China has revalued its currency, the yuan, and linked it to a basket of currencies—though it is not yet clear how far it will be allowed to rise. The move may ease trade tension with America, though China's slowing economy, which is boosting its trade surplus, may reignite the spat
中國(guó)調(diào)整了它的貨幣（元）的價(jià)格，并將其與一籃子貨幣進(jìn)行掛鉤，但人民幣升值能走多遠(yuǎn)目前尚不明晰。這樣的行為能緩解中美之間緊張的貿(mào)易關(guān)系，盡管中國(guó)減緩的經(jīng)濟(jì)與日益增長(zhǎng)的貿(mào)易順差，也許會(huì)重新點(diǎn)燃雙方的沖突。
SOONER or later, it was going to happen, and on Thursday July 21st it did. China abandoned the 11-year-old peg of its currency, the yuan, at 8.28 to the dollar. From now on, the yuan will be linked to a basket of currencies, the central parities of which will be set at the end of each day. And the currency has been revalued, although by nothing like as much as America and others have been demanding: the yuan's initial central rate against the dollar was shifted by just 2.1%, to 8.11.
遲早會(huì)發(fā)生的事情，在7月21日星期四這天來(lái)臨了。中國(guó)放棄了它實(shí)行11年的外匯制度——1美元兌8.28元人民幣。從此以后，人民幣將與一籃子貨幣進(jìn)行掛鉤，每個(gè)工作日閉市后公布人民幣匯率的收盤價(jià)。盡管不如美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家期望的那么高，但人民幣終于重估了：人民幣對(duì)美元中心匯率上升2.1%，調(diào)整為1美元兌8.11元人民幣。
So far, it is not clear exactly how the new system will operate. The Chinese called it a “managed floating exchange-rate regime”, which may well imply more management than floating. Neither the currencies in the basket used to set the level of the yuan, nor their weights, have been disclosed. The fact that the Chinese have acted at all is important. But the eventual economic and political effects of the revaluation will depend on how far and how fast the yuan moves from now on. In Friday's trading it barely budged—and in fact closed a fraction below 8.11 to the dollar, suggesting the authorities are keen to damp down market expectations of further rises.
新的系統(tǒng)將如何運(yùn)作目前尚不清楚。中方稱其為“有管理的浮動(dòng)匯率制度”，很好地暗示了管理大于浮動(dòng)。至于人民幣與之掛鉤的“一籃子貨幣”，既沒有公開幣種，也沒有披露它們?cè)谄渲械臋?quán)重。雖然如此，中國(guó)官方調(diào)整匯率動(dòng)作的本身就已經(jīng)十分重要，但最終的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)卻取決于人民幣匯率調(diào)整能走的多遠(yuǎn)，走的多快。在周五的交易市場(chǎng)上匯率幾乎未有變動(dòng)——事實(shí)上曾有跌破過(guò)8.11對(duì)1美元，暗示了官方的渴望：打壓市場(chǎng)對(duì)進(jìn)一步升值的預(yù)期。
Such a slight initial revaluation is unlikely to do much to slow China's fast-expanding economy. The day before the currency regime changed, the country's official statisticians said that GDP in the second quarter of 2005 was 9.5% higher than a year before—more than most pundits had forecast and only a shade less than the figure for the same period of 2004 (see chart below). Growth rates of industrial production, ahead by 16.8% in the year to June, and investment in fixed assets, up by 25.4% in the first half, year on year, have both eased from their levels at the end of 2003, but remain strong. Inflation, as measured by the consumer-price index, is mild. It slid to 1.6% last month, down from 5%-plus a year ago.
如此輕微的匯率重估未必能減緩中國(guó)快速增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)。就在匯率制度改變前一天，國(guó)家的官方統(tǒng)計(jì)人員稱2005年第二季度的GDP增長(zhǎng)率是9.5%，比多數(shù)專家預(yù)期的高，只比2004年同期略低一點(diǎn)。工業(yè)生產(chǎn)截至六月增長(zhǎng)率為16.8%，固定資產(chǎn)投資上半年同比增長(zhǎng)25.4%，都比2003年底的水平有所緩和，但仍保持強(qiáng)勁增勢(shì)。通貨膨脹（通過(guò)消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)衡量）上漲比較溫和，從一年前的超過(guò)5%跌落到上個(gè)月的1.6%。
In truth, the economy is slowing more markedly than these (highly suspect) official figures suggest. Many economists say that China has an institutionalised[制度化的] bias[偏愛] to over-reporting growth at the bottom of a cycle and under-reporting it at the top, to reduce the volatility[浮夸] of the numbers. Judged by physical indicators, such as electricity consumption[消費(fèi)] or freight[貨運(yùn)] volumes, GDP growth probably peaked at over 12% in 2003 and should slow to 8% by 2006. Since China's macroeconomic[宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)] growth is driven more by fixed investment[固定資產(chǎn)投資] than by household consumption[家庭消費(fèi)] (which dominates[占優(yōu)] in the West), it is especially vulnerable to any slowing of corporate investment or public spending on infrastructure[基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施].
“In investment cycles,” says Andy Xie, Asia economist at Morgan Stanley, “the leading indicators are profit margins[利率], product prices and property prices, which forecast corporate cash flow or ability to borrow.” These three indicators are slowing. For the past five years, Chinese industrial firms have enjoyed record[創(chuàng)記錄的] profit margins as revenue growth has outpaced[超過(guò)] the increase in wages and raw-material[原料] costs. In 2003 and 2004, industrial production and sales grew at an annual rate of nearly 30% in real terms, analysts estimate, but in 2005 the pace has slowed to around 15%. With commodity[日用品] prices high, companies' margins are being squeezed[擠壓]: overheated industries such as cars, steel, cement[水泥] and basic materials are suffering especially.
Property prices are also moderating[緩和] after a period of extraordinary growth, particularly in big cities. Shanghai house prices, up by half since 1998 and by almost 10% in the first quarter of this year, have fallen back by 10-20% since mid-April. Transaction volumes[交易量] in most urban centres have also dropped, because the government has imposed a property-sales tax and tightened mortgage[抵押] requirements.
Overall, however, China seems to be managing the soft landing that it wants. The authorities have acted earlier and more decisively[果斷地] than they did in the mid-1990s, curbing[抑制] growth before it gets out of hand. Policymakers have also been more sophisticated[圓滑], targeting selected sectors with administrative restrictions while shifting to market-based measures, including last October's increase in interest rates, to rein in[控制] money and credit growth. A dearer yuan—but much dearer, probably, than after this week's move—would give the economy another downward nudge[輕推].
In addition, the economy is looking better balanced: there are signs that consumer spending is doing more to support the economy, alongside fixed investment and exports. Rising incomes are boosting households' spending power, lifting retail sales by 13% in the first half of the year, compared with the same period of 2004. And the countryside is finally playing a part: after six years of lacklustre[無(wú)光澤地] growth, rural incomes rose by 12.5% in the first half.
That said, China's policymakers cannot afford to rest on their laurels[桂冠]. On the one hand, there is a risk that the economy will steam away again as spending for the Beijing Olympics in 2008 takes off. On the other, the vast amount of manufacturing capacity[制造能力] built up over the past few years means that a slightly sharper slowdown, perhaps triggered[被觸發(fā)] by lower growth in America, could tip the country back into deflation[通縮]. Already, a staggering[令人驚愕的] nine-tenths of manufactured goods in China are thought to be in oversupply[過(guò)度供給].
In the short term, the biggest worry is that China becomes a victim of its own international success. Until recently China has been a powerful engine driving the world economy. If it slows, existing[現(xiàn)有的] political and trade tensions[緊張] could still worsen. Thus an unfortunate side effect[副作用] of China's attempts to cool its domestic economy has been an exploding trade surplus[貿(mào)易順差], because import growth has softened while exports have remained robust[強(qiáng)健的]. In June, China's exports rose by 30.6%, year-on-year, while imports grew by just 15.1%, widening the monthly trade surplus to $9.7 billion. The cumulative[累計(jì)的] surplus for 2005 is now nearly $40 billion, more than for the whole of last year. This year's current-account surplus could reach 9% of GDP. “Just one year ago, China was the world's fastest-growing importer of heavy industrial products,” says Jonathan Anderson, chief Asia economist at UBS. “Today, the mainland is actually a growing net exporter, with shipments[出貨] of not only textiles but also steel, other metals and chemicals accelerating visibly.”
Slowing imports (of everything but commodities) are bad news for international companies, at a time when those doing business in China are already suffering from increased competition and oversupply. And mainland firms are becoming aggressive exporters of everything from textiles and steel to electronics and even cars. Ningbo Bird[波導(dǎo)], based in Zhejiang province, is flooding Asia with cheap mobile-phone handsets it cannot sell profitably at home.
Revaluing the yuan should make some of the tensions created by all this less acute[強(qiáng)烈]. American politicians, in particular, have been demanding a step in this direction—President George Bush's spokesman welcomed the move. However, some congressmen have been demanding a much bigger stride[步幅]. And investment is becoming as touchy[難處理的] an issue as trade has been. China is no longer using its huge stock of foreign-exchange reserves[外匯儲(chǔ)備]—over $700 billion—merely to buy American Treasury bonds[美國(guó)國(guó)債], but to snap up[搶購(gòu)] physical assets too. The $18.5 billion contested bid by CNOOC, a big Chinese oil company, for America's Unocal is causing an uproar[騷動(dòng)] in Washington, DC. China's currency move may dampen calls for trade protection and revaluation for a while. But if its domestic economy slows and thus becomes less supportive of global growth, such calls are likely to return soon.
中國(guó)調(diào)整了它的貨幣（元）的價(jià)格，并將其與一籃子貨幣進(jìn)行掛鉤，但人民幣升值能走多遠(yuǎn)目前尚不明晰。這樣的行為能緩解中美之間緊張的貿(mào)易關(guān)系，盡管中國(guó)減緩的經(jīng)濟(jì)與日益增長(zhǎng)的貿(mào)易順差，也許會(huì)重新點(diǎn)燃雙方的沖突。
SOONER or later, it was going to happen, and on Thursday July 21st it did. China abandoned the 11-year-old peg of its currency, the yuan, at 8.28 to the dollar. From now on, the yuan will be linked to a basket of currencies, the central parities of which will be set at the end of each day. And the currency has been revalued, although by nothing like as much as America and others have been demanding: the yuan's initial central rate against the dollar was shifted by just 2.1%, to 8.11.
遲早會(huì)發(fā)生的事情，在7月21日星期四這天來(lái)臨了。中國(guó)放棄了它實(shí)行11年的外匯制度——1美元兌8.28元人民幣。從此以后，人民幣將與一籃子貨幣進(jìn)行掛鉤，每個(gè)工作日閉市后公布人民幣匯率的收盤價(jià)。盡管不如美國(guó)和其他國(guó)家期望的那么高，但人民幣終于重估了：人民幣對(duì)美元中心匯率上升2.1%，調(diào)整為1美元兌8.11元人民幣。
So far, it is not clear exactly how the new system will operate. The Chinese called it a “managed floating exchange-rate regime”, which may well imply more management than floating. Neither the currencies in the basket used to set the level of the yuan, nor their weights, have been disclosed. The fact that the Chinese have acted at all is important. But the eventual economic and political effects of the revaluation will depend on how far and how fast the yuan moves from now on. In Friday's trading it barely budged—and in fact closed a fraction below 8.11 to the dollar, suggesting the authorities are keen to damp down market expectations of further rises.
新的系統(tǒng)將如何運(yùn)作目前尚不清楚。中方稱其為“有管理的浮動(dòng)匯率制度”，很好地暗示了管理大于浮動(dòng)。至于人民幣與之掛鉤的“一籃子貨幣”，既沒有公開幣種，也沒有披露它們?cè)谄渲械臋?quán)重。雖然如此，中國(guó)官方調(diào)整匯率動(dòng)作的本身就已經(jīng)十分重要，但最終的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)卻取決于人民幣匯率調(diào)整能走的多遠(yuǎn)，走的多快。在周五的交易市場(chǎng)上匯率幾乎未有變動(dòng)——事實(shí)上曾有跌破過(guò)8.11對(duì)1美元，暗示了官方的渴望：打壓市場(chǎng)對(duì)進(jìn)一步升值的預(yù)期。
Such a slight initial revaluation is unlikely to do much to slow China's fast-expanding economy. The day before the currency regime changed, the country's official statisticians said that GDP in the second quarter of 2005 was 9.5% higher than a year before—more than most pundits had forecast and only a shade less than the figure for the same period of 2004 (see chart below). Growth rates of industrial production, ahead by 16.8% in the year to June, and investment in fixed assets, up by 25.4% in the first half, year on year, have both eased from their levels at the end of 2003, but remain strong. Inflation, as measured by the consumer-price index, is mild. It slid to 1.6% last month, down from 5%-plus a year ago.
如此輕微的匯率重估未必能減緩中國(guó)快速增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)。就在匯率制度改變前一天，國(guó)家的官方統(tǒng)計(jì)人員稱2005年第二季度的GDP增長(zhǎng)率是9.5%，比多數(shù)專家預(yù)期的高，只比2004年同期略低一點(diǎn)。工業(yè)生產(chǎn)截至六月增長(zhǎng)率為16.8%，固定資產(chǎn)投資上半年同比增長(zhǎng)25.4%，都比2003年底的水平有所緩和，但仍保持強(qiáng)勁增勢(shì)。通貨膨脹（通過(guò)消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)衡量）上漲比較溫和，從一年前的超過(guò)5%跌落到上個(gè)月的1.6%。
In truth, the economy is slowing more markedly than these (highly suspect) official figures suggest. Many economists say that China has an institutionalised[制度化的] bias[偏愛] to over-reporting growth at the bottom of a cycle and under-reporting it at the top, to reduce the volatility[浮夸] of the numbers. Judged by physical indicators, such as electricity consumption[消費(fèi)] or freight[貨運(yùn)] volumes, GDP growth probably peaked at over 12% in 2003 and should slow to 8% by 2006. Since China's macroeconomic[宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)] growth is driven more by fixed investment[固定資產(chǎn)投資] than by household consumption[家庭消費(fèi)] (which dominates[占優(yōu)] in the West), it is especially vulnerable to any slowing of corporate investment or public spending on infrastructure[基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施].
“In investment cycles,” says Andy Xie, Asia economist at Morgan Stanley, “the leading indicators are profit margins[利率], product prices and property prices, which forecast corporate cash flow or ability to borrow.” These three indicators are slowing. For the past five years, Chinese industrial firms have enjoyed record[創(chuàng)記錄的] profit margins as revenue growth has outpaced[超過(guò)] the increase in wages and raw-material[原料] costs. In 2003 and 2004, industrial production and sales grew at an annual rate of nearly 30% in real terms, analysts estimate, but in 2005 the pace has slowed to around 15%. With commodity[日用品] prices high, companies' margins are being squeezed[擠壓]: overheated industries such as cars, steel, cement[水泥] and basic materials are suffering especially.
Property prices are also moderating[緩和] after a period of extraordinary growth, particularly in big cities. Shanghai house prices, up by half since 1998 and by almost 10% in the first quarter of this year, have fallen back by 10-20% since mid-April. Transaction volumes[交易量] in most urban centres have also dropped, because the government has imposed a property-sales tax and tightened mortgage[抵押] requirements.
Overall, however, China seems to be managing the soft landing that it wants. The authorities have acted earlier and more decisively[果斷地] than they did in the mid-1990s, curbing[抑制] growth before it gets out of hand. Policymakers have also been more sophisticated[圓滑], targeting selected sectors with administrative restrictions while shifting to market-based measures, including last October's increase in interest rates, to rein in[控制] money and credit growth. A dearer yuan—but much dearer, probably, than after this week's move—would give the economy another downward nudge[輕推].
In addition, the economy is looking better balanced: there are signs that consumer spending is doing more to support the economy, alongside fixed investment and exports. Rising incomes are boosting households' spending power, lifting retail sales by 13% in the first half of the year, compared with the same period of 2004. And the countryside is finally playing a part: after six years of lacklustre[無(wú)光澤地] growth, rural incomes rose by 12.5% in the first half.
That said, China's policymakers cannot afford to rest on their laurels[桂冠]. On the one hand, there is a risk that the economy will steam away again as spending for the Beijing Olympics in 2008 takes off. On the other, the vast amount of manufacturing capacity[制造能力] built up over the past few years means that a slightly sharper slowdown, perhaps triggered[被觸發(fā)] by lower growth in America, could tip the country back into deflation[通縮]. Already, a staggering[令人驚愕的] nine-tenths of manufactured goods in China are thought to be in oversupply[過(guò)度供給].
In the short term, the biggest worry is that China becomes a victim of its own international success. Until recently China has been a powerful engine driving the world economy. If it slows, existing[現(xiàn)有的] political and trade tensions[緊張] could still worsen. Thus an unfortunate side effect[副作用] of China's attempts to cool its domestic economy has been an exploding trade surplus[貿(mào)易順差], because import growth has softened while exports have remained robust[強(qiáng)健的]. In June, China's exports rose by 30.6%, year-on-year, while imports grew by just 15.1%, widening the monthly trade surplus to $9.7 billion. The cumulative[累計(jì)的] surplus for 2005 is now nearly $40 billion, more than for the whole of last year. This year's current-account surplus could reach 9% of GDP. “Just one year ago, China was the world's fastest-growing importer of heavy industrial products,” says Jonathan Anderson, chief Asia economist at UBS. “Today, the mainland is actually a growing net exporter, with shipments[出貨] of not only textiles but also steel, other metals and chemicals accelerating visibly.”
Slowing imports (of everything but commodities) are bad news for international companies, at a time when those doing business in China are already suffering from increased competition and oversupply. And mainland firms are becoming aggressive exporters of everything from textiles and steel to electronics and even cars. Ningbo Bird[波導(dǎo)], based in Zhejiang province, is flooding Asia with cheap mobile-phone handsets it cannot sell profitably at home.
Revaluing the yuan should make some of the tensions created by all this less acute[強(qiáng)烈]. American politicians, in particular, have been demanding a step in this direction—President George Bush's spokesman welcomed the move. However, some congressmen have been demanding a much bigger stride[步幅]. And investment is becoming as touchy[難處理的] an issue as trade has been. China is no longer using its huge stock of foreign-exchange reserves[外匯儲(chǔ)備]—over $700 billion—merely to buy American Treasury bonds[美國(guó)國(guó)債], but to snap up[搶購(gòu)] physical assets too. The $18.5 billion contested bid by CNOOC, a big Chinese oil company, for America's Unocal is causing an uproar[騷動(dòng)] in Washington, DC. China's currency move may dampen calls for trade protection and revaluation for a while. But if its domestic economy slows and thus becomes less supportive of global growth, such calls are likely to return soon.