什么教育觀念比學(xué)券更容易引發(fā)爭議。所謂學(xué)券，就是讓父母花納稅人的錢隨意為孩子選擇去哪里上學(xué)。經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Milton Friedman 1955年首次提出這一概念，其原則十分簡單，但令人信服：即國家出錢；父母選擇；學(xué)校競爭，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提升；各方受益。
這一原則雖然簡單，但引發(fā)了教育機構(gòu)的反對。這是預(yù)料之中的，但常常是致命的。讓父母為孩子選擇在何處接受教育的想法很荒唐；專業(yè)人士才是最懂行的。合作而非競爭才是提高所有學(xué)生教育水平的方式。學(xué)券會增加不平等，因為最難教的孩子將會被甩在后面。
但是這些說法在強有力的證據(jù)面前正敗下陣來。一些不同的國家正在實行學(xué)券計劃，但并沒有對社會疑聚力造成負(fù)面影響；用抽簽方式發(fā)放學(xué)券的國家也證明：接受學(xué)券者比不接受學(xué)券者獲得了更好的教育。
世界銀行的教育經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Harry Patrinos列舉了20世紀(jì)90年代啟動、被稱做“PACES”的哥倫比亞項目。該項目旨在增加學(xué)生上中學(xué)的機會。它為12.5 萬名貧困孩子提供了學(xué)券，其價值約為私立中學(xué)教育收費的一半。但關(guān)鍵問題是，申請人比學(xué)券多。該項目以抽簽方式挑選學(xué)生，為研究人員提供了幾乎完美無缺的實驗，類似于用來判定新藥療效的“安慰劑”研究。后來的研究結(jié)果表明，接受學(xué)券的孩子完成中學(xué)學(xué)業(yè)的可能性要高出15%至20%，留級的可能性低5個百分點，在學(xué)術(shù)能力測試中的得分高些，也更有可能參加大學(xué)入學(xué)考試。
美國也有幾個州在類似方式實施學(xué)券計劃。主張全面推廣學(xué)券計劃的慈善組織弗里德曼基金會的統(tǒng)計學(xué)家Greg Forster說，美國有8項類似的研究，其中7項研究的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)顯示，學(xué)券對于那些幸運的獲得者們具有明顯的積極作用；第8項研究也顯示了正面結(jié)果，但由于設(shè)計不佳不予考慮。
盡管在與普通公立學(xué)校接受教育的學(xué)生相比，政府的支出要少，但接受學(xué)券的學(xué)生成績卻更好。美國的學(xué)券計劃通常提供給私立學(xué)校費用為政府在公立學(xué)校學(xué)生身上投入的一半。哥倫比亞項目甚至沒有把提供比公立學(xué)校更好的教育作為目標(biāo)；其目標(biāo)僅僅是盡快提高入學(xué)率，并提供盡可能便宜的教育。
這些研究結(jié)果非常重要，因為他們完全排除了其它因素的影響。家庭背景、居住社區(qū)環(huán)境和天賦都比孩子在哪個學(xué)校就讀更能影響結(jié)果。如果說拿到學(xué)券的學(xué)生與未能拿到學(xué)券的學(xué)生之間存在差異——或許僅僅由于前者來自那種事事爭先，志在必得的家庭——任何差可能僅僅是其他多種因素作用的結(jié)果。但隨機分配學(xué)券避免了這種風(fēng)險。
反對學(xué)券制者認(rèn)為，那些擇校的人能力、最執(zhí)著，如果讓他們在好學(xué)校扎堆兒，會將那些處于弱勢地位、沒有代言人的學(xué)生留在爛校長期受煎熬。有人舉智利為例，該國普及了允許學(xué)校收取附加學(xué)費的學(xué)券計劃，但似乎只程度地提高了最富裕學(xué)生的教育水平。
反擊這一批評的最有力的證據(jù)來自瑞典。瑞典的父母比幾乎任何其它國家的人都自由，可隨意支配政府分配的子女教育費用。1992年開始的全面改革不僅放寬了公立學(xué)校的入學(xué)要求，允許學(xué)生到他們所居住的城市以外的地方上學(xué)，而且也允許學(xué)生將國家的資助轉(zhuǎn)到私立學(xué)校，包括宗教學(xué)校以及盈利性學(xué)校。對私立學(xué)校真正的限制就是必須按“先來先得”的原則招收學(xué)生，并且要承諾不收取附加費(大多數(shù)美國學(xué)券計劃也附加類似條件)。
這樣做的結(jié)果是辦學(xué)形式越來越多樣化，私立學(xué)校飛速增加。啟動改革時，瑞典只有大約1%的學(xué)生在私立學(xué)校接受教育，現(xiàn)在達(dá)到了10%，而且在私立學(xué)校就讀學(xué)生比例增長的趨勢依然不減。
一位風(fēng)險資本家在1999年創(chuàng)辦的Kunskapsskolan是一家擁有26所瑞典學(xué)校的連鎖學(xué)校，現(xiàn)在正處于贏利狀態(tài)。該校的Anders Hultin 說，各分校幾乎沒有用過“先來先得”的規(guī)則——為滿足需求，連鎖學(xué)校增加得非?？?，愿意送孩子來該校讀書的家長一般都能如愿。所以，通過增加學(xué)校數(shù)量，私立學(xué)校這一領(lǐng)域能夠緩解公立學(xué)校領(lǐng)域瘋狂爭搶進(jìn)入學(xué)校的壓力(對比之下，如果劣等學(xué)校還有招生空間，政府官員就不愿意為增加招生撥款)。
哈佛大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家Caroline Hoxby為擇校能夠提高所有學(xué)生水平提供了更多的證據(jù)。他已經(jīng)證明，當(dāng)美國的公立學(xué)校必須同接受學(xué)券的學(xué)校競爭生源時，它們的業(yè)績就有進(jìn)步。瑞典的研究人員也堅持同樣的觀點?？磥?，在公立學(xué)校工作的人就像其他人一樣：面對一點競爭時，他們會做得更好。