Computerised trading agents may help humans build better markets
THANKS to slumping markets， investment banks are shedding many of their highly-paid traders. When markets recover， the banks might be tempted to replace them with rather cheaper talent. One alternative has been around for a while but has yet to catch on： autonomous trading agents-computers programmed to act like the human version without such pesky costs as holidays， lunch breaks or bonuses. Program trading has， of course， been done before； some blamed the 1987 stockmarket crash on computers instructed with simple decision-making rules. But robots can be smarter than that.
Dave Cliff， a researcher at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories in Bristol， England， has been creating trading robots for seven years. In computer simulations he lets them evolve "genetically"， and so allows them to adapt and fit models of real-world financial markets. His experiments have suggested that a redesign of some markets could lead to greater efficiency. Last year， a research group at IBM showed that Mr Cliff's artificial traders could consistently beat the human variety， in various kinds of market. Nearly all take the shape of an auction. One well-known type is the English auction， familiar to patrons of the salesrooms of Christie's and Sotheby's， where sellers keep mum on their offer price， and buyers increase their bids by stages until only one remains.
At the other extreme is the Dutch auction， familiar to 17th-century tulip-traders in the Netherlands as well as to bidders for American Treasury bonds. Here， buyers remain silent， and a seller reduces his price until it is accepted. Most markets for shares， commodities， foreign exchange and derivatives are a hybrid of these two types： buyers and sellers can announce their bid or offer prices at any time， and deals are constantly being closed， a so-called "continuous double auction".
Mr Cliff's novel idea was to apply his evolutionary computer programs to marketplaces themselves. Why not， he thought， try and see what types of auction would let traders converge most quickly towards an equilibrium price？ The results were surprising. In his models， auctions that let buyers and sellers bid at any time like most of today's financial exchanges were less efficient than ones that required relatively more bids from either buyers or sellers. These "evolved auctions" also withstood big market shocks， such as crashes and panics， better than today's real-world versions. Mr Cliff's most recent results， which will be presented in Sydney， Australia， on December 10th， show that the best type of auction for any market depends crucially on even slight differences in the number of buyers and sellers.
Bank of America has been investigating these new auctions， along with robotic traders， for possible use in electronic exchanges. The hope is that today's financial auctions and online marketplaces might work better by becoming more like their English and Dutch forebears. But what to call such multi-ethnic hybrids？ Here's introducing the "Cliffhanger".
注（1）：本文選自Economist；11/30/2002， p65， 1/2p， 1c；
注（2）：本文習(xí)題命題模仿2000年真題text 3第1題（1），text 4第3題（2），2004年真題text 4第1題，2001年真題text 1第2題（4），1999年真題text 1第4題（5）；
1.The passage is mainly__________.
[A] a review of two kinds of auctions
[B] an introduction of trading robots
[C] a survey of the trading market
[D] about trading alternatives
2.Which of the following is true according to the text？
[A] David's robot traders have now been used in real-world markets.
[B] Robot traders can evolve like creatures.
[C] There is room for improvement in efficiency in trading markets.
[D] The English auction is the most popular trading form.
3.If you were trading American Treasury bonds， you would most likely take the trading
form of ___________.
[A] the English auction
[B] the continuous double auction
[C] the Dutch auction
[D] the evolved auction
4.We can infer from the text that______________.
[A] existing auctions can not withstand market shocks
[B] the Dutch auction is better than the continuous double auction
[C] it's hard for traders to reach an equilibrium price
[D] the best type of auction takes place when the number of the buyers is equal to that of sellers
5.Toward robot traders， the writer's attitude can be said to be__________.
[A] biased
[B] objective
[C] pessimistic
[D] optimistic
答案：B C C B D
篇章剖析
本篇文章是一篇說(shuō)明文，介紹了一種機(jī)器人交易員。第一段以銀行也需要薪資更低廉的交易員開(kāi)始引入機(jī)器人交易員的話題，說(shuō)明機(jī)器人交易員不同于程序交易，是聰明的交易員。第二段介紹了這種機(jī)器人交易員的研發(fā)過(guò)程和其模擬的一種拍賣形式。第三段介紹了其他拍賣形式。第四段介紹了這種機(jī)器人交易員在模擬拍賣中的表現(xiàn)。最后一段對(duì)這種機(jī)器人交易員的前景及影響作了簡(jiǎn)單評(píng)價(jià)。
詞匯注釋
slump： [slQmp] v. （價(jià)格等）暴跌， （買賣）清淡； 衰落； 蕭條
shed： [Fed] v. 去除除去（不想要或不需要的東西）
pesky： [5peski] adj. 討厭的，麻煩的
auction： [5C：kFEn] n. 拍賣
patron： [5peitrEn] n. 顧客；主顧
salesroom： n. 拍賣場(chǎng)
mum： [mQm] adj. 沉默的；無(wú)言的；不說(shuō)話的
derivative： [di5rivEtiv] n. 衍生物
hybrid： [5haibrid] n. 混合物
converge： [kEn5vE：dV] v. 達(dá)成一致趨于或達(dá)成聯(lián)合、共同結(jié)論或者結(jié)果
equilibrium： [7i：kwi5libriEm] n. 平衡
forebear： [5fC：bZE] n. 祖先，祖宗
cliffhang： [`klIfhAN] v. 扣人心弦，懸疑
難句突破
In his models， auctions that let buyers and sellers bid at any time like most of today's financial exchanges were less efficient than ones that required relatively more bids from either buyers or sellers.
主體句式：auctions… were less efficient than ones……
結(jié)構(gòu)分析：這是一個(gè)復(fù)雜句，句子的主語(yǔ)auctions后面有一個(gè)that引導(dǎo)的定語(yǔ)從句對(duì)它進(jìn)行修飾，句子主體結(jié)構(gòu)中包含了一個(gè)比較級(jí)，在比較的對(duì)象ones后面也有一個(gè)that引導(dǎo)的定語(yǔ)從句對(duì)它進(jìn)行修飾。
句子譯文：在他的模式中，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中采用的讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下。
題目分析
1. 答案為B，屬推理判斷題。判斷文章主旨要從文章整體來(lái)把握。文章第一段說(shuō)明機(jī)器人交易員可以替代人類從事交易工作。接下來(lái)作者介紹其研發(fā)過(guò)程及其模擬的幾種拍賣形式以及拍賣中的表現(xiàn)，最后一段對(duì)這種機(jī)器人交易員的前景進(jìn)行了展望，可見(jiàn)全文都是在介紹機(jī)器人交易員。
2. 答案為C，屬事實(shí)細(xì)節(jié)題。根據(jù)文章第二段第四行，克里夫的研究表明“對(duì)某些市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行重新設(shè)計(jì)可能會(huì)大幅提高效率?！笨梢?jiàn)交易市場(chǎng)仍然有提高效率的空間。
3. 答案為C，屬事實(shí)細(xì)節(jié)題。文章第三段介紹荷蘭式拍賣時(shí)說(shuō)它是“今天競(jìng)拍美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券競(jìng)標(biāo)人所熟悉的一種拍賣形式?！笨梢?jiàn)，如果交易美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券，最有可能采用荷蘭式拍賣方式。
4. 答案為B，屬推理判斷題。根據(jù)文章第四段克里夫的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中所采用讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下?？梢?jiàn)荷蘭式的拍賣方式比連續(xù)雙向拍賣。這也可以從文章最后一段中所說(shuō)的“今天的金融拍賣和網(wǎng)上市場(chǎng)如果能更多地模仿它們的英國(guó)和荷蘭先祖生意也許就會(huì)更好”看出。
5. 答案為D，屬推理判斷題。作者的態(tài)度可以通過(guò)材料的選擇和措辭來(lái)判斷。在第一段，作者指出，機(jī)器人交易員不同于程序交易，是聰明的交易員。接著作者介紹了 IBM的一個(gè)研究小組的成果：這種機(jī)器人交易員可以在各種市場(chǎng)上擊敗真人交易員?？梢?jiàn)，作者對(duì)機(jī)器人交易員持積極樂(lè)觀的態(tài)度。
參考譯文
由于市場(chǎng)不景氣，投資銀行辭退了許多高薪交易員。等到市場(chǎng)恢復(fù)，銀行也許會(huì)用薪資更低廉的人才來(lái)取代他們?，F(xiàn)在他們又多了一個(gè)選擇：電子交易員—— -經(jīng)過(guò)編程可以像人一樣工作，但卻不需要休假，午餐休息或者獎(jiǎng)金等煩人的支出的電腦。這種電子交易員已經(jīng)面世一段時(shí)間了，但尚未流行起來(lái)。以前當(dāng)然也出現(xiàn)過(guò)程序交易；有人就把1987年的股市崩盤歸罪于那些只按照簡(jiǎn)單決策規(guī)則指令工作的電腦。不過(guò)機(jī)器人會(huì)聰明得多。
大衛(wèi)·克利夫是英國(guó)布里斯托惠普實(shí)驗(yàn)室的研究員，7年來(lái)他一直致力于創(chuàng)造交易機(jī)器人。在計(jì)算機(jī)仿真試驗(yàn)中，他使這些機(jī)器人“按照遺傳方式”不斷發(fā)展，以使它們適應(yīng)并且適合真實(shí)金融市場(chǎng)的各種模式。他的實(shí)驗(yàn)意味著對(duì)某些市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行重新設(shè)計(jì)可能會(huì)大幅提高效率。去年，IBM的一個(gè)研究小組證明克利夫的人造交易員可以在各種市場(chǎng)上擊敗真人交易員。幾乎所有這些實(shí)驗(yàn)都是以拍賣的形式進(jìn)行的。其中一種的拍賣形式就是英式拍賣，克里斯蒂和索斯比拍賣行的顧客對(duì)此都很熟悉，賣家不報(bào)出他們的競(jìng)拍價(jià)，而買家則不斷抬高競(jìng)拍價(jià)鉻，直到只有一位買家出價(jià)為止。
另外一種形式是荷蘭式拍賣，它是十七世紀(jì)荷蘭的郁金香商人以及今天競(jìng)拍美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券競(jìng)標(biāo)人所熟悉的一種拍賣形式。這一回，買家不報(bào)價(jià)，由賣家不斷降價(jià)，直到有人接受這個(gè)價(jià)格為止。大部分股票市場(chǎng)，商品市場(chǎng)，外匯市場(chǎng)和衍生產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)則采用這兩種類型的混合模式：買賣雙方可以隨時(shí)宣布他們的競(jìng)價(jià)或者報(bào)價(jià)，交易也隨時(shí)完成，即所謂“連續(xù)雙向拍賣”。
克利夫的新思路就是把他研制的可以不斷升級(jí)的電腦程序應(yīng)用于市場(chǎng)。他想，為什么不試試看哪種拍賣形式能最快地讓交易員趨于一個(gè)均衡價(jià)格呢？其研究結(jié)果令人吃驚。在他的模式中，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中采用的讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下。這些“進(jìn)化的拍賣方式”還承受住了大的市場(chǎng)震蕩，比如崩盤和恐慌，比真人拍賣表現(xiàn)出色?？死?qū)⒂?2月10日在澳大利亞悉尼演示他的最新研究成果，這些成果表明買賣雙方人數(shù)的輕微差異都會(huì)對(duì)的市場(chǎng)拍賣形式產(chǎn)生影響。
美洲銀行已經(jīng)開(kāi)始研究這些新型拍賣形式以及機(jī)器人交易員，看看是否可能在電子交易中使用。今天的金融拍賣和網(wǎng)上市場(chǎng)如果能更多地模仿它們的英國(guó)和荷蘭先祖生意也許就會(huì)更好。但這種多種類混合體該叫什么呢？ 叫“克利夫懸疑”如何？
THANKS to slumping markets， investment banks are shedding many of their highly-paid traders. When markets recover， the banks might be tempted to replace them with rather cheaper talent. One alternative has been around for a while but has yet to catch on： autonomous trading agents-computers programmed to act like the human version without such pesky costs as holidays， lunch breaks or bonuses. Program trading has， of course， been done before； some blamed the 1987 stockmarket crash on computers instructed with simple decision-making rules. But robots can be smarter than that.
Dave Cliff， a researcher at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories in Bristol， England， has been creating trading robots for seven years. In computer simulations he lets them evolve "genetically"， and so allows them to adapt and fit models of real-world financial markets. His experiments have suggested that a redesign of some markets could lead to greater efficiency. Last year， a research group at IBM showed that Mr Cliff's artificial traders could consistently beat the human variety， in various kinds of market. Nearly all take the shape of an auction. One well-known type is the English auction， familiar to patrons of the salesrooms of Christie's and Sotheby's， where sellers keep mum on their offer price， and buyers increase their bids by stages until only one remains.
At the other extreme is the Dutch auction， familiar to 17th-century tulip-traders in the Netherlands as well as to bidders for American Treasury bonds. Here， buyers remain silent， and a seller reduces his price until it is accepted. Most markets for shares， commodities， foreign exchange and derivatives are a hybrid of these two types： buyers and sellers can announce their bid or offer prices at any time， and deals are constantly being closed， a so-called "continuous double auction".
Mr Cliff's novel idea was to apply his evolutionary computer programs to marketplaces themselves. Why not， he thought， try and see what types of auction would let traders converge most quickly towards an equilibrium price？ The results were surprising. In his models， auctions that let buyers and sellers bid at any time like most of today's financial exchanges were less efficient than ones that required relatively more bids from either buyers or sellers. These "evolved auctions" also withstood big market shocks， such as crashes and panics， better than today's real-world versions. Mr Cliff's most recent results， which will be presented in Sydney， Australia， on December 10th， show that the best type of auction for any market depends crucially on even slight differences in the number of buyers and sellers.
Bank of America has been investigating these new auctions， along with robotic traders， for possible use in electronic exchanges. The hope is that today's financial auctions and online marketplaces might work better by becoming more like their English and Dutch forebears. But what to call such multi-ethnic hybrids？ Here's introducing the "Cliffhanger".
注（1）：本文選自Economist；11/30/2002， p65， 1/2p， 1c；
注（2）：本文習(xí)題命題模仿2000年真題text 3第1題（1），text 4第3題（2），2004年真題text 4第1題，2001年真題text 1第2題（4），1999年真題text 1第4題（5）；
1.The passage is mainly__________.
[A] a review of two kinds of auctions
[B] an introduction of trading robots
[C] a survey of the trading market
[D] about trading alternatives
2.Which of the following is true according to the text？
[A] David's robot traders have now been used in real-world markets.
[B] Robot traders can evolve like creatures.
[C] There is room for improvement in efficiency in trading markets.
[D] The English auction is the most popular trading form.
3.If you were trading American Treasury bonds， you would most likely take the trading
form of ___________.
[A] the English auction
[B] the continuous double auction
[C] the Dutch auction
[D] the evolved auction
4.We can infer from the text that______________.
[A] existing auctions can not withstand market shocks
[B] the Dutch auction is better than the continuous double auction
[C] it's hard for traders to reach an equilibrium price
[D] the best type of auction takes place when the number of the buyers is equal to that of sellers
5.Toward robot traders， the writer's attitude can be said to be__________.
[A] biased
[B] objective
[C] pessimistic
[D] optimistic
答案：B C C B D
篇章剖析
本篇文章是一篇說(shuō)明文，介紹了一種機(jī)器人交易員。第一段以銀行也需要薪資更低廉的交易員開(kāi)始引入機(jī)器人交易員的話題，說(shuō)明機(jī)器人交易員不同于程序交易，是聰明的交易員。第二段介紹了這種機(jī)器人交易員的研發(fā)過(guò)程和其模擬的一種拍賣形式。第三段介紹了其他拍賣形式。第四段介紹了這種機(jī)器人交易員在模擬拍賣中的表現(xiàn)。最后一段對(duì)這種機(jī)器人交易員的前景及影響作了簡(jiǎn)單評(píng)價(jià)。
詞匯注釋
slump： [slQmp] v. （價(jià)格等）暴跌， （買賣）清淡； 衰落； 蕭條
shed： [Fed] v. 去除除去（不想要或不需要的東西）
pesky： [5peski] adj. 討厭的，麻煩的
auction： [5C：kFEn] n. 拍賣
patron： [5peitrEn] n. 顧客；主顧
salesroom： n. 拍賣場(chǎng)
mum： [mQm] adj. 沉默的；無(wú)言的；不說(shuō)話的
derivative： [di5rivEtiv] n. 衍生物
hybrid： [5haibrid] n. 混合物
converge： [kEn5vE：dV] v. 達(dá)成一致趨于或達(dá)成聯(lián)合、共同結(jié)論或者結(jié)果
equilibrium： [7i：kwi5libriEm] n. 平衡
forebear： [5fC：bZE] n. 祖先，祖宗
cliffhang： [`klIfhAN] v. 扣人心弦，懸疑
難句突破
In his models， auctions that let buyers and sellers bid at any time like most of today's financial exchanges were less efficient than ones that required relatively more bids from either buyers or sellers.
主體句式：auctions… were less efficient than ones……
結(jié)構(gòu)分析：這是一個(gè)復(fù)雜句，句子的主語(yǔ)auctions后面有一個(gè)that引導(dǎo)的定語(yǔ)從句對(duì)它進(jìn)行修飾，句子主體結(jié)構(gòu)中包含了一個(gè)比較級(jí)，在比較的對(duì)象ones后面也有一個(gè)that引導(dǎo)的定語(yǔ)從句對(duì)它進(jìn)行修飾。
句子譯文：在他的模式中，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中采用的讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下。
題目分析
1. 答案為B，屬推理判斷題。判斷文章主旨要從文章整體來(lái)把握。文章第一段說(shuō)明機(jī)器人交易員可以替代人類從事交易工作。接下來(lái)作者介紹其研發(fā)過(guò)程及其模擬的幾種拍賣形式以及拍賣中的表現(xiàn)，最后一段對(duì)這種機(jī)器人交易員的前景進(jìn)行了展望，可見(jiàn)全文都是在介紹機(jī)器人交易員。
2. 答案為C，屬事實(shí)細(xì)節(jié)題。根據(jù)文章第二段第四行，克里夫的研究表明“對(duì)某些市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行重新設(shè)計(jì)可能會(huì)大幅提高效率?！笨梢?jiàn)交易市場(chǎng)仍然有提高效率的空間。
3. 答案為C，屬事實(shí)細(xì)節(jié)題。文章第三段介紹荷蘭式拍賣時(shí)說(shuō)它是“今天競(jìng)拍美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券競(jìng)標(biāo)人所熟悉的一種拍賣形式?！笨梢?jiàn)，如果交易美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券，最有可能采用荷蘭式拍賣方式。
4. 答案為B，屬推理判斷題。根據(jù)文章第四段克里夫的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中所采用讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下?？梢?jiàn)荷蘭式的拍賣方式比連續(xù)雙向拍賣。這也可以從文章最后一段中所說(shuō)的“今天的金融拍賣和網(wǎng)上市場(chǎng)如果能更多地模仿它們的英國(guó)和荷蘭先祖生意也許就會(huì)更好”看出。
5. 答案為D，屬推理判斷題。作者的態(tài)度可以通過(guò)材料的選擇和措辭來(lái)判斷。在第一段，作者指出，機(jī)器人交易員不同于程序交易，是聰明的交易員。接著作者介紹了 IBM的一個(gè)研究小組的成果：這種機(jī)器人交易員可以在各種市場(chǎng)上擊敗真人交易員?？梢?jiàn)，作者對(duì)機(jī)器人交易員持積極樂(lè)觀的態(tài)度。
參考譯文
由于市場(chǎng)不景氣，投資銀行辭退了許多高薪交易員。等到市場(chǎng)恢復(fù)，銀行也許會(huì)用薪資更低廉的人才來(lái)取代他們?，F(xiàn)在他們又多了一個(gè)選擇：電子交易員—— -經(jīng)過(guò)編程可以像人一樣工作，但卻不需要休假，午餐休息或者獎(jiǎng)金等煩人的支出的電腦。這種電子交易員已經(jīng)面世一段時(shí)間了，但尚未流行起來(lái)。以前當(dāng)然也出現(xiàn)過(guò)程序交易；有人就把1987年的股市崩盤歸罪于那些只按照簡(jiǎn)單決策規(guī)則指令工作的電腦。不過(guò)機(jī)器人會(huì)聰明得多。
大衛(wèi)·克利夫是英國(guó)布里斯托惠普實(shí)驗(yàn)室的研究員，7年來(lái)他一直致力于創(chuàng)造交易機(jī)器人。在計(jì)算機(jī)仿真試驗(yàn)中，他使這些機(jī)器人“按照遺傳方式”不斷發(fā)展，以使它們適應(yīng)并且適合真實(shí)金融市場(chǎng)的各種模式。他的實(shí)驗(yàn)意味著對(duì)某些市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行重新設(shè)計(jì)可能會(huì)大幅提高效率。去年，IBM的一個(gè)研究小組證明克利夫的人造交易員可以在各種市場(chǎng)上擊敗真人交易員。幾乎所有這些實(shí)驗(yàn)都是以拍賣的形式進(jìn)行的。其中一種的拍賣形式就是英式拍賣，克里斯蒂和索斯比拍賣行的顧客對(duì)此都很熟悉，賣家不報(bào)出他們的競(jìng)拍價(jià)，而買家則不斷抬高競(jìng)拍價(jià)鉻，直到只有一位買家出價(jià)為止。
另外一種形式是荷蘭式拍賣，它是十七世紀(jì)荷蘭的郁金香商人以及今天競(jìng)拍美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券競(jìng)標(biāo)人所熟悉的一種拍賣形式。這一回，買家不報(bào)價(jià)，由賣家不斷降價(jià)，直到有人接受這個(gè)價(jià)格為止。大部分股票市場(chǎng)，商品市場(chǎng)，外匯市場(chǎng)和衍生產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)則采用這兩種類型的混合模式：買賣雙方可以隨時(shí)宣布他們的競(jìng)價(jià)或者報(bào)價(jià)，交易也隨時(shí)完成，即所謂“連續(xù)雙向拍賣”。
克利夫的新思路就是把他研制的可以不斷升級(jí)的電腦程序應(yīng)用于市場(chǎng)。他想，為什么不試試看哪種拍賣形式能最快地讓交易員趨于一個(gè)均衡價(jià)格呢？其研究結(jié)果令人吃驚。在他的模式中，現(xiàn)今大多數(shù)金融交易中采用的讓買賣雙方隨時(shí)競(jìng)價(jià)的拍賣方式比起那些需要買賣雙方提出更多競(jìng)價(jià)的模式效率要低下。這些“進(jìn)化的拍賣方式”還承受住了大的市場(chǎng)震蕩，比如崩盤和恐慌，比真人拍賣表現(xiàn)出色?？死?qū)⒂?2月10日在澳大利亞悉尼演示他的最新研究成果，這些成果表明買賣雙方人數(shù)的輕微差異都會(huì)對(duì)的市場(chǎng)拍賣形式產(chǎn)生影響。
美洲銀行已經(jīng)開(kāi)始研究這些新型拍賣形式以及機(jī)器人交易員，看看是否可能在電子交易中使用。今天的金融拍賣和網(wǎng)上市場(chǎng)如果能更多地模仿它們的英國(guó)和荷蘭先祖生意也許就會(huì)更好。但這種多種類混合體該叫什么呢？ 叫“克利夫懸疑”如何？