Time is up for non-executive directors. Through successive corporate crises and systemic catastrophes, despite — and in part because of — layers of codes and regulations, independent board members have failed to do the impossible job handed to them by complacent fund managers.
非執(zhí)行董事的時(shí)間已經(jīng)到頭了。在又的企業(yè)危機(jī)和系統(tǒng)性災(zāi)難中，盡管（在一定程度上也是因?yàn)椋┯袑訉颖O(jiān)管法律法規(guī)，但獨(dú)立董事并未能實(shí)現(xiàn)那些自滿的基金經(jīng)理們交給他們的不可能完成的任務(wù)。
Here is the charge sheet. Executive recklessness: still untamed. Executive enterprise: often smothered. Executive pay: unchecked. Scandals and failures: recurrent. Sickly corporate cultures: unaltered. Complex operations: unmonitored. Trust in business: fragile.
對(duì)非執(zhí)行董事的“控訴清單”如下：管理層的魯莽行為仍然未被馴服；管理層的進(jìn)取心則常常受到壓制；管理層的薪酬依舊不受控制；丑聞與失敗層出不窮；病態(tài)的企業(yè)文化沒有改觀；復(fù)雜的業(yè)務(wù)操作無人監(jiān)控；外界對(duì)企業(yè)的信任非常脆弱。
This list is long. Directors will argue that they are not responsible for all of it. That is precisely the problem. Tighter governance has become the catch-all solution to all corporate, and some systemic, crises, with directors as useful scapegoats if things go wrong. Nobody will weep for people who sometimes earn multiples of average workers’ salaries. But non-executives are under immense pressure as part-time outsiders, overseeing driven full-time experts, who are themselves trying to control companies that are often bafflingly complex.
這是一個(gè)很長(zhǎng)的清單。董事們將會(huì)辯解稱，他們并不對(duì)所有這些問題負(fù)責(zé)。而這正是問題的癥結(jié)所在。更嚴(yán)格的治理儼然已經(jīng)成了所有企業(yè)危機(jī)（甚至某些系統(tǒng)性災(zāi)難）的萬金油式解決方案，而如果進(jìn)展不順，董事們可以被方便地當(dāng)作替罪羊。沒有人會(huì)為薪酬有時(shí)高達(dá)普通員工數(shù)倍的人流淚。但非執(zhí)行董事作為非全職外部人士承受著巨大的壓力，他們要監(jiān)督那些野心十足的全職專家，而這些專家自身也在摸索著控制常常復(fù)雜得令人困惑的企業(yè)。
A recent US study, “Are Boards Designed to Fail?”, detected many obstacles to proper oversight. They include excessive deference to the chief executive, who often decides when, or even whether, non-executives can visit operations and quiz managers. Then there is the sheer lack of time: here, former executives who boast of “going plural” — taking multiple directorships —should reflect that a singular focus would be more effective, if less lucrative. A new report from Tomorrow’s Company (“UK Business: What’s Wrong? What’s Next?”) suggests the build-up of codes and rules, plus the public’s knee-jerk attacks on directors after a corporate catastrophe, have made boards too risk averse. Separately, the think-tank lists 17 topics, from audit to strategy, on which directors are expected to act in the 30 days a year that is all they usually devote to the job.
美國(guó)近期一項(xiàng)名為“董事會(huì)的制度設(shè)計(jì)是否注定會(huì)失??？”的研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)了有效控管面臨的多項(xiàng)障礙。這其中包括對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官的過度服從，首席執(zhí)行官常常決定了非執(zhí)行董事何時(shí)可以、甚至是否可以走訪企業(yè)的運(yùn)營(yíng)部門并對(duì)經(jīng)理們提問。此外還有嚴(yán)重不足的履職時(shí)間：在這個(gè)問題上，那些夸耀自己“身兼數(shù)職”的前任高管——即同時(shí)在數(shù)家企業(yè)擔(dān)任董事——應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到集中精力將更加有效，如果對(duì)應(yīng)的報(bào)酬會(huì)有所減少的話。智庫Tomorrow’s Company新發(fā)表的報(bào)告《英國(guó)企業(yè)：哪里出了問題？接下來會(huì)怎樣？》指出，各種規(guī)章制度的不斷累積，加上公眾在企業(yè)災(zāi)難發(fā)生后對(duì)董事們發(fā)起的條件反射般的攻擊，導(dǎo)致董事會(huì)過于懼怕風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這家智庫機(jī)構(gòu)另外列出17個(gè)領(lǐng)域，從審計(jì)到企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略，董事們被期待每年花30天時(shí)間處理這些領(lǐng)域的事務(wù)，這是他們每年通常用于履行職務(wù)的時(shí)間。
Governance flaws are usually addressed piecemeal. I have written recently about the need to give more weight to remuneration committees, the importance of separating chair and chief executive, the role of independent voices in improving and safeguarding culture. But the moment has come to address the root of the problem.
公司治理方面的缺陷通常是以零打碎敲的方式應(yīng)對(duì)的。近期我曾撰文闡述提高薪酬委員會(huì)地位的必要性，由不同人出任公司董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官的重要性，以及獨(dú)立聲音在改進(jìn)和維護(hù)公司文化方面所扮演的角色。但現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候討論問題根源了。
One former chair and director of a number of small UK companies emailed me to suggest scrapping non-executive directors. “Doing away with most NEDs would make investors face up to their responsibilities,” he wrote.
一位曾在數(shù)家英國(guó)小型公司擔(dān)任董事長(zhǎng)和董事的人發(fā)電子郵件給我，建議在企業(yè)中取消非執(zhí)行董事。他寫道，“取消絕大多數(shù)的非執(zhí)行董事職位，將迫使投資者直面自己的責(zé)任”。
This remedy would appal many (including parts of the FT group) who train, advise, and recruit directors. But investors need the kick. Dodging active ownership responsibility for their cluttered portfolios, “they looked to NEDs to do it for them (at a fraction of [what] they paid themselves)”, the same director writes. Largely, that is still the case.
這副藥方會(huì)讓很多培訓(xùn)、咨詢和招聘董事的人感到驚駭（包括英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的一些部門）。但投資者需要這種刺激。給我郵件的這位董事寫道，投資者逃避對(duì)自己凌亂投資組合的積極所有權(quán)責(zé)任，“他們寄希望于非執(zhí)行董事代替他們履行這些職責(zé)”（而聘請(qǐng)非執(zhí)行董事的費(fèi)用只占了投資者給自己報(bào)酬的一小部分）?？偟膩碚f，目前的情況仍然如此。
There are exceptions. Norway’s sovereign oil fund is attacking high executive pay, the focus of increasing investor protest worldwide, and plans to sue Volkswagen over its emissions scandal. Shareholders have more regulatory weapons and are using them. A few are putting their own professional representatives on boards to influence strategy.
也有例外的情況。例如挪威的主權(quán)石油基金正在杯葛管理層高薪，世界各地聚焦于加強(qiáng)投資者保護(hù)，以及投資者在大眾汽車(Volkswagen)尾氣排放丑聞曝光后計(jì)劃向該公司提起訴訟。股東現(xiàn)在擁有了更多監(jiān)管武器，并已開始使用它們。一些股東提名自己的專業(yè)代表進(jìn)入董事會(huì)，以影響公司戰(zhàn)略。
Stripping out non-executives could tempt executives to revisit the bad habits some showed when their power was untrammelled. Even private equity firms — hardly fans of extraneous bureaucracy — like to appoint directors to oversee companies they own. Executives say they prefer private equity’s hands-on approach to the stifling governance cotton-wool applied by some listed companies.
取消非執(zhí)行董事或許會(huì)導(dǎo)致管理層故態(tài)復(fù)萌，一些高管在他們的權(quán)力不受束縛時(shí)顯露過那些壞毛病。即便是私募股權(quán)投資公司——這類公司并不喜歡多余的官僚安排——也喜歡指派董事去控管他們擁有的企業(yè)。企業(yè)管理層表示，他們更喜歡私募投資公司親自上手參與的方式，而不是某些上市公司采取的像棉絮一樣令人窒息的治理機(jī)制。
The US researchers suggest ending the blame game and assembling boards of specialists with relevant expertise to help and challenge chief executives. Tomorrow’s Company proposes that directors engage more closely with shareholders who, in turn, should behave more like stewards of long-term growth, rather than traders.
美國(guó)研究人員提出的建議是，終止互相指責(zé)的游戲，組建擁有相關(guān)專業(yè)技能的專家委員會(huì)，由其輔佐和挑戰(zhàn)首席執(zhí)行官。智庫Tomorrow’s Company建議，董事們應(yīng)與股東保持更加密切的互動(dòng)，反過來，股東應(yīng)該更像長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)的領(lǐng)路人，而非像交易員。
Another director I know strongly supports non-executives and suggests they are the best guarantors of long-termism. She may be right, in theory. Yet in practice, the merry-go-round of board service, well lubricated at the top level with fees and prestige, leaves few satisfied. Making executives, regulators and investors start from scratch — without the ragged safety net that non-executive directors struggle to provide — would force them to think harder about how to do their own jobs better.
我所認(rèn)識(shí)的另一位董事則強(qiáng)烈支持非執(zhí)行董事制度，并指出非執(zhí)行董事是確保長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)眼光的佳保障。從理論上來說，她或許是對(duì)的。但在實(shí)踐中，走馬燈一樣不停輪換的董事服務(wù)（高層享受優(yōu)厚的待遇、名利雙收），很少能讓人感到滿意。讓公司管理層、監(jiān)管*以及投資者們從零開始——離開非執(zhí)行董事難以提供的并不牢靠的安——將迫使他們更加努力地思考如何把自己的工作做得更好。
非執(zhí)行董事的時(shí)間已經(jīng)到頭了。在又的企業(yè)危機(jī)和系統(tǒng)性災(zāi)難中，盡管（在一定程度上也是因?yàn)椋┯袑訉颖O(jiān)管法律法規(guī)，但獨(dú)立董事并未能實(shí)現(xiàn)那些自滿的基金經(jīng)理們交給他們的不可能完成的任務(wù)。
Here is the charge sheet. Executive recklessness: still untamed. Executive enterprise: often smothered. Executive pay: unchecked. Scandals and failures: recurrent. Sickly corporate cultures: unaltered. Complex operations: unmonitored. Trust in business: fragile.
對(duì)非執(zhí)行董事的“控訴清單”如下：管理層的魯莽行為仍然未被馴服；管理層的進(jìn)取心則常常受到壓制；管理層的薪酬依舊不受控制；丑聞與失敗層出不窮；病態(tài)的企業(yè)文化沒有改觀；復(fù)雜的業(yè)務(wù)操作無人監(jiān)控；外界對(duì)企業(yè)的信任非常脆弱。
This list is long. Directors will argue that they are not responsible for all of it. That is precisely the problem. Tighter governance has become the catch-all solution to all corporate, and some systemic, crises, with directors as useful scapegoats if things go wrong. Nobody will weep for people who sometimes earn multiples of average workers’ salaries. But non-executives are under immense pressure as part-time outsiders, overseeing driven full-time experts, who are themselves trying to control companies that are often bafflingly complex.
這是一個(gè)很長(zhǎng)的清單。董事們將會(huì)辯解稱，他們并不對(duì)所有這些問題負(fù)責(zé)。而這正是問題的癥結(jié)所在。更嚴(yán)格的治理儼然已經(jīng)成了所有企業(yè)危機(jī)（甚至某些系統(tǒng)性災(zāi)難）的萬金油式解決方案，而如果進(jìn)展不順，董事們可以被方便地當(dāng)作替罪羊。沒有人會(huì)為薪酬有時(shí)高達(dá)普通員工數(shù)倍的人流淚。但非執(zhí)行董事作為非全職外部人士承受著巨大的壓力，他們要監(jiān)督那些野心十足的全職專家，而這些專家自身也在摸索著控制常常復(fù)雜得令人困惑的企業(yè)。
A recent US study, “Are Boards Designed to Fail?”, detected many obstacles to proper oversight. They include excessive deference to the chief executive, who often decides when, or even whether, non-executives can visit operations and quiz managers. Then there is the sheer lack of time: here, former executives who boast of “going plural” — taking multiple directorships —should reflect that a singular focus would be more effective, if less lucrative. A new report from Tomorrow’s Company (“UK Business: What’s Wrong? What’s Next?”) suggests the build-up of codes and rules, plus the public’s knee-jerk attacks on directors after a corporate catastrophe, have made boards too risk averse. Separately, the think-tank lists 17 topics, from audit to strategy, on which directors are expected to act in the 30 days a year that is all they usually devote to the job.
美國(guó)近期一項(xiàng)名為“董事會(huì)的制度設(shè)計(jì)是否注定會(huì)失??？”的研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)了有效控管面臨的多項(xiàng)障礙。這其中包括對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官的過度服從，首席執(zhí)行官常常決定了非執(zhí)行董事何時(shí)可以、甚至是否可以走訪企業(yè)的運(yùn)營(yíng)部門并對(duì)經(jīng)理們提問。此外還有嚴(yán)重不足的履職時(shí)間：在這個(gè)問題上，那些夸耀自己“身兼數(shù)職”的前任高管——即同時(shí)在數(shù)家企業(yè)擔(dān)任董事——應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到集中精力將更加有效，如果對(duì)應(yīng)的報(bào)酬會(huì)有所減少的話。智庫Tomorrow’s Company新發(fā)表的報(bào)告《英國(guó)企業(yè)：哪里出了問題？接下來會(huì)怎樣？》指出，各種規(guī)章制度的不斷累積，加上公眾在企業(yè)災(zāi)難發(fā)生后對(duì)董事們發(fā)起的條件反射般的攻擊，導(dǎo)致董事會(huì)過于懼怕風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這家智庫機(jī)構(gòu)另外列出17個(gè)領(lǐng)域，從審計(jì)到企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略，董事們被期待每年花30天時(shí)間處理這些領(lǐng)域的事務(wù)，這是他們每年通常用于履行職務(wù)的時(shí)間。
Governance flaws are usually addressed piecemeal. I have written recently about the need to give more weight to remuneration committees, the importance of separating chair and chief executive, the role of independent voices in improving and safeguarding culture. But the moment has come to address the root of the problem.
公司治理方面的缺陷通常是以零打碎敲的方式應(yīng)對(duì)的。近期我曾撰文闡述提高薪酬委員會(huì)地位的必要性，由不同人出任公司董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官的重要性，以及獨(dú)立聲音在改進(jìn)和維護(hù)公司文化方面所扮演的角色。但現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候討論問題根源了。
One former chair and director of a number of small UK companies emailed me to suggest scrapping non-executive directors. “Doing away with most NEDs would make investors face up to their responsibilities,” he wrote.
一位曾在數(shù)家英國(guó)小型公司擔(dān)任董事長(zhǎng)和董事的人發(fā)電子郵件給我，建議在企業(yè)中取消非執(zhí)行董事。他寫道，“取消絕大多數(shù)的非執(zhí)行董事職位，將迫使投資者直面自己的責(zé)任”。
This remedy would appal many (including parts of the FT group) who train, advise, and recruit directors. But investors need the kick. Dodging active ownership responsibility for their cluttered portfolios, “they looked to NEDs to do it for them (at a fraction of [what] they paid themselves)”, the same director writes. Largely, that is still the case.
這副藥方會(huì)讓很多培訓(xùn)、咨詢和招聘董事的人感到驚駭（包括英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的一些部門）。但投資者需要這種刺激。給我郵件的這位董事寫道，投資者逃避對(duì)自己凌亂投資組合的積極所有權(quán)責(zé)任，“他們寄希望于非執(zhí)行董事代替他們履行這些職責(zé)”（而聘請(qǐng)非執(zhí)行董事的費(fèi)用只占了投資者給自己報(bào)酬的一小部分）?？偟膩碚f，目前的情況仍然如此。
There are exceptions. Norway’s sovereign oil fund is attacking high executive pay, the focus of increasing investor protest worldwide, and plans to sue Volkswagen over its emissions scandal. Shareholders have more regulatory weapons and are using them. A few are putting their own professional representatives on boards to influence strategy.
也有例外的情況。例如挪威的主權(quán)石油基金正在杯葛管理層高薪，世界各地聚焦于加強(qiáng)投資者保護(hù)，以及投資者在大眾汽車(Volkswagen)尾氣排放丑聞曝光后計(jì)劃向該公司提起訴訟。股東現(xiàn)在擁有了更多監(jiān)管武器，并已開始使用它們。一些股東提名自己的專業(yè)代表進(jìn)入董事會(huì)，以影響公司戰(zhàn)略。
Stripping out non-executives could tempt executives to revisit the bad habits some showed when their power was untrammelled. Even private equity firms — hardly fans of extraneous bureaucracy — like to appoint directors to oversee companies they own. Executives say they prefer private equity’s hands-on approach to the stifling governance cotton-wool applied by some listed companies.
取消非執(zhí)行董事或許會(huì)導(dǎo)致管理層故態(tài)復(fù)萌，一些高管在他們的權(quán)力不受束縛時(shí)顯露過那些壞毛病。即便是私募股權(quán)投資公司——這類公司并不喜歡多余的官僚安排——也喜歡指派董事去控管他們擁有的企業(yè)。企業(yè)管理層表示，他們更喜歡私募投資公司親自上手參與的方式，而不是某些上市公司采取的像棉絮一樣令人窒息的治理機(jī)制。
The US researchers suggest ending the blame game and assembling boards of specialists with relevant expertise to help and challenge chief executives. Tomorrow’s Company proposes that directors engage more closely with shareholders who, in turn, should behave more like stewards of long-term growth, rather than traders.
美國(guó)研究人員提出的建議是，終止互相指責(zé)的游戲，組建擁有相關(guān)專業(yè)技能的專家委員會(huì)，由其輔佐和挑戰(zhàn)首席執(zhí)行官。智庫Tomorrow’s Company建議，董事們應(yīng)與股東保持更加密切的互動(dòng)，反過來，股東應(yīng)該更像長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)的領(lǐng)路人，而非像交易員。
Another director I know strongly supports non-executives and suggests they are the best guarantors of long-termism. She may be right, in theory. Yet in practice, the merry-go-round of board service, well lubricated at the top level with fees and prestige, leaves few satisfied. Making executives, regulators and investors start from scratch — without the ragged safety net that non-executive directors struggle to provide — would force them to think harder about how to do their own jobs better.
我所認(rèn)識(shí)的另一位董事則強(qiáng)烈支持非執(zhí)行董事制度，并指出非執(zhí)行董事是確保長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)眼光的佳保障。從理論上來說，她或許是對(duì)的。但在實(shí)踐中，走馬燈一樣不停輪換的董事服務(wù)（高層享受優(yōu)厚的待遇、名利雙收），很少能讓人感到滿意。讓公司管理層、監(jiān)管*以及投資者們從零開始——離開非執(zhí)行董事難以提供的并不牢靠的安——將迫使他們更加努力地思考如何把自己的工作做得更好。