2015年在職研究生GCT備考:英語(yǔ)閱讀素材(10)

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    "It's our currency and your problem," U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally famously said of the dollar in 1971.
    More than 40 years later, China is doing something about it.
    Fed up with what it sees as Washington's malign neglect of the dollar, China is busily promoting the cross-border use of its own currency, the yuan, also known as the renminbi, in trade and investment.
    The aim is both narrowly commercial - to reduce transaction costs for Chinese exporters and importers - and sweepingly strategic.
    Displacing the dollar, Beijing says, will reduce volatility in oil and commodity prices and belatedly erode the ‘exorbitant privilege' the United States enjoys as the issuer of the reserve currency at the heart of a post-war international financial architecture it now sees as hopelessly outmoded.
    Zha Xiaogang, a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said Beijing wants to see a better-balanced international monetary system consisting of at least the dollar, euro and yuan and perhaps other currencies such as the yen and the Indian rupee.
    Competition among major currency issuers and a wider menu of options when investing, trading or seeking a store of value would produce better results for the world economy, Zha argued.
    "The shortcomings of the current international monetary system pose a big threat to China's economy," he said. "With more alternatives, the margin for the U.S. would be greatly narrowed, which will certainly weaken the power basis of the U.S."
    Zha's comments were in a paper prepared for a seminar in Bahrain this week on the geopolitics of currencies organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think tank.
    SHIFTING SANDS
    The great financial crisis, alongside the ascent of China and other emerging markets and the existential threat to the euro, is prompting policymakers in the West, too, to question the established monetary order. Change is in the air.
    But with no obvious alternative to the dollar for now, the timing and extent of any shifts in the existing order are inherently unpredictable, much like exchange rates themselves.
    While Beijing sees opportunities in using the yuan beyond its borders, others see risks - not least to China itself: relaxing capital controls so foreigners can reinvest their accumulated yuan in China's securities markets is one of the preconditions of reserve currency status.
    Yet allowing market-driven money flows to drive exchange and interest rates would weaken the ruling Communist Party's tight grip on two of the main economic levers, potentially sowing the very instability it abhors.
    John Williamson, one of the foremost academics on exchange rates, went back to basics and questioned the assumption that reserve currency status confers vast benefits.
    Whereas China, Brazil and others have laMBAsted the United States for deliberately cheapening the dollar through loose monetary policies, Williamson argued that U.S. exchange-rate flexibility is actually limited because the dollar is the anchor of the system. It is other countries that adjust their rates; the dollar then adjusts as a "residual".
    Of course, the United States gets to finance its payments deficits more cheaply because of demand for dollars from reserve managers, but this might not be enough to outweigh the loss of freedom to manage its exchange rate.
    "It is not surprising that many economists have therefore concluded that a reserve currency role is not advisable," said Williamson, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
    He identified only two ways that U.S. power in the world economy is enhanced by the dollar's dominant role, which he does not expect to be challenged in the next quarter century.
    First, the $3.2 trillion in official reserves that China has accumulated in maintaining the yuan's semi-fixed peg to the dollar tie Beijing's policy hands. That is because any hostile gesture, such as a threat to shift out of dollars, would destroy Chinese wealth.
    Second, because of the extensive private use of the dollar globally, the United States is better able to enforce a financial blockade, such as the one now directed against Iran.
    "I have the impression that the additional national power which stems from commanding an international currency tends to be exaggerated by strategic thinkers," he wrote.
    ASIAN STRAINS
    Yuriko Koike, a former Japanese defense minister, sees the power of currencies through a different prism. She said China was already using its economic might to build a "new model mercantilist imperialism" in Africa.
    Turning to Asia, Koike said China's rise was likely to continue to incite as many fears as it does hopes. Beijing's economic clout was one more reason for Japan to put its financial house in order soon.
    "So far, Chinese purchases of Japanese government bonds have been negligible, but the potential for China to gain influence over Japan in this regard is real and should be acknowledged," Koike, who was not present to discuss her paper, wrote.
    Not surprisingly, Zha, the Shanghai researcher, saw the blossoming of the yuan as the currency equivalent of China's peaceful rise in foreign policy.
    Before long, the renminbi would be the de facto common currency of a more economically and financially integrated East Asia that would thus speak with a "more consensus-oriented" regional voice in international affairs. The consensus, he implied, would be set out by China, whose economy would be at least twice as big as Japan's within a decade.
    Harsha Vardanha Singh, deputy director-general of the World Trade Organization, said the yuan was the currency most likely to acquire reserve status in years to come.
    But, because of the changing patterns of trade and the increase in supply chains, other currencies important in regional trade would assume a much larger significance on the global stage, he argued.
    "These various developments will create a much more extensive multi-polar currency world than is usually anticipated," Singh said.
    CURRENCY WAR AND PEACE
    What does it all mean for the markets?
    The phrase "currency wars" inevitably springs to mind as rising economies show their resentment of incumbents, notably the United States, which they view as resorting to maximum monetary stimulus without worrying about the global spillovers.
    Surjit Bhalla, an Indian economist, believes massive undervaluation of the yuan was a major reason for China's meteoric rise and the deep economic iMBAlances that led to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global crash.
    But Bhalla, author of a new book "Devaluing to Prosperity", is convinced that China is shedding its mercantilist skin and switching its development model from exports to consumption-led growth.
    He sees little merit in greater international use of the yuan but expects Beijing to push up its real exchange rate by 3-5 percent a year in order to help lift private consumption to at least 50 percent of national output over time from around just 35 percent now.
    The result, he said in an interview on the sidelines of the conference, would be an end to talk of currency wars as well as stronger global growth in both advanced economies and emerging markets such as China.
    "This will be one of the most remarkable win-win situations of recent times," said Bhalla, chairman of Oxus Investments, a New Delhi hedge fund. "Currency peace is breaking out. There have been currency wars, but now is time to enjoy the peace."
       相關(guān)中文資料
    "這是我們的貨幣,但那是你們自己的問(wèn)題,"這是1971年時(shí)任美國(guó)財(cái)長(zhǎng)John Connally提到美元時(shí)的一句名言.
    40多年之後的今天,中國(guó)正在設(shè)法自力救濟(jì).
    受夠了美國(guó)*惡意忽視美元問(wèn)題,中國(guó)正積極推動(dòng)人民幣在貿(mào)易及投資的跨境使用.
    這種作法兼具小部份商業(yè)目的--減少中國(guó)進(jìn)出口業(yè)者的交易成本--及重大戰(zhàn)略考量.
    中國(guó)*宣稱,美元成為二戰(zhàn)後國(guó)際金融架構(gòu)核心的儲(chǔ)備貨幣,使美國(guó)享有過(guò)高的特權(quán),但現(xiàn)在已完全不符現(xiàn)實(shí),美元地位遭取代後,石油及大宗商品的波動(dòng)程度將減少.
    上海國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究院研究人員查曉剛指出,北京*希望見(jiàn)到一個(gè)更均衡的國(guó)際貨幣體系,至少涵蓋美元、歐元、人民幣,可能還有一些其他貨幣,像是日?qǐng)A及印度盧比.
    查曉剛認(rèn)為,主要貨幣發(fā)行國(guó)家之間互相競(jìng)爭(zhēng),加上投資、交易或?qū)で蟊V档目蛇x擇標(biāo)的范圍擴(kuò)大,有利於全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展.
    "現(xiàn)行國(guó)際貨幣體系的缺陷,對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成一大威脅,"他稱."有了更多其他選擇,美國(guó)所享有的余??臻g將大幅縮小,當(dāng)然也會(huì)削弱美國(guó)的權(quán)力基礎(chǔ)."
    查曉剛的評(píng)論是來(lái)自預(yù)定本周在巴林一場(chǎng)研討會(huì)發(fā)表的論文,這場(chǎng)研討會(huì)由倫敦智庫(kù)國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略研究所主辦會(huì),主題為貨幣的地緣政治.
    美元仍具實(shí)力
    金融危機(jī)、中國(guó)和其他新興市場(chǎng)的崛起,加之歐元如今面臨的現(xiàn)實(shí)威脅,也迫使西方政界人士開(kāi)始質(zhì)疑現(xiàn)有的貨幣體系.變革正在悄然臨近.
    不過(guò),由於目前美元并沒(méi)有明確的替代貨幣,當(dāng)前(金融)秩序變革的時(shí)機(jī)和廣度是不可預(yù)測(cè)的,這很像匯率本身.
    北京認(rèn)為人民幣的跨境使用能夠帶來(lái)機(jī)遇,但與此同時(shí),其他人則看到了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)--特別是對(duì)於中國(guó)自身:放寬資本管制,以便海外投資人士可以將手中聚集的人民幣再投資於中國(guó)的證券市場(chǎng),這是成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣的先決條件之一.
    然而,允許以市場(chǎng)為導(dǎo)向的資金流驅(qū)動(dòng)匯率和利率起伏,勢(shì)必會(huì)弱化政府的嚴(yán)格管控,可能埋下不穩(wěn)定的種子,而這正是北京不愿看到的.
    外匯知名學(xué)者John Williamson追根溯源,對(duì)儲(chǔ)備貨幣地位能夠帶來(lái)巨大利益的觀點(diǎn)提出了質(zhì)疑.
    中國(guó)、巴西和其他國(guó)家都在指責(zé)美國(guó)透過(guò)寬松貨幣政策,故意讓美元貶值,而Williamson指出,美元匯率彈性其實(shí)是有限的,因?yàn)槊涝钦麄€(gè)貨幣體系的核心.實(shí)際上是其他國(guó)家先調(diào)整匯率,美元才會(huì)作出應(yīng)對(duì).
    誠(chéng)然,因?yàn)閮?chǔ)備管理者對(duì)美元的需求,美國(guó)的確可以通過(guò)更為低廉的美元來(lái)為收支逆差融資,但是與失去能夠自由管理匯率的權(quán)力相比,或許尚不足以彌補(bǔ)這種落差.
    "許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家由此得出追求儲(chǔ)備貨幣并不明智的結(jié)論,這并不讓人感到意外."Williamson表示.他是彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所的資深研究員.
    他認(rèn)為,美元的統(tǒng)治地位只通過(guò)兩種方式增強(qiáng)了美國(guó)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中的實(shí)力.同時(shí)他認(rèn)為未來(lái)25年內(nèi)美元的地位還不會(huì)受到挑戰(zhàn).
    首先,中國(guó)在保持人民幣"半盯住"美元的過(guò)程中積累起了3.2兆(萬(wàn)億)官方儲(chǔ)備,但反而束縛了政府的手腳.因?yàn)橐坏┯腥魏螖硨?duì)動(dòng)作,例如威脅出脫美元,將會(huì)令中國(guó)的財(cái)富縮水.
    第二,由於全球范圍內(nèi)民間都在大量使用美元,美國(guó)更有能力實(shí)施金融封鎖,譬如目前正在對(duì)伊朗實(shí)施的金融制裁.
    "我的觀點(diǎn)是,戰(zhàn)略家們夸大了由國(guó)際儲(chǔ)備貨幣給國(guó)家實(shí)力帶來(lái)的提升效果,"他寫道.
    亞洲局勢(shì)緊張
    曾任日本防衛(wèi)大臣的小池百合子從另外一個(gè)角度詮釋貨幣力量.她指出,中國(guó)已經(jīng)在非洲運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)力量來(lái)打造一個(gè)"新的商業(yè)帝國(guó)主義模型".
    說(shuō)到亞洲,小池百合子稱中國(guó)的崛起料將繼續(xù)引發(fā)許多區(qū)域恐慌,正如中國(guó)所希望造成的威懾作用一樣.鑒於中國(guó)所展現(xiàn)出的經(jīng)濟(jì)力量,這是促使日本盡快讓其金融體系變得有序的重要原因.
    "迄今為止,中國(guó)購(gòu)買的日本公債數(shù)量還可以基本忽略不計(jì),但中國(guó)未來(lái)在這方面對(duì)日本施加潛在影響的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)卻是真實(shí)存在的,需要認(rèn)識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)."小池百合子說(shuō)到.
    查曉剛認(rèn)為,人民幣的崛起與中國(guó)在外交政策方面的和平興起是相輔相成的.他有這樣的觀點(diǎn)并不奇怪.
    不久的將來(lái),人民幣或會(huì)成為東亞地區(qū)真正的通用貨幣,屆時(shí)的東亞在經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融領(lǐng)域?qū)⒏鼮橐惑w化,在國(guó)際事務(wù)上也將發(fā)出更為共同一致的聲音.據(jù)查曉剛暗示,這個(gè)共同聲音的基調(diào)將由中國(guó)來(lái)確立,中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模在未來(lái)十年內(nèi)料將至少達(dá)到日本的兩倍.
    世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)的副總干事辛格(Harsha Vardanha Singh)指出,在將來(lái)的數(shù)年間,人民幣是最有可能獲得儲(chǔ)備貨幣地位的貨幣.
    但是他也表示,鑒於貿(mào)易模式的改變以及供應(yīng)鏈的增多,其它重要的地區(qū)貨幣料也將在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上發(fā)揮越來(lái)越重要的影響."諸多發(fā)展變化將打造出一個(gè)比我們慣常想象中更為廣泛的多極貨幣體系世界."
    貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平共處
    那麼對(duì)於市場(chǎng)而言,這些變化到底意味著什麼呢?
    隨著新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體對(duì)於現(xiàn)有的"老大們"--首當(dāng)其沖的就是美國(guó)--表現(xiàn)出越來(lái)越多的不滿,"貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)"這個(gè)耳熟能詳?shù)脑~匯就不可避免的躍入腦海.在很多新興國(guó)家看來(lái),那些所謂的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家動(dòng)輒就使用巨額貨幣刺激手段,而根本不顧及由此給全球帶來(lái)的波及效應(yīng).
    印度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Surjit Bhalla認(rèn)為,人民幣被大幅低估是推動(dòng)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)迅猛崛起并造成經(jīng)濟(jì)嚴(yán)重失衡局面的主要原因.1997/98年的亞洲金融危機(jī)和2008年的全球信貸危機(jī)都在一定程度上源於經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡.
    作為新書(shū)"貶值到繁榮(Devaluing to Prosperity)"的作者,Surjit Bhalla頗為肯定的認(rèn)為,中國(guó)正在褪去其重商主義的外衣,改變其發(fā)展模型,逐步從出口導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)向消費(fèi)帶動(dòng)的增長(zhǎng)模式.
    他認(rèn)為人民幣獲得更多的國(guó)際使用地位不會(huì)帶來(lái)多少益處,但他預(yù)計(jì)中國(guó)政府將會(huì)每年把人民幣實(shí)質(zhì)匯率推高3-5%,以便將民間消費(fèi)占國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)出的比重從當(dāng)前的約35%逐漸提高到至少50%.
    他在場(chǎng)邊接受采訪時(shí)表示,如此作為料將可以終止有關(guān)貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的談?wù)?并帶來(lái)更強(qiáng)勁的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),發(fā)達(dá)和發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體都會(huì)從中受益,自然也包括中國(guó).
    "這將是最值得期待的雙贏局面,"Bhalla表示,"貨幣和平正在破繭而出.我們一直經(jīng)歷著貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng),但現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候享受和平了."